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ESSAYS ON FINANCE AND BANKING
Torsten Jochem, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
A flurry of new regulation was passed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007. Much
remains however unknown about policies designed to prevent a repeat. In this dissertation
I investigate two such regulatory approaches in financial and banking markets. In Chapter
2 I present an analysis of a revision of proxy access rules as it was mandated by Congress
in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and subsequently implemented by the
SEC in August 2010. Proxy access – the right for shareholders to nominate directors to
a firm’s board – lies at the heart of shareholder control and the monitoring process of
management. I use the repeal of a new proxy access regime by the U.S. Court of Appeals
as a natural experiment to quantify the costs and benefits associated with proxy access.
The findings indicate that proxy access resulted in an increase of shareholder wealth for
firms with agency issues, smaller firms, and firms where more investors qualified to make
use of it. There are no valuation changes for large firms, firms without any agency is-
sues and firms with special-interest investors. The results indicate that the market valued
the empowerment of shareholders positively and calls for renewed regulatory attention to
proxy access. Chapter 3 analyzes the effects from portfolio diversification and banking
competition on the stability of U.S. banks during the 2008-2011 banking crisis in which
more than 10% of U.S. banks ceased to exist. To do so, the analysis makes use of exoge-
nous cross-sectional and time-series variation in states’ branching restrictions, the degree
iv
of county business cycle integration, and topographic variation due to oceans and interna-
tional borders that limited the potential to diversify. I find that both banking competition
and portfolio diversification significantly reduced the failure probability of banks thereby
providing a policy rationale to reduce the financial fragmentation of U.S. banking markets,
to promote banking competition and an overall greater degree of diversification.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007
Few signals pointed in spring 2007 to the panic and forthcoming massive losses in U.S.
financial markets and the decline in the real economy that would start to engulf the U.S.
economy just months later. In April 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at an
all-time high of 12,382 points while the composite market capitalization of publicly listed
U.S. banks reached in February 2007 an all-time record of $1.7 trillion. At the same time,
U.S. unemployment at 4.4% was at its lowest since 1970. It would be hard to imagine a
worse and faster deterioration than what would occur over the following two years. By
March 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had lost more than half of its prior valua-
tion and U.S. unemployment was still on the rise, reaching in October 2009 10% – just shy
of its 1982 post-World War II record. With real estate and shareholder wealth down, total
household net worth had shrunk by an unprecedented $16 trillion. It is hard to fathom
what human tragedy lies behind those numbers.
Meanwhile, the U.S. banking sector went through one of its largest reorganization in
modern history. By March 2009, the composite market capitalization of publicly listed
U.S. banks had fallen by a staggering 75% to just $426 billion. Between 2008 and 2011,
10.6% of all U.S. banks had ceased to exist, half of which had been closed by the FDIC.
The 427 failed banks between 2008 and 2011 alone rival the 575 bank failures in almost
50 years between the Great Depression (1934) and the Savings and Loan Crisis (1981).
A major factor that eventually led to the stabilization of the U.S. banking sector was a
1
federal recapitalization program for struggling banks in 2009. By December 31, 2009, the
U.S. Government had injected a total of $200 billion as part of TARP’s Capital Purchase
Program (CPP) into 742 banks. In over 90% of those injections, the government received
preferred stocks, thus effectively nationalizing part the U.S. banking sector. By June 2012,
341 institutions had repaid TARP funds, while another 401 banks were still partly owned
by the government. Nonetheless, in another sign of continued bank distress, 921 U.S. banks
with combined assets of $349 billion remained on the FDIC’s (unofficial) list of “problem
banks” as of July 2012.
Even though that these are striking numbers, banking crises and the accompanying
massive wealth destruction are by no means a rare phenomenon. While Laeven and Va-
lencia (2012) put the estimated output loss for the U.S. between 2007 and 2011 at 31%
of GDP, the authors identify an additional 146 banking crisis episodes around the world
between 1970 and 2011, 49 of which generated losses exceeding those of the recent crisis in
the United States (see figure (1.1)). Consequently, research on the causes, policy responses
and on the design of efficient regulation which strengthen the resilience of financial and
banking systems remain relevant and essential for continuing economic progress.
2
Figure 1.1: Banking Crises Worldwide, 1970-2011
Banking crises before 2007 were mostly the disease of developing nations and have often
been linked to weak institutions. The most recent crisis however forcefully illustrates that
advanced economies with strong institutions are also not immune from financial distress.
With its sudden onset and vast consequences, the U.S. financial crisis provides an abrupt
economic shock that will provide researchers for years to come with the opportunity to
learn from it. This dissertation is one such contribution within a much broader research
agenda by scientists across many disciplines that makes use of the shock so to analyze
how regulatory institutions can be strengthened so to avoid (or at least mitigate) future
financial crises.
To this end, Chapter (2) analyzes the effects of a shareholder empowerment provision
3
as it was prescribed by U.S. Congress in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.
As part of financial reform, Congress mandated the Securities and Exchange Commission
to facilitate director candidate nominations by shareholders. This was to be achieved by
granting shareholders access to the firm’s voting ballot for director elections (the proxy) and
was in turn expected to strengthen the monitoring link over management, thus providing a
barrier against excessive managerial risk-taking and overconfidence. By empowering share-
holders – so Congress argued – regulators could harness the desire of shareholders to avoid
firm losses and bankruptcy, particularly among large publicly listed financial institutions.
Given the efficiency and liquidity of U.S. financial markets, the analysis investigates the
market response to specifically designed portfolios so to estimate what investors thought
about the potential benefits and costs from shareholder empowerment via proxy access.
A lot of exciting recent work on bank stability has focuses on the propagation of shocks
via interbank and securities markets. An important observation that is often overlooked
however is that the great majority of U.S. bank failures occurred in 2010 and thereafter
– months and sometimes years after the financial panic that reached its peak in March
2009 (see figure (3.1)). Chapter (3) therefore investigates how local economic conditions
affected bank failures and analyzes the degree to which geographic portfolio diversification
and the exposure to banking competition prior to the financial crisis impacted bank sur-
vival. The analysis makes use of two exceptional features of the U.S. banking environment.
First, the unique extent of banking and local economic business cycle data that is made
available by U.S. regulators which allows for the construction of a novel measure of bank
portfolio risk. Second, an equally unique institutional setup that provides rich exogenous
cross-sectional and time-series variation in the degree of banking competition across U.S.
states. The analysis finds that the degree of portfolio risk/diversification that a bank in-
curs via its branch network is a significant and important source of bank stability. While
greater banking competition prior to the crisis also increased bank survival (a finding that
4
is in line with the efficient structure hypothesis), the effect from portfolio diversification is
2-3 times larger and remains significant across a series of robustness checks. The finding
thereby calls for renewed regulatory attention to the extent of financial fragmentation in
U.S. banking markets that is sustained by costly state-level branching restrictions.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter (2), titled “Does
Proxy Access Increase Shareholder Wealth? Evidence from a Natural Experiment”, dis-
cusses shareholder empowerment via greater proxy access and presents an analysis of the
market’s perspective on its expected benefits and cost. Chapter (3), titled “Geographic Di-
versification, Competition and Bank Survival”, follows up by investigating the effect from
geographic portfolio diversification and banking competition on bank stability. Chapter
(4) concludes.
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2.0 DOES PROXY ACCESS INCREASE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH?
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Financial systems have long been regarded crucial engines of economic growth (Bagehot,
1873; Hicks, 1963; Schumpeter, 1912; King and Levin, 1993; Levin and Zervos, 1998; Rajan
and Zingales, 1998). Recent cross-country empirical work points in particular towards the
importance of legal institutions that define the separation of ownership and management
in public firms as a determinant of capital formation and economic growth. La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998) for example find that across countries, stronger minority shareholder rights
correlate with a greater ownership dispersion and greater market capitalization, which is
positively correlated with economic growth. This in turn provides a public policy rationale
for improving shareholder rights. Cross-country studies may however suffer from endo-
geneity issues. Evidence from a within-country setting – and optimally from a natural
experiment – would therefore be preferable but is hard to come by as it requires an exoge-
nous source of variation in shareholder rights across public firms in the same jurisdiction.
This paper uses such an exogenous shock to shareholder rights in the U.S. financial market,
namely the surprising repeal of a securities law by a U.S. Court of Appeals to determine the
extent to which shareholder rights impact shareholder wealth, and thus firm profitability.
Central to shareholder rights are the procedures by which shareholders can nominate
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and elect directors to the board which, in turn, oversees the firm’s management. Allow-
ing investors to nominate their own candidates to the board of directors – so-called proxy
access – has however been a contentious topic for many years in the United States. Di-
rector candidates are required to be included in the proxy filing that is sent out ahead of
the annual meeting to all shareholders. Access to the company’s proxy statement so that
shareholders can nominate their own candidates is thereby a principle avenue to influence
a firm’s management and to keep it accountable. Proxy access thus lies at the heart of
shareholder control and has far-reaching consequences in the balance of power between
shareholders and management. Recognizing the importance of the rules that govern proxy
access for overall shareholder rights, this paper analyzes the market reaction to the repeal
of a proxy access reform that was initiated by the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (henceforth, Dodd-Frank Act) in July 2010, implemented by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2010, and vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in July 2011.
The analysis finds that the repeal of proxy access reform resulted in a decline of firm val-
uation for firms with potential agency issues, for smaller firms in which investors could have
made greater use of enhanced proxy access, and for firms in which more investors qualified
to make immediate use of greater proxy access. Further, the results indicate that proxy
access had rather weak effects: we observe no valuation changes for large firms, firms with
no or only few specific anti-takeover provisions, firms without any investors surpassing the
prescribed threshold to use proxy access and for overall U.S. shareholder wealth. A major
concern by corporations has been that greater proxy access may empower special-interest
investors (pension and union funds), thereby allowing them to push through politically
motivated, value-destroying policies that are not aligned with the interests of other share-
holders. We do not find any evidence to support such concerns. We conclude that proxy
access had very weak effects and affected only very few firms with extreme ownership or
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extreme corporate governance situations. In the few cases where proxy access reform was
strong enough to affect firm valuations, the market valued proxy access reform positively,
leading to an increase in shareholder wealth.
The chapter makes three major contributions:
1. This is the first paper to use a natural experiment to estimate the overall shareholder
wealth effect of proxy access. The sharp discontinuity on the day of the court repeal
combined with the fact that the repeal ended proxy access for the foreseeable future
allows us to identify precise valuation effects. A precise estimate matters as shareholder
empowerment via proxy access may not only provide benefits (when for example agency
conflicts are present), but may also result into significant proxy contest costs as well as
management and board disruption in all those firms without any agency conflicts. As
a result, overall U.S. shareholder wealth may well decline despite the regulation’s good
intentions of empowering shareholders.
2. The aggregate U.S. shareholder wealth effect may still mask significantly different
wealth effects within the cross-section (e.g., significant wealth increases for firms with
agency issues may in the aggregate mask wealth decreases in firms with special-interest
investors). We therefore analyze in depth the cross-sections of potentially affected firms.
Specifically – following earlier cost-benefit arguments of supporters and critics – we in-
vestigate for the first time the wealth effects on firm portfolios with potential agency
issues and the wealth effects for small firms which are ill-equipped to incur large contest
costs. We also analyze whether the market agreed that the empowerment of special-
interest investors (unions and pension funds) may lead to wealth destruction. This is
the first paper to use direct ownership information of such investors and of potential
coalitions thereof and which disentangles investment holdings that qualify from those
that do not qualify for proxy access. These estimates quantify the benefits and costs
that supporters and critics have argued over in the past and may be informative for
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any future regulatory attempts to provide investors with greater proxy access.
3. Finally, we analyze firm valuation changes for several corporate governance provisions
that have been previously linked to agency conflicts. If, for example, a staggered board
or a poison pill was indeed entrenching the management and destroying shareholder
wealth, then shareholder empowerment should have increased the likelihood that such
provisions would be dropped. The repeal of greater proxy access thus should have been
met with a decline in firm valuations where such agency-linked corporate provisions
are in place. The court repeal thus allows us to learn the market’s view on specific
governance provisions from setting of a natural experiment and in a moment when
shareholder rights abruptly changed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section (2.2) provides some
background information on proxy access regulation, its reform and subsequent repeal. Sec-
tion (2.3) discusses two competing theories that portray proxy access as either beneficial
or detrimental to overall shareholder wealth and derives hypotheses. Section (2.3) also
provides a review of previous literature on the topic. Section (2.4) then introduces the
methodology and data sources used in the rule’s analysis while section (2.5) presents the
results. Section (2.6) concludes.
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF PROXY ACCESS (REFORM)
The dispute around the optimal legal arrangements of proxy access have been long and
contentious. Institutional and activist investors have been lobbying hard for easier proxy
access for many years while businesses have vigorously opposed any change, warning about
the costs such a move might entail. Fisch (2011) discusses proxy access reviews reforms by
the SEC as early as 1942 and 1977. A renewed regulatory push to reform occurred in the
early 2000s and was again abandoned in 2003. The momentum for a far-reaching reform
9
only resurfaced in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 as boards were blamed for
having failed to effectively monitor management as they engaged in excessive risk-taking.
As a result, on July 21, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act that included an au-
thorization to the SEC to rewrite the existing proxy regime.
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Proxy Access Reform and its Repeal
With several earlier attempts to reform proxy access and a revised and commented-
upon reform proposal from June 2009, the SEC was prepared to act fast: on August 25,
2010 the SEC adopted a modified version of SEC Rule 14a-11 which regulates proxy ac-
cess (SEC, 2010). Summarized, the new proxy access rules allowed access to a company’s
proxy and the right to nominate up to 25% of the seats on the board if a shareholder –
or coalition of shareholders – owned a combined 3% stake in the corporation for at least
3 years (henceforth, the 3%-3 year rule/threshold). The new regulation was set to go into
effect for all publicly listed firms in the U.S. with a market capitalization above $75 million
on November 15, 2010. (Firms below $75 million were excluded until November 15, 2013.)
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On August 29, 2010, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable filed
a legal challenge with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals against the SEC’s proxy access
reform arguing that the new regulation violated the First Amendment by forcing public
companies to carry campaign speech of third party outsiders, satisfied the legal description
of “arbitrary and capricious” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
overstepped the SEC’s mandate by entering the realm of state law. With a pending court
review, the SEC stayed the modified Rule 14a-11’s effectiveness on October 4, 2010. While
most observers argued that the petition was unlikely to overturn proxy access, the Court
surprisingly vacated Rule 14a-11 on July 22, 2011 for violating the APA, arguing that “the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed [to] adequately assess the
economic effects of a new rule” (D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 2011a: 7). In section 3,
we argue that this court ruling provides the setting for a natural experiment that allows
for the very analysis of the costs and benefits that the Court requested in its ruling.
2.3 COMPETING THEORIES ABOUT GREATER PROXY ACCESS
Relaxing the rules by which investors can add their own board candidates to the slate of
nominees has consistently faced vigorous and “nearly unanimous opposition” by corporate
America (SEC, 2004: II). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce for example calls proxy access
“extremely significant ... [with an] enormous impact” and has vowed that killing any po-
tential reform will remain among its top 5 priorities (Scannell, 2010). Corporate law firm
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz credits proxy access reform with the potential to “wreak
havoc with American business” and refers to it as “dangerously unwise and unnecessary”.
Proponents of greater proxy access claim that any reform would be “highly beneficial to
investors”, “new and powerful”, “historic”, “ground-breaking” and “long overdue”. One
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observer refers to proxy access as “the biggest change relating to corporate governance
ever proposed by the SEC.”1 Proponents of greater proxy access such as the Council of
Institutional Investors (representing $3 trillion in assets under management) argue that the
reform is necessary so to “effectively end the board of directors’ monopoly over the director
nomination process” and to “invigorate board elections, [to] make boards more responsive
to shareholders and more vigilant in their oversight.” (CII, 2011: 1). Supporters further
point to academic research that credits shareholder activism with firm valuation increases
(e.g., Brav et al., 2007; Klein and Zur, 2011); despite the potential of activism, only very
few proxy contests however occur annually, arguably due to the hefty price tag that a proxy
contest typically carries.
2.3.1 The Entrenchment Perspective
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show that the market is well aware of the agency problem
that arises when the CEO is part of the board that ought to supervise the management. For
a sample between 1994-1996, the authors show that stock price reactions to the announce-
ment of a board nomination are significantly lower if a CEO is involved in the nomination
process. This is in line with their finding that board nominees are more often insiders
(i.e., subordinates of the CEO) or outside directors with conflicts of interests (“gray direc-
tors”) when the CEO himself is involved in the nomination process. Several other studies
have further documented a significant correlation between a firm’s market valuation and
its corporate governance level: Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen
and Ferrell (2005, 2009) construct corporate governance indices (henceforth, GIM-Index
and E-Index) based on the number of anti-takeover provisions in corporate bylaws. Anti-
takeover provisions (ATP) empower the management and board relative to investors so
to reduce the likelihood of hostile takeovers but can also lead to agency issues and man-
1Quotes from Bebchuk (2007), Kahan and Rock (2010), Schuster (2010), and CII (2010).
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agerial entrenchment. The two corporate governance indices have resulted in numerous
follow-up studies on agency issues. While such studies may suffer from endogeneity, and
disagreement persists as to the direction of causality between firm value and anti-takeover
provisions (see, e.g., Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2005) both indices have become staples in
financial studies.
Bebchuk (2007) points out that there were only 24 contested elections among publicly
listed firms with a market capitalization of more than $200 million between 1996 and 2005
where shareholders put a rival slate to the current board’s nomination. In only eight of
those cases the rival actually succeeded over the current board’s nominee. Similarly, Cai
et al. (2009) find only 4 contested elections among 2,488 Russell 1000 board elections be-
tween 2003-2005. Further, an analysis of about 166,000 director-years of S&P 1500 boards
between 1996-2006 shows that a re-nomination is 3-4 times more likely for a director that
serves on the nomination committee than for a director that is not on the committee.
Moreover, once a director joins the nomination committee, the likelihood to rejoin the
nomination committee the following year is 6 times higher than for a non-committee direc-
tor.2 While those statistics cannot serve as evidence of agency issues, they suggest prima
facie that agency issues may exist in some companies.
Among the major problems of activist shareholders is that boards do not have to in-
clude any shareholder nominations into the company’s proxy statement. As a result, if a
shareholder seeks to nominate a board member that is not supported by the current board,
he has two options: first, to ask the board to voluntarily include the candidate3, or second,
to engage in a proxy contest by sending out his own proxy statement to all shareholders. A
proxy contest can however become prohibitively expensive: Bebchuk (2007) estimates the
2Results based on data from RiskMetrics Governance and Directors database.
3Boards only rarely do so voluntarily: only 5 out of 4,000 firms tracked by data service FactSet Shark-
Watch allow proxy access as of 2010 (McDonnell, 2005; WSJ, 2010).
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average proxy contest costs between 2003 and 2005 at $368,000. In one prominent example,
Red Zone LLC versus Six Flags, the activist investor incurred $3,950,000 in proxy contest
costs. While the activist incurs significant costs, incumbents and nominees supported by
the board can use corporate funds to counter activists’ nominations. Facing those institu-
tional obstacles, many investors choose to follow the “Wall Street Rule”: sell a stock rather
than try to change the company’s policies.
Despite those limited options, prior research has identified real costs associated with po-
tential agency issues: Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirers with boards that have more
anti-takeover provisions experience significantly lower abnormal announcement returns.
Thus, managerial entrenchment may lead to greater value-destruction during mergers and
acquisitions due to a lower disciplinary power by shareholders and the market for corporate
control. Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) confirm this finding by showing that poorly
governed firms dissipate cash through acquisitions. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) an-
alyze the effect of governance on the value of cash holdings and find a significantly lower
valuation of excess cash for firms with worse governance. The authors explain this finding
by showing that firms with worse governance choose less profitable investments, thereby
destroying firm value. Denis et. al (1997) find evidence that the level of firm diversification
is negatively related to managers’ equity ownership and that a decrease of diversification
is associated with external control threats. These findings suggest that agency issues may
be responsible for value-reducing diversification strategies. Other authors such as DeAn-
gelo and Rice (1983), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), and Cremers and Nair (2005)
also find that that anti-takeover provisions may shelter management from the discipline
and scrutiny of the market for corporate control. In a study of board elections, Cai et al.
(2009) confirm that even in severely underperforming firms, board directors still receive
well above 90% of votes. Thus, agency issues can result in real costs to shareholders with
few direct consequences to directors. Very few annual proxy contests, almost no company
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providing proxy access voluntarily and a hefty price tag for starting a proxy initiative has
convinced proponents of proxy access of recurring managerial and board entrenchment.
Greater proxy access in turn is seen as a way to mitigate such agency issues and to allow
owners to take back control in firms with unresponsive management. As agency issues have
been shown to be costly, greater proxy access is thereby expected to increase firm value.
Contrary to the above expectation, corporate governance regulation may however not
matter at all. First, product market competition may force firms to minimize costs; hence,
to secure external capital at the lowest possible price, corporations have an intrinsic moti-
vation to comply with the demands of shareholders. Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) pro-
vide general economic frameworks for such an evolutionary approach. More firm-specific,
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Fama and Jensen (1983) provide theoretic frameworks in
which the contractual relationship between managers and owners are the endogenous out-
come to the risk-bearing and monitoring possibility of the contractual environment; thus,
any observed outcome in the market is already optimized given its specific environment.
Second, the Coase Theorem (1960) suggests that (assuming no transaction costs) bargain-
ing between management and shareholders may lead to an efficient outcome: specifically,
providing management with equity allows to “trade away” the negative externality that
arises from the separation of ownership and control. Thus, with sufficient managerial in-
centivization through equity compensation, any agency issues disappear and management’s
incentives are perfectly aligned with those of shareholders. Third, Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
argue that the structure of corporate ownership is endogenously and efficiently chosen by
owners (rather than managers), thus challenging the classic narrative by Berle and Means
(1932) of an increasing separation of ownership and control due to ever greater dispersion
of ownership. All three accounts suggest that corporate governance legislation is unneces-
sary and that observed outcomes are already optimized given the contractual environment
so that firms and managers by themselves will choose to engage in the value-maximizing
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behavior.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: As agency issues are costly, greater monitoring and disci-
plining power of shareholders leads to an increase in firm
value.
Alternative H1A: Corporate governance levels are endogenous and firms are
already at their optimal level; thus proxy access does not
impact firm value.
2.3.2 The Board Disruption Perspective
Critics of proxy access argue that the governance situation is not as dire: in a trend that has
recently picked up, ever more companies are adjusting their bylaws from plurality voting
towards majority voting. Under the new voting regime, uncontested director nominees only
get elected if they receive at least 50% of the casted votes. This trend has been accompanied
by a rise of “just vote no” campaigns, in which disgruntled investors lobby other share-
holders to withhold their votes during board elections. Recent empirical evidence shows
that this low-cost type of activism succeeds in forcing boards to take action, specifically by
improving operating performance and increasing abnormal disciplinary CEO turnover (Del
Guercio et al., 2008). Further, an increasing number of boards have chosen to destagger in
recent years, exposing themselves to a greater risk of being removed from office.4 Ganor
(2008) for example shows that the likelihood of dismantling a staggered board increases
with shareholder pressure, indicating that directors are responsive to shareholder wishes.
In addition, there are frequent behind-the-scene talks between the management/board and
major investors who use, for example, the threat of exiting the stock to influence corporate
4In staggered boards, director are split into classes, each serving a term as long as the number of classes.
Destaggering the board implies that all directors have to stand annual elections at the shareholder meeting.
16
decisions (Bharath et al., 2010; Gallagher et al., 2011). Besides unobserved investor influ-
ence, behind-the-scene concessions may also result in settling some looming proxy fights
before they ever become public, thus downward biasing statistics about the actual number
of proxy contests that would have occurred if management and boards were truly unre-
sponsive.
Yet, even if proxy access rules were relaxed and boards became indeed more responsive
to shareholder wishes, it is unclear whether this would in fact lead to increased firm valu-
ations. In its petition to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce writes:
“The appropriateness of a proxy access rule has been under discussion by the
Commission on and off for decades. [..] Few issues in corporate governance
have generated more disagreement or stronger passions, in part because of
the serious disruptions that issuers of securities and others have long feared
would result. Those disruptions include the threat of an access candidate
being used as leverage to achieve other, special interest objectives of the
nominating shareholder(s); the distraction of directors and officers from other
responsibilities and the direct costs to shareholders of an election contest;
and disruption in the operation of the board itself if an access nominee is
elected.” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010)
An increase in a board’s responsiveness to its shareholders may thus decrease share-
holder wealth as firms could face board disruptions and contest costs. As most firms do
not have agency issues but would be exposed to such costs overall U.S. shareholder wealth
could also decline. On the other hand, earlier literature credits greater shareholder ac-
tivism with valuation increases rather than decreases (e.g., Brav et al., 2007; Klein and
Zur, 2011), and thus all firms should benefit (or at least not be hurt) by proxy access. This
provides us with the second hypothesis:
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Hypothesis H2: Most boards and management do not have any agency issues
but proxy access (and its costs) will apply to all firms. This
will lead to a decline of overall U.S. shareholder wealth.
Alternative H2A: Greater proxy access reduces the costs of shareholder ac-
tivism which is shown to increase value. Hence, there is an
increase (or, assuming no agency issues at the average firm,
at least no change) in overall U.S. shareholder wealth.
In its petition to the Court, the Chamber of Commerce further estimated proxy contest
costs in the range between $4 million to $14 million for large companies and $800,000 to $3
million for small issuers. While the SEC maintained that shareholder activism is beneficial
and many boards would choose to not fight shareholder nominees (thus avoiding a large
part of such price tags), the Chamber upheld that a board might indeed be bound by its
fiduciary duty to fight a nominee if it considered the candidate unfit. Extensive proxy
contest costs in turn could significantly depress earnings, particularly from smaller issuers.
This leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis H3: Small firms will be particularly hit by proxy access as (a)
it is easiest to cross the 3%-3 year threshold in small firms
and (b) board disruption and proxy contest costs are larger
relative to profits.
Alternative H3A: Shareholder activism is beneficial independent from firm
size; thus it should also be valuable to small firms.
One reason that we expect small firms to be more affected by proxy access is because
it is easier for activist shareholders to accumulate and hold 3% of the outstanding shares.
For an alternative (and more direct) way of measuring the likelihood of being affected we
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can also turn towards the current ownership structure. As the court repeal came as a
surprise to the market (as further discussed in (2.4.1)), we expect to see a larger shock to
firm valuations whenever there was a larger number of investors qualifying (individually or
as a coalition) to make immediate use of proxy access. In other words, if the market saw
a benefit from greater proxy access, we would expect to see a larger firm valuation decline
upon the court repeal for those firms which had already investors (or coalitions thereof)
qualifying. On the other hand, firms without any qualifying investors (or coalitions) would
remain unaffected for at least 3 more years until an investor had held a newly accumulated
≥3% share for the required 3-year period.
This provides us with the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis H4: The more investors (or coalitions thereof) qualify for proxy
access in a firm’s investor base, the greater is the firm’s
valuation decline.
Alternative H4A: Proxy access creates value in firms with agency issues; thus,
we will not observe any valuation declines as the number of
qualifying investors (or coalitions thereof) increases.
Finally, a prominent argument holds that proxy access empowers special-interest in-
vestors (such as union and pension funds) and enables them to push through political or
personal goals. Romano (1993: 799-820) recounts several instances in which public pension
officials faced political pressure to finance state-related investments, limit investments to
firms with prevailing wages or other work benefits, or to inject capital into distressed local
companies to avoid local job losses. Further, officials in public pension funds may be moti-
vated by private benefits such as seeking publicity so to run for public office or to advance
a private consulting career. Such conflict of interests would be at odds with the profit-
maximization interest of general shareholders. Romano’s anecdotal evidence is supported
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by systematic empirical evidence: Woidtke (2002) for example analyzes firm value by the
degree of ownership level of public and private pension funds and finds that Tobin’s Q is
negatively related to the ownership level of activist public pension funds. This supports the
notion that investors perceive the influence of public pension funds to be value-destroying.
Del Guercio and Woidtke (2011) find that directors who comply with requests by unions
and pensions funds suffer reputational damage in the labor market for directors; assuming
efficient director labor markets, this implies that union and pension fund interests are not
aligned with those of other shareholders.
An analysis of shareholder proposals confirms that just a few special-interest investors
make up a large share of activism (as measured by shareholder proposals): between 1996
and 2010, unions and pension funds filed 2,150 (or 40.7%) out of 5,289 shareholder propos-
als recorded in annual reports by Georgeson. Data on 2,750 shareholder proposals collected
between 2006 and 2012 by Proxy Monitor – an alternative data source – classifies 625 pro-
posals (22.7%) as filed by public pension funds or labor union. While this is a significantly
lower estimate, also in this data set just 20 special-interest investors account for 554 (or
20.1%) of all proposals.
Despite the activism and the potential for misaligned incentives by union and pen-
sion funds, it is however not clear whether proxy access indeed empowers special-interest
investors sufficiently to push through politically motivated agendas. First, it is unclear
whether unions and pension funds hold sufficiently large stakes to cross the 3%-3 year
threshold that allows access to the proxy. Fisch (2011: 27), for example, argues: “Public
pension funds, union pension funds, foundations and the like virtually never hold as much
as 3% of a company – holdings of even 1% are comparatively rare, because such concen-
trated holdings increase the risk of the institution’s portfolio.” Second, even if a union or
pension fund crossed the 3%-3 year threshold and was allowed to nominate its own director
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candidate, it would still need to convince a majority of the remaining shareholders that its
candidate was superior to the one of the current management. If shareholders suspected
a public pension fund or union fund to have a politically-oriented agenda (e.g., due to
previous such episodes in other companies), they may deny their support. This leads to
the fifth and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis H5: Empowering special-interest investors (unions, pension
funds) will allow them to push through political rather than
profit-maximizing goals; this hurts firm profits and leads to
lower firm valuations.
Alternative H5A: Special-interest investors rarely hold sufficiently large and
long-term stakes to make use of proxy access. Even if they
do, proxy access does not provide sufficient empowerment
to push through value-destroying policies.
2.3.3 Board Trends 1995-2011
A key disagreement between proponents and critics of the reform is about the number of
unobserved proxy fights and whether boards have become more responsiveness to share-
holders. Specifically, critics of proxy access argue that recent trends toward destaggering
boards, majority voting and a greater willingness of management and board to accommo-
date shareholder concerns are signs of a growing board flexibility that renders greater proxy
access obsolete. To quantify those arguments, Table (2.1) shows the development of three
trends: (1) the number of annual proxy contests, (2) several voting-related governance
measures, and (3) the change in composition of board members.
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Table 2.1: Board Trends, 1995-2011
PROXY CONTESTS GOVERNANCE DIRECTOR CLASSIFICATIONS
Intent of Proxy Staggered Boards Cumul. Major. Insiders Linked Independent Dual Role
Contest filed Contests EDGAR S&P 1500 Voting Voting Pct. Tenure Pct. Tenure Pct. Tenure (CEO &
Year (PREC14A) (DEFC14A) universe (%) (avg.yrs) (%) (avg.yrs) (%) (avg. yrs) Chairman)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1995 44 32 29% 60% 14% - - - - - - - -
1996 85 58 28% - - - 21% - 22% - 57% - 67%
1997 112 81 31% - - - 22% - 21% - 57% - 69%
1998 108 81 33% 58% 12% - 22% 9.9 22% 10.5 56% 7.5 84%
1999 123 87 34% - - - 21% 9.7 22% 10.4 56% 7.4 82%
2000 130 114 34% 58% 10% - 21% 9.6 22% 10.1 57% 7.2 82%
2001 115 85 34% - - - 21% 11.8 21% 10.1 58% 8.4 80%
2002 104 82 34% 59% 9% - 19% 10.0 19% 11.5 62% 7.4 82%
2003 135 84 33% - - - 18% 10.3 18% 11.7 64% 7.4 80%
2004 79 63 33% 60% 9% - 17% 14.7 18% 14.4 65% 8.6 78%
2005 90 60 32% - - - 16% 10.9 18% 12.5 66% 7.4 75%
2006 99 69 32% 57% 8% - 16% 10.8 18% 12.0 67% 7.4 69%
2007 125 86 35% 55% 8% - 16% 10.7 14% 13.5 71% 7.5 53%
2008 130 112 33% 54% 8% 25% 15% 12.0 14% 13.8 71% 7.9 64%
2009 136 98 35% 52% 8% 32% 15% 11.1 14% 13.9 71% 7.8 63%
2010 98 76 35% 50% 7% 35% 15% 11.4 13% 14.3 72% 8.0 62%
2011∗ 57 28 35% - - - - - - - - - -
Data sources: Columns (1)-(2) show the number of public firms that had at least one PREC14A/DEFC14A filed with the SEC in a given year. The filings were directly
obtained from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Column (3) shows the percentage of all public firms with staggered boards, where a firm’s board is classified as staggered
when its annual proxy filing (DEF14A) filed with the SEC mentions classified directors keywords: (“Class I director”, “Class II director”, ... with Roman or Arabic-based
numbers). Columns (4)-(13) are based on RiskMetrics’s directors and governance database that covers S&P 1500 firms. ∗2011 data is based on Q1 and Q2 filings only.
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As soon as an investor considers initiating a proxy contest, the investor is required to
file a preliminary proxy statement (PREC14A) with the SEC followed by a definite proxy
contest statement (DEFC14A) if the proxy contest advances. Columns 1 and 2 show the
number of firms that were targets to preliminary and definite proxy contest filings.5 The
number of actual plus threatened proxy contests has remained mostly stable over the past
18 years with an average of about 100 per year and peaks during times of economic down-
turns. About one third of initiated contests (PREC14A) never occur and seem to have
been either settled or abandoned. Despite a decade of overall rising shareholder activism,
there seems to be no clear time trend towards a greater investor assertion via proxy con-
tests. The observation is consistent with two explanations: first, as the proponents of the
entrenchment perspective would argue, it is a sign of prohibitive costs to proxy activism.
Alternatively, it may suggest overall little discontent among investors regarding the respon-
siveness of directors towards shareholders’ demands.
Columns 3 and 4 show the percentage of firms with staggered boards in which only
a fraction of the board is elected each year. While column 3 shows the percentage of
all public firms with staggered boards, column 4 shows the share of firms with staggered
boards among the more prominent S&P 1500. While there is no obvious trend towards
destaggering in the universe of public firms, 10% of S&P 1500 firms destaggered between
2004 and 2010. Columns 5 and 6 provide data on changes in board voting procedures:
at the same time as cumulative voting has been largely abandoned by firms (from 14% in
1995 down to 7% in 2010), the less powerful majority voting has picked up. As of 2010,
over one-third of the S&P 1500 firms have introduced majority voting.
Columns 7-13 shed light on trends in board composition: columns 7, 9 and 11 pro-
5The same methodology is used by Fos (2011). Note that while this method identifies actual as well as
threatened (and later settled or abandoned) contests, it still does not capture all of the behind-the-scene
interaction between investors and management where an implicit threat of a proxy contest might have led
to management concessions.
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vide the percentage of inside directors (employees), linked directors (e.g., relatives, past
employees, interlocked) and independent/outside directors in the average board per year.
This is supplemented by the average tenure of directors on firms’ boards in columns 8,
10 and 12. Several trends can be detected: first, the percentage of independent directors
has strongly increased relative to linked and inside directors (not least due to new list-
ing requirements by stock exchanges and new regulation such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act). Simultaneously, the average tenure of insiders and linked directors has increased
considerably: on average, linked directors in 2010 had a tenure of 14.3 years versus just 8
years for independent directors. The greater “staying power” of linked and inside directors
however need not signal entrenchment: the rising average tenure of linked directors could
be the result of boards retaining their best-performing linked and inside directors while
replacing their worst-performing ones with new outside directors. Finally, column 13 shows
the share of S&P 1500 firms in which the CEO also holds the position as the Chairman
of the board. While the number of dual roles first rose to 82% in 2002, it has since come
down significantly (62% as of 2010). While this could be understood as a considerable
improvement from a shareholders’ perspective, it is about the same level that markets had
previously seen in the mid 1990s.6
Overall, Table (2.1) provides mixed evidence: neither can a clear trend towards greater
shareholder empowerment be observed (number of proxy contests, staggered boards, cu-
mulative voting), nor can it be claimed that there has been no change at all (number of
independent board members, majority voting, destaggering of boards among S&P 1500
firms). With mixed evidence and conflicting theoretical arguments about the costs and
benefits from greater proxy access, the question whether greater proxy access can create
value for shareholders ultimately becomes empirical.
6Note that there is disagreement whether a separation of the CEO and Chairman position is indeed
beneficial to shareholders: Faleye (2007) for example finds that – depending on firm and CEO characteristics
– shareholder wealth may in fact decrease under a separation of the CEO and Chairman position while
Balsam et al. (2011) find that an outside board chair impacts firm performance positively.
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2.3.4 Proxy Access Literature
Proxy access reform ranks among the most debated regulatory issues the SEC has dealt
with in years. An examination of SEC comment letters on proxy access reforms filed by
investors and businesses between 2003-2010 results in a count of 2,332 comment letters
with an additional 52,543 form letters.7 This compares to just 1,572 comment letters filed
with the SEC between 2002-2004 on 21 different proposal originating from the prominent
Sarbanes Oxley Act.8 While there are numerous articles in law journals discussing existing
rules and ways for potential reform, few empirical studies exist. Harvard Law professor
John C. Coates explains in his testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Secu-
rities, Insurance and Investments why:
“[T]o my knowledge, there is no reliable large-scale empirical evidence – good
or bad – on the effects of shareholder access to a company’s proxy statement
(..) there is no general body of data that is capable of revealing whether such a
system would consistently have good or bad effects on shareholder welfare – and
no such data will exist unless and until a large number of companies voluntarily
adopt such a system or are required to by law.” (Coates, 2009: 4)
Since then, four empirical studies have appeared. Akyol et al. (2011) use 14 event
dates between 2006 and 2009 on which the likelihood of a proxy access reform increased
or decreased and compare the change in the returns of a portfolio of 5,128 U.S firms on
events days to the return of two benchmark indices (a Canadian and a Global stock index).
The authors find statistically significant abnormal returns on six of the 14 event days and
find (when the events are aggregated) the returns to be significant and inversely associated
to the likelihood of proxy access reform. The authors conclude that greater proxy access
7An additional 890 comment and 10,100 form letters have been filed on a related 2002 proxy voting
proposal.
8Source: Proposals’ comment pages at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml.
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destroys shareholder wealth. The study suffers from three limitations: first, in five of the
14 events between 2006-2007, proxy access reform was considered dead by most observers
(Schuster, 2010: 1044-1045), other dates do not coincide with those proxy event dates of a
second similar study by Larcker et al. (2011), and there are no dates from the 2010/2011
period which saw most regulatory activity. Second, any changes in the U.S. stock market
relative to the Canadian and Global benchmark indices could also originate from other
events that moved the U.S. stock market on that day but to a lesser degree the benchmark
indices. Two such problematic dates (also used by Larcker et al., 2011, discussed below)
include March 10, 2009, which saw the biggest stock market rally in 5 months and March
18, 2009, which saw another stock market rally and the largest drop in 10-year treasury
yields since 1987 due to a FED announcement that day to buy up $300 billion in Treasury
bonds. Attributing the differences in the overall U.S. stock market reaction (relative to a
global or Canadian benchmark index) of such macroeconomic shocks to a change in the
probability of proxy access regulations seems problematic. Third, the analysis considers
only total U.S. shareholder wealth but does not analyze in-depth the impact of proxy access
in the cross-section (e.g., firms with potential agency issues versus those without); thus,
wealth increases by one set of firms may be masked in the aggregate by wealth decreases
of other types of firms, or vice versa.
In a related study, Larcker et al. (2011) identify event dates that increased or de-
creased the probability of federal regulation on proxy access as well as executive payment
restrictions. For proxy access, the authors find abnormal returns in 4 out of 10 event dates.
Of the four significant events, three events relate to an effort by the Delaware Congress
to pre-empt a federal law through a state law (§112 DGCL): (1) On March 10, 2009, the
Delaware House of Representatives introduced a bill to allow (but not to require) corpora-
tions to voluntarily adopt bylaws permitting proxy access to shareholders. (2) On March
18, the law passed Delaware’s House and (3) on April 8, it passed its Senate. Becker,
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Bergstresser and Subramanian (2010) however point out that the Delaware Bill was simply
a formality:
“It is well-known that the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Asso-
ciation, not the Delaware legislature, creates Delaware corporate law. Once
the Corporate Law Section voted in favor of a shareholder access amendment
on February 26, 2009, its implementation in Delaware became virtually a
foregone conclusion. Both the Akyol study and the Larcker study examine
the introduction of the shareholder access bill in the Delaware House of
Representatives (March 10, 2009), the passage of the bill in the House (March
18), and the passage of the bill in the Delaware Senate (April 8), but fail to
examine the recommendation from the Corporate Law Council that occurred
on February 26. If the marketplace fully anticipates an event, then wealth
effects around the event date can be meaningless.”
(Becker, Bergstresser and Subramanian, 2010:16-17)
Becker et al.’s criticism is supported by the fact that both the House as well as the
Senate voted unanimously in support of the bill (Delaware General Assembly, 2009). More-
over, even though three of the four significant dates are related to this legislation, Larcker
et. al concede that the Delaware bill did in fact not change actual law or practice: “In-
terestingly, proxy access was already voluntary prior to the Delaware law. In this regard,
the Delaware amendment merely codified existing case law.” (Larcker et al., 2010: 16)
Finally, the last significant event took place two years earlier in June 2007, at a time when
proxy access was considered dead by most observers (Schuster, 2010: 1044-1045). For the
remaining 6 proxy access event dates, no coefficient is significant and all have magnitudes
less than one-tenth of those on the 4 significant dates.
Becker et al. (2011) and Cohn et al. (2011) are the two latest empirical studies
on proxy access reform and closest to this one. Becker et al. (2011) use the surprise
announcement by the SEC on October 4, 2010, to stay the effectiveness of Rule 14a-11
(which was due to go into effect on November 15, 2010) pending the court review. The
authors find that those firms among the S&P 1500 that would have been most affected by
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proxy access (as measured by an index of institutional ownership) lost most value when
the delay was announced. The authors further find that firms that were incorporated in
Delaware suffered fewer losses which is relevant as Delaware changed preemptively its state
laws to allow companies to adopt bylaws permitting greater proxy access. The authors’
results point towards proxy access being value-creating rather than value-destroying. Two
concerns for any natural experiment are (1) the exogeneity assumption of the experiment
and (2) the assigned meaning of any identified discontinuity: first, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce had petitioned the Court of Appeals already two months earlier to stay 14a-11’s
effectiveness pending court review. Once the Court had accepted the petition, a voluntary
stay by the SEC or an ordered stay through the Court of 14a-11 was to be expected, thus
only leaving the exact timing but likely not the stay itself a surprise. If an efficient market
had anticipated with some probability that a stay was likely to occur after the petition
had been accepted, this would introduce a downwards bias into the authors’ estimates by
said probability. Further, as we will argue shortly, the market’s expectation at that point
was that the review would merely delay greater proxy access – potentially to proxy season
2012 – but would not result in a repeal of it. As a result, even when assuming that the
market was surprised by the stay, the event date’s estimate might measure the value of
the delay of greater proxy access by one year but not the value of greater proxy access itself.
Finally, Cohn et. al (2011) use three event dates on which the ownership thresholds
in the proxy access reform proposal changed as natural experiments: on June 16, 2010,
Senator Dodd proposed that an investor would have to hold a universal 5% to access the
proxy instead of the 1%, 3% and 5% thresholds the SEC had previously suggested for firms
with market capitalizations <$75 million, $75-700 million and >$700 million. On June 24,
2010, the 5% threshold was again dropped during negotiations between the House and the
Senate and the SEC’s thresholds were back on the table. Cohn and his co-authors analyze
how the valuations of firms with activist investors changed on dates at which firms saw their
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applicable thresholds change. The authors find that firm valuations decreased (increased)
around events that increased (decreased) the hurdles to proxy access, concluding that proxy
access increased shareholder wealth. Importantly, the authors only include firms that are
in the portfolio of so-called “SharkWatch50 investors.” SharkWatch50 is a compilation of
50 significant activist investors; inclusion into the list depends on the number of publicly
disclosed activist campaigns and proxy fights waged as well as the past success rate in
affecting change at targeted companies (SharkRepellent, 2008). As a result, the authors’
findings are not applicable to the whole market, but only to the subset of firms in which a
number of very successful activist investors had previously invested into. Put differently,
the results provide estimates of the value of greater proxy access to those investors that
use the tool most aggressively and for those firms that had been previously targets of such
investors; it is however unclear whether those results can be generalized to the average firm
and the average investor. As a result, we cannot exclude the possibility that greater proxy
access may have been indeed harmful to firms that were not part of the SharkWatch50
investors’ portfolios or to firms with other specific characteristics (e.g., small issuers or
firms without agency issues).
2.3.5 Contribution
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this is the first
paper that uses the repeal of proxy access regulation by the U.S. Court of Appeals that
effectively ended proxy access reform for the foreseeable future. It thereby does not require
us to pick dates from the regulatory process that are noisily related to the reform. Second,
we investigate valuation changes for the cross-section of U.S. firms instead of the U.S. mar-
ket as a whole; as a result, we do not have to rely on international benchmark comparisons
between the U.S. and other countries. Third, as the repeal came as a major surprise to
the market (as argued in the next section) and is considered the end of proxy access re-
form for the foreseeable future, the subsequent firm valuation changes provide us with the
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most accurate estimates to date about the value of greater proxy access. This compares
favorably to the mere temporary stay of greater proxy access by one year that occurred on
Nov 15, 2010, or the market’s expectations between 2006 and 2009 about changes in the
probability of future proxy access regulation. Fourth, we analyze for the first time valua-
tion changes for several corporate governance provisions that have been previously linked
to agency conflicts (e.g., staggered board, poison pill). This allows us to understand the
value of greater proxy access in the cross-section of firms sorted by the nature and number
of corporate governance provisions. Further, since critics of the reform have argued that
greater proxy access will also hurt the valuation of firms that do not have any agency
issues, we investigate the effect of proxy access on firms without agency issues, on overall
U.S. shareholder wealth and by firm size to determine if we can find significant negative
impacts for certain subsets of firms. Finally, we investigate the popular argument that
empowering special-interest investors (unions, pension funds) would diminish shareholder
wealth. This is the first paper that does so by using direct ownership information of such
investors (or potential coalitions thereof) to determine the valuation changes in firms in
which special-interest investors would have immediately qualified for greater proxy access.
2.4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.4.1 Natural Experiment
We use the court repeal of Rule 14a-11 on July 22, 2011 as a natural experiment to estimate
the shareholder wealth effects of greater proxy access. This assumes that the repeal of the
SEC’s proxy access reform came as a surprise to the market. We argue that this is the
case for three reasons:
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1. Timing: The Court had not issued any pre-announcement of a forthcoming ruling and
the Court’s statutes do not prescribe any time limits as to when a ruling needs to be
issued (D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 2011b). Further, while the SEC had initially
expected a resolution already in late Spring and despite extensive coverage of proxy
access reform in the popular media in early 2011, there was no news about an imminent
decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the days prior to July 22, 2011: A
Lexis-Nexis and Factiva news search finds no single news article between July 1-21 in-
cluding the words ‘‘court of appeals’’ + proxy, but 18 (27) such articles on July
22 and 17 (7) more articles on July 23 on Lexis-Nexis (Factiva).9 Further, while the
Court made its opinion public at around 11.30am, it took Bloomberg until 2.13pm
to issue a news alert (Bloomberg, 2011) and Associated Press until 4:25pm when the
market had already closed for the weekend, indicating that even the business media
was unaware of the impending decision.
2. Content: Legal experts did not expect the challenge to uphold in court. Not only was
the SEC explicitly authorized by Congress to rewrite proxy access regulation, but the
SEC had also spent considerable time and resources – 21,000 staff hours valued at
$2.5 million (SEC, 2011) – to propose rules, seek feedback and research its impacts.
While the final rule included an 80 page cost-benefit analysis, the Court’s “insufficient
cost-benefit analysis” ruling surprised even outspoken legal critics of proxy access re-
form. Stephen Bainbridge for examples writes: “[C]andidly, while I am pleased, I’m
also surprised. I had thought – and said publicly – that this suit was a long shot.”
(Bainbridge, 2011) His surprise is echoed by Brown (2011) arguing that “The DC Cir-
cuit struck down the rule, imposing a ‘nigh impossible’ standard with respect to the
applicable economic analysis [upon the SEC].” Keller (2011) concurs “There are many
(and I am one) who, although believing the SEC acted unwisely in adopting proxy ac-
9We also tried other combinations of the terms proxy, proxy access, 14a-11, SEC + Chamber of
Commerce, Court of Appeals.
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cess, at least in the form of Rule 14a-11, are concerned about the high, nigh impossible,
bar the Court set that could put in jeopardy most SEC rulemaking of any complexity
or controversy. It remains to be seen whether the high bar established by the Court in
this case will be limited in subsequent cases.” Finally, the surprise about the verdict
was confirmed in a private conversation with a corporate lawyer from K&L Gates who
followed the proceedings.
3. Empirical Tests: Perhaps most convincing, we test for early portfolio price movements
in the days prior to the repeal. Specifically, we provide in all our results the portfolio
returns of day -1 (Thursday, July 21, 2011) to test for significant abnormal returns the
day before the repeal.10 We further compute for all our results the 200 trading day em-
pirical distribution [-100, +100] of the average daily abnormal return of the respective
portfolio so to be able to rank the event window’s coefficient relative to the portfo-
lio returns in the 200 days around the repeal. As will become clear in the empirical
analysis in section (??), both measures (classical statistical significance that assumes
normality of portfolio returns and significance based on the empirical distributions)
give no indication that the market expected the court repeal.
For those reasons – (1) the unforeseen release of the verdict on July 22, 2011, (2)
legal critics being surprised about the repealed, and (3) the significance obtained from our
empirical distributions – we argue that the court repeal provides us with an ideal setting
for a natural experiment. Note however that if – for whatever reason – investors were
not surprised by the court’s decision, this would bias us against finding any significant
treatment effect on July 22, 2011 as the repeal of proxy access would have already been
priced into stocks in the prior days or weeks.
10Note that day -1 is typically included in the treatment window of event studies (often, [-1,1]); using
day -1 as a placebo treatment is thus a very conservative robustness test that assumes that there was no
(or at the least very little) prior leakage of the Court’s decision.
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2.4.2 Estimation of Shareholder Wealth Effects
We estimate the shareholder wealth effect of greater proxy access by comparing the average
daily abnormal return of a portfolio of firms that should have been affected to the abnormal
returns of a firm portfolio that should not have been affected by the repeal. We compute
portfolio abnormal returns using the standard Schipper and Thompson (1983) portfolio
methodology rather than individual firm abnormal returns as we have an identical event
day (July 22, 2011) for all firms, which can otherwise lead to cross-correlation among ab-
normal returns and biased standard errors. An alternative approach to account for the
cross-correlation of returns is to use an FGLS estimation which requires an estimation of
the variance-covariance matrix. We decide against the FGLS approach and in favor of the
Schipper and Thompson portfolio methodology since “[FGLS] requires accurate estimation
of the covariance matrix of the residual returns, which is not normally possible in finite
samples, especially as the number of firms increases. [..] Chandra and Balachandran (1990)
further argue that GLS is highly sensitive to model misspecification, which may lead to
inefficient test results even if the covariance matrix is known. They conclude that GLS
should be avoided in event studies because the correct model specification is rarely known
for certain.” (Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010: 3997-8).
All abnormal returns are obtained with the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) and the Fama-French 3-factor (FF3) and 4-factor (FF4) asset pricing models
while equally-weighting as well as value-weighting portfolios.11 We do not report FF3 re-
sults as they are almost identical to FF4 results. We also do not report value-weighted
results as there is a firm size effect (more on this later); value-weighted portfolio results
are however in almost all results qualitatively the same.
Specifically, we run the following specifications (Schipper and Thompson, 1983):
11We use the market capitalization of firms at the end of Q4-2010 for value-weighted results.
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CAPM: r¯t = α+βMktRft + γdEventWindowt + t
FF4: r¯t = α+β1MktRft + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt
+ γdEventWindowt + t
where r¯t is the excess portfolio return on day t (we use 366 trading days; July 21 2010
to December 31, 2011), MktRft is the market return on day t in excess of that day’s risk-free
rate, SMBt and HMLt are the Fama-French risk factors for day t while UMDt is the Carhart
momentum factor for day t. Finally, dEventWindowt is a treatment/indicator variable that
is 0 on days outside the event window and 1 on days in the event window. Hence, the
coefficient of interest γ captures the daily portfolio excess return that cannot be explained
by risk and momentum factors. Any constant effect that is not captured by the risk factors
and does not belong to the treatment is further absorbed by the intercept term. We report
the trading day event windows [0,0], [0,1], [0,2], [0,3] and, as a placebo treatment, [-1,-1].
Note that if proxy access was considered by the market a beneficial (detrimental) regu-
lation for the portfolio firms with its expected benefits (costs) exceeding the its expected
costs (benefits), we would expect a negative (positive) coefficient γ upon the regulation’s
repeal.
Although the coefficient of interest γ already provides us with the average daily ab-
normal returns that occurred during the treatment period, one could still argue that the
treatment effect may be due to other market forces in the event window that affected all
firms. To answer to such criticism, we run the above regressions twice, once for a portfolio
of firms that should have been affected by greater proxy access and once for a portfolio
of firms that should have been less (or not at all) affected by greater proxy access. If the
abnormal returns in the event window were due to greater proxy access, one would expect
to find that the abnormal return coefficients differed significantly across the two portfo-
lios. Moreover, one might expect that the abnormal returns should be larger in magnitude
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and more significant in those portfolios that were more affected by proxy access reform,
providing us with additional testable implications. We report in all our cross-sectional
specifications the difference between affected and non-affected portfolios.
At the latest since Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) it is well-known that portfolio
returns exhibit fat tails, with the result that classic significance measures that assume
asymptotic normality of portfolio returns might be biased. We therefore also compute
the empirical distribution of the indicator coefficient based on a 200 trading day window
around the court repeal. Specifically, for example for the 1-day event window, we set
dEventWindowt equals to 1 (else 0) separately for each day between trading days -100 and
+100 and re-run our CAPM or FF4 specification 201 times. We thereby gain information
on the ranking of our coefficient on day 0 (July 22, 2011) relative to all the other coefficients
on the 200 trading days (or, 10 months) around day 0. We report the percentile at which
the event day coefficient lies in its empirical distribution.
2.4.3 Data
We use stock data and balance sheet information from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Corpo-
rate governance data originates from RiskMetrics Analytics Governance/Directors databases
and Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Reviews while the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick
(GIM) index and the Bebchuck-Cohen-Ferrell (E) index are downloaded from the authors’
webpages.
Institutional ownership information is obtained from quarterly 13-F filings available
at SEC’s EDGAR database. These filings report the amount of shares and the current
value of each of the investor’s investments. We download all 13-F filings from the SEC’s
EDGAR database between July 1, 2008 and Aug 30, 2011 (57,887 filings), thereby cover-
ing the 3-year holding period (Q2-2008 to Q2-2011) that an investor needs to satisfy such
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that his stocks become eligible for proxy access. We then extract 11,078,553 investment
positions for 4,082 distinct 13-F filers12 and eliminate all investments that were held for
less than 12 consecutive quarters. For each remaining investor-firm position we keep only
the lowest number of shares that the investor held across all 12 quarters. This leads to
148,698 investment positions that were held for 12 consecutive quarters. Next, we obtain
the shares outstanding by firm and quarter and compute the percentage of ownership each
investor held in each of the target firms at the end of June 2011 that is eligible to be used
under the new proxy access rules. Finally, we identify those firms in which there existed
individual investors exceeding 3% for 3 years and in which a shareholder coalition of up to
3 investors can cross the 3%-3 year threshold.
To test the effect from greater proxy access onto firms with special-interest investors, we
further identify all special-interest investors (52) among all 13-F filers (4,082) and identify
the targets, the sizes and durations of all their shareholdings.13,14 The list of special-interest
investors included in our analysis is provided in Appendix (A). We create a portfolio of
firms in which special-interest investors exceed 3% ownership for at least 3 years, and – as a
control group – a portfolio of firms in which there is at least one non-special-interest investor
exceeding 3% for 3 years but no significant stake of a special-interest investor. We repeat
this process for different thresholds (1% and 0.5% instead of 3%) and different holdings
12The parent of related money managers file 13-Fs together so that the actual number of investors is
much greater. (Example: ”Deutsche Bank AG” files one 13-F for 19 subsidiary money managers.)
13We research online the names of all 4,082 institutional investors (the most frequently used internet
sources are the investors’ own websites, businessweek.com, forbes.com and finance.yahoo.com). We also
obtain membership lists of the AFL-CIO (the umbrella organization of American unions) and the Council
of Institutional Investors (self-described as “a nonprofit association of pension funds and employee benefit
funds, foundations and endowments with combined assets that exceed $3 trillion”) and check whether their
members are among the list of investors.
14As only investors with investment holdings exceeding $100 million have to file 13-F schedules, this
method does not give us the universe of all special-interest investors. Since, however, a 3% stake in the
mean (median) public firm affected by proxy access reform constitutes an investment of $109 ($17) million,
we are foremost interested in investors that can make such large investment over a >3 year period without
sacrificing too much portfolio diversification. As a result, the $100 million holding requirement should not
pose a serious limitation to our analysis.
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periods (2 years, 1 year and 0 years). We also repeat this process to create treatment and
control group portfolios in which special-interest investors can form coalitions (unlimited
in the number of members) to jointly cross 3% (alternatively, 2% and 1%) for a holding
period of 3 years (alternatively, 2 years, 1 year and 0 years).
2.5 RESULTS
2.5.1 Corporate Governance and Proxy Access
Our first investigation concerns corporate governance levels since the main objective of
proxy access was to empower shareholders in firms with unresponsive management and
agency issues. Tables (2.2) and (2.3) show how the proxy access repeal affected firms in
the cross-section of corporate governance levels. Table (2.2) shows the abnormal portfolio
return to firms that are considered “plausibly entrenched” (E6 and G-high) versus “non-
entrenched” (E0 and G-low) as classified by the E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell,
2009) and the GIM-Index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). The E0-portfolio consists
of 59 firms which had in the latest 2 years of the index (2007, 2008) none of the six major
anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) that Bebchuk et al. relate to managerial entrenchment.15
Conversely, the E6-portfolio consists of 72 firms that had all six of the major ATPs. Simi-
larly, the G-low portfolio consists of 54 firms that had (in 2006, the last available year of the
index) five or less of the 24 ATPs that Gompers et al. relate to managerial entrenchment,
while G-high consists of 63 firms with at least 14 ATPs.16 Note that we do not need to
take sides on the debate whether the presence of several ATPs lead to a lower firm value
or whether a lower firm value leads to a greater number of ATPs. In either case, greater
proxy access aims at giving (activist) investors more influence onto firm decisions, which
15Those provisions are staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
16We choose 5 and 14 ATPs as those delineate the lowest and highest deciles.
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can be valuable to investors in both cases, entrenched as well as under-performing firms.
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Table 2.2: Proxy Access and Managerial/Board Entrenchment
Event Benchmark E0 E6 Diff: G-low G-high Diff:
Window Model (n=59) (n=72) E6-E0<0 (n=54) (n=63) G high-G low<0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[−1,−1] CAPM 0.0000 -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0009 -0.0040 -0.0031
Placebo [0.00] [-1.14] [-0.83] [-0.19] [-0.92] [-0.48]
FF4 0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0063 0.0024 -0.0030 -0.0039
Placebo [1.24] [-0.89] [-1.05] [0.77] [-0.89] [-1.18]
[0, 0] CAPM -0.0011 -0.0096**γ -0.0085*β 0.0029 -0.0076*β -0.0047α
[-0.27] [-2.23] [-1.43] [-0.61] [-1.77] [-0.74]
FF4 -0.0003 -0.0075***γ -0.0072**β -0.0009 -0.0053α -0.0045α
[-0.10] [-2.46] [-2.29] [-0.28] [-1.61] [-0.98]
[0, 2] CAPM -0.0007 -0.0048*β -0.0041β -0.0029 -0.0058***γ -0.0029α
[-0.29] [-1.92] [-1.19] [-1.06] [-2.34] [-0.79]
FF4 0.0006 -0.0032*γ -0.0039**β -0.0011 -0.0047***γ -0.0035*β
[0.39] [-1.84] [-1.65] [-0.61] [-2.44] [-1.35]
Table (2.2) shows average daily abnormal portfolio returns as obtained with CAPM and FF4 for “entrenched” versus “non-entrenched”
firms as classified by the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) and the Entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell,
2009). Specifically, the E0-portfolio consists of firms which had in the latest 2 years of the index (2007, 2008) none of the six major
ATPs while E6 is a portfolio of firms which had all six major ATPs. Likewise, the G-low portfolio consists of firms that had 5 or less
ATPs while G-high consists of firms with at least 14 ATPs in 2006 (the last available year of the index). The numbers in the table
represent the coefficient γ on dEventWindow in the empirical asset pricing regressions in section (2.4.2). For ease of reading, t-statistics
are shown in square brackets. *,**,*** shows statistical significance assuming portfolio returns are normally distributed at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level while α, β, γ show statistical significance in the empirical distribution of the respective portfolio (or difference between
portfolios). Specifically, α, β, γ means that the coefficient ranks in the 10th, 5th, 1th percentile of the 200 trading day empirical
distribution around the announcement date.
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We first note that there are no significant abnormal returns in the placebo event win-
dow [-1,-1] (rows 1 and 2) in both CAPM and FF4 specifications. Additionally, none of
the abnormal returns in [-1,-1] rank in the bottom 10% of the [-100,+100] empirical dis-
tribution of the 1-day returns. Both are indications that the court repeal surprised the
market. To the contrary, in the two specifications in which we do expect a significant effect
(portfolios E6 and G-high), the coefficients turn highly significant in the treatments that
include the day of the court repeal, [0,0] and [0,2]. In addition, the coefficients rank in
the bottom 5% or 1% of their respective empirical distributions; in the case of E6 at [0,0]
and G-high at [0,2], the coefficients comprise the largest portfolio value reductions in the
complete 10-month empirical distribution window. In all treatments, we find significant
negative abnormal returns, pointing toward a significant reduction in firm valuations due
to the repeal of the law. This indicates that the market valued proxy access positively
for plausibly entrenched firms. The magnitude of the effect is between 53 and 96 basis
points for the day of the repeal. Further, there are no significant abnormal returns to the
portfolios of firms with few ATPs (E0 and G-low in columns 1 and 4), indicating that the
repeal of proxy access reform did not impact the valuation of firms which were unlikely to
suffer from managerial entrenchment.
Columns 3 and 6 show the difference-in-difference estimates between the high versus
low-entrenchment firm portfolios. While the differences are not significant on day -1, they
turn significant in column 3 in all specifications that include the day of the repeal. Fur-
thermore, the results are also highly significant in their respective empirical distributions
(bottom 5%). While we obtain a significant firm value decline of 72 to 85 basis points
between E6 and E0 firms, significance levels are lower for most specifications using the
GIM-index in column 6. This may possibly be the case as the most recent GIM-index
dates back to 2006 and might be thus more noisy than the more recent E-Index; addition-
ally, a high GIM-score may still exclude some of the more severe anti-takeover provisions
40
that a firm in the E6 portfolio includes.17 Nonetheless, the difference between the G-high
and G-low portfolios are still firmly negative and are located in the bottom 5% or 10% of
their respective empirical distributions.
We next investigate several specific corporate governance bylaws: a staggered board, the
lack of majority or cumulative voting, the existence of a poison pill or a golden parachute,
dual class shares to concentrate voting power, having faced considerable shareholder op-
position in the most recent 2011 board elections, having had three or more board- or
voting-related shareholder proposals in the recent three years, and being in the top or
bottom decile in the number of independent directors. In each of those cases, investors
and management/board may be particularly affected from greater proxy access. For com-
pactness and ease of reading, Table (2.3) shows only the difference in the average daily
abnormal returns (similar to columns 3 and 6 in Table (2.2)). Column 1, for example,
shows the difference in the abnormal daily returns to a portfolio of firms with a staggered
board relative to a portfolio of firms without staggered boards.
17In the GIM-index, a firm earns one point for each of 24 unique governance rules that strengthen the
rights of the management relative to shareholders. The E-index however focuses only on the 6 most severe
anti-takeover provisions.
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Table 2.3: Corporate Governance and Proxy Access
Event Bench- Diff: Diff: No Diff: Diff: Diff: Diff: D1 vs. D10
Window mark Stagg.Board Maj.Voting Poison Pill Dual Class Previous of Indep. Directors
Model (n1=737; (n1=960; (n1=310; (n1=90; Opposition (n1=174; n2=225)
n2=744) n2=521) n2=1,171) n2=1,391) (n1=33; n2=115)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[−1,−1] CAPM -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0006
Placebo [-0.07] [-0.28] [-0.11] [0.48] [-0.43] [-0.12]
FF4 0.0006 0.0016 0.0009 0.0033α -0.0034 0.0000
Placebo [0.22] [0.58] [0.36] [1.03] [-0.70] [0.00]
[0, 0] CAPM -0.0032γ -0.0014 0.0018 0.0007 0.0025 -0.0011
[-0.66] [-0.29] [0.35] [0.13] [0.50] [-0.22]
FF4 -0.0029γ -0.0006 0.0016 0.0006 0.0030 0.0010
[-1.10] [-0.21] [0.61] [0.20] [0.62] [0.34]
[0, 3] CAPM -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0019α 0.0008
[-0.21] [-0.47] [-0.02] [0.29] [0.76] [0.33]
FF4 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0012 0.0014 0.0017β
[-0.07] [0.02] [0.34] [0.72] [0.58] [1.12]
Table (2.3) repeats columns 3 and 6 from Table (2.2) and shows only the difference of the average daily abnormal returns (CAPM and FF4) to two
firm portfolios: one portfolio that includes firms with a specific corporate governance bylaw that have been related to managerial entrenchment and the
other portfolio including firms that do not have such a bylaw. Shown in brackets is the t-statistic of the difference, and *,**,*** indicating the 10%, 5%
and 1% statistical significance levels assuming normal portfolio returns for the one-sided directional test of the difference being either above or below
zero. α, β, γ show the statistical significance in the empirical distribution of the difference between the two respective portfolios. Specifically, α, β, γ
means that the coefficient ranks in the 10th, 5th, 1th percentile of the 200 trading day empirical distribution around the announcement date. Other
provisions checked but with no significant differences: Golden parachute, cumulative voting, three or more board- or voting-related shareholder
proposals in recent three years. Data sources: Columns (1)-(5) include all S&P 1500 firms. Data originates from RiskMetrics Analytics Governance
database for 2010. Column (5) shows the difference in abnormal returns between S&P 500 firms who faced 30% or more opposition in 2011 board
elections and those S&P 500 that did experience less or no opposition in 2011 board elections. Column (5) data originates from the ISS 2011 U.S.
Postseason Report. Column (6) data originates from the RiskMetric Analytics Director database for 2010 and shows the difference in abnormal returns
between S&P 1500 firms in the highest decile of firms with independent directors versus S&P 1500 firms in the lowest decile of firms with independent
directors. Finally, results on firms that received three or more board- or voting-related shareholder proposals between 2008 and 2010 and those that
did not (results omitted) are based on data extracted from the Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Reviews for 2008-2010.
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The principle result from Table (2.3) is that only one corporate governance provision – a
staggered board – reaches statistical significance (coefficient in the lowest 1% of its empirical
distribution in [0,0]). This is consistent with the argument that if there were indeed a
number of corporate governance provisions that were value-destroying, shareholders would
not allow them and/or boards would not adopt them. Instead, combining the evidence
from Tables (2.2) and (2.3), it seems that only the presence of several major anti-takeover
provisions at the same time (e.g., all 6 ATPs of the E-index) might indicate actual agency
issues with the result that only in such rare cases empowering shareholders relative to the
management is value-creating. Perhaps most surprising are the results from columns 5
and 6: while one might expect that firms with a greater share of inside directors or firms
with considerable opposition in recent director elections would have seen their valuations
decrease after the repeal, we do not find such an effect. Further, no sub-sample of firms in
Tables (2.2) and (2.3) has positive abnormal returns. Specifically, firms without any agency
issues (as measured by ATPs in the E0 and G-low portfolios) have insignificant abnormal
returns. This indicates that the market did not expect any significant net costs to firms
without any agency issues. We therefore conclude in favor of hypothesis H1: a greater
monitoring and disciplining power for shareholders leads to an increase in firm value when
potential agency issues are present. To further analyze the effect of proxy access on the
average firm in the market, we turn next to overall U.S. shareholder wealth.
2.5.2 Proxy Access and U.S. Shareholder Wealth
Hypothesis 2 addresses the concern that greater proxy access may lead to an overall decline
of U.S. shareholder wealth. This could occur if the costs from board disruption and proxy
contests which affect all firms overwhelmed any potential benefits that could be found
in firms that suffered from agency issues. To test for significant U.S. shareholder wealth
changes, we analyze the 1-day, 2-days and 3-days return of several U.S. market indices.
We not only consider the largest available U.S. indices S&P 1500, NASDAQ Composite
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and Russell 3000, but also specific large and small cap indices (Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage, S&P 500, and S&P 600 Small Cap). We also compare several of the U.S. indices
to international benchmark indices from Canada and the U.K. (both arguably the closest
international matches for the U.S. market).
Note that this test should only be considered a “one-sided” test: any significant changes
in the U.S. shareholder wealth relative to the benchmark indices could not only stem from
a repeal of proxy access regulation, but also from other market-relevant events in both
countries on the day of the repeal. If it was however true that overall shareholder wealth
had been depressed due to pending proxy access regulation, we would expect to see a
significant increase in the U.S. market indices upon repeal relative to their international
benchmarks. If we do not find any significant change in the shareholder wealth, then this
can be interpreted as evidence against hypothesis 2, which states that greater proxy access
diminishes U.S. shareholder wealth.
As Table (2.4), rows 1-5 show, we do not find any significant U.S. shareholder wealth
changes on and around the court repeal date. None of the t-statistics (that assume nor-
mality of index returns) is significant on any of the traditional significance levels. Also,
none of the 1-day, 2-days or 3-days returns lie in the upper or lower tail of their respective
366 trading day empirical distribution (July 21, 2010 to December 31, 2011). Columns
7-10 compares the performance of selected U.S. indices (Russell 3000, S&P 500 Large Cap
and S&P 600 Small Cap) relative to their corresponding international benchmark indices
from Canada and the U.K. We test if the return difference between the U.S. index and its
corresponding international benchmark is significantly different from 0 on or around the
day of the court repeal. In all specifications, we again do not find any significant differ-
ences. Most return differences from July 22, 2011 in fact lie at about the median of their
366 empirical distribution.
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Table 2.4: U.S Shareholder Wealth on and around the Day of Court Repeal
Index 1-day 2-days 3-days
return return return
(1) S&P 1500
return 0.09% 1.41% 1.32%
t-statistic [0.04] [0.82] [0.59]
percentile (51%) (84%) (77%)
(2) Russell 3000
return 0.13% 1.42% 1.33%
t-statistic [0.05] [0.71] [0.51]
percentile (52%) (80%) (74%)
(3) DIJA
return 0.34% 0.87% 0.74%
t-statistic [-0.34] [0.47] [0.29]
percentile (28.4%) (71%) (63%)
(4) NASDAQ Composite
return 0.86% 1.59% 1.14%
t-statistic [0.56] [0.75] [0.40]
percentile (78%) (80%) (64%)
(5) S&P 500 Large Cap
return 0.09% 1.45% 1.38%
t-statistic [0.03] [0.76] [0.56]
percentile (50.4%) (82%) (77%)
(6) S&P 600 Small Cap
return -0.18% 0.95% 0.56%
t-statistic [-0.14] [0.33] [0.11]
percentile (41%) (63%) (51%)
Difference to 1-day 2-days 3-days
International Indices return return return
(7)
Russell 3000 -
S&P TSX Composite
return -0.32% 0.26% 0.11%
t-statistic [-0.45] [0.17] [0.00]
percentile (30%) (56%) (48%)
(8)
S&P 500 -
S&P TSX 60
return -0.24% 0.30% 0.21%
t-statistic [-0.36] [0.20] [0.06]
percentile (34%) (58%) (51%)
(9)
S&P 500 -
FTSE 100
return -0.50% 0.06% -1.13%
t-statistic [-0.60] [0.00] [-1.14]
percentile (23%) (49%) (11%)
(10)
S&P 600 -
S&P TSX Small Cap
return -0.66% 0.04% -0.56%
t-statistic [-0.54] [-0.05] [-0.38]
percentile (26%) (47%) (31%)
Table (2.4), Rows 1-6 show the 1-day, 2-days and 3-days raw returns of several major U.S. indices on July 22, 2011 –
the day of the court repeal. Columns 7-10 show the 1-day, 2-days and 3-days difference in the returns between several
major U.S. indices and their respective international benchmark indices for Canada and the U.K. Shown in square
brackets is the t-statistics of the return based on returns of the index in the 366 trading days window between July 21,
2010 and December 31, 2011 while assuming normality. Finally, in round brackets, we drop the normality assumption
and show the percentile of the July 22, 2011 return in its respective 366 trading day empirical distribution.
Indices: The S&P TSX Composite includes about 300 Canadian firms and comprises 70% of the market capitalization
of all public firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. S&P TSX 60 includes the largest 60 publicly listed Canadian
firms while S&P TSX Small Cap includes about 250 small Canadian firms with an average market cap of C$ 470
million. The FTSE 100 includes the largest 100 stocks at the London Stock Exchange.
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The results in Table (2.4) lend support to H2A: proxy access does not significantly
depress overall U.S. shareholder wealth. We next turn toward analyzing specific sub-
samples of firms for which we might expect to find a differential effect.
2.5.3 Firm Size and Proxy Access
In its complaint to the Court of Appeals, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was particularly
worried about the costs that a proxy contest may entail for small firms. Specifically, in its
petition, the Chamber had estimated the costs of recent proxy contests at larger companies
to range between $4 million and $14 million and at smaller companies between $800,000
and $3 million (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010: 3). Following this argument, we would
expect positive abnormal returns particularly for smaller firms upon the repeal of proxy
access reform. Alternatively, proponents of proxy access might argue that shareholder
activism is beneficial independent from firm size and thus the benefits from proxy access
might be even greatest for smaller firms since a larger set of investors is able to cross the
3%-3 year threshold.
Table (2.4) presents the results from portfolios based on firm size. We first analyze
in column 1 a pooled sample of all publicly listed firms that had a market capitalization
greater than $75 million at the end of Q4-2010 (the threshold below which firms were
exempted from proxy access for 3 years). As this is similar to the return on market indices
in Table II, it is not surprising that we do not find any significant valuation change for the
portfolio of all firms for which proxy access was mandated. Column 2 consists of firms at
the opposite end of the spectrum with market caps below $75 million (1,576 firms) and
thus exempted from proxy access for 3 years.18 As expected, the repeal does not have any
18In an earlier version of this paper we tried to utilize the $75 million market cap cutoff as an instrument
in a regression discontinuity design. While the cutoff appears sharp at first, it is applied annually. As a
result, firms that are this year below the cutoff might be the next year above the cutoff (and vice versa).
This issue is worsened by the fact that prices of very small firms are typically more volatile than those of
large firms. As a result, the 3-year exclusion from (or inclusion into) greater proxy access may not apply
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significant impact on firm valuations excluded from greater proxy access.19 Next, columns
3 to 7 break down the pooled firm sample by firm size and provide the abnormal returns to
each market cap quintile of public firms larger than $75 million. While no single quintile
by itself is statistically significant, we can see a gradual decline in the coefficient (and t-
statistic) across the quintiles: for example, the coefficients in event window [0,3] decrease
from +6 basis points in quintile 5 to -3 basis points in quintile 4, -8 in quintile 3, -17 in
quintile 2 and finally to -25 basis points in quintile 1. The same declining monotonic trend
can be observed in the event windows [0,0] and [0,1] in both CAPM and FF4 specifications,
but not in the placebo window [-1,-1]. Columns 8 and 9 present the difference between the
quintiles 1 and 5 and the difference between quintile 1 firms ($75 to $184 million market
cap) and firms smaller than $75 million that would have been (for the time being) exempted
from the reform. The differences between quintiles 1 and 5 range between -23 and -38 basis
points and are significantly below 0 at the 5% and 10% level in [0,1] and [0,3]. Further, the
coefficients rank in the bottom 5-10% of their respective empirical distributions. Though
the difference between quintile 1 and exempted firms are even larger (quintile 1 firms
experience an average abnormal return on July 22nd between 47 and 55 basis points lower
than the one of exempted firms) the differences are only statistically significant in their
respective empirical distributions.20
to all firms that are currently below (above) the cutoff. Additionally, a management of a firm close to the
cutoff may try to influence its valuation ahead of the annual deadline that determines the rule’s application
to the firm, thereby introducing noncompliance and endogenous sorting. Perhaps not surprising, besides
these methodological issues, we also did not find any significance with this instrument.
19Firms that were excluded for 3 years could still have seen a valuation change (1) in expectation of
the regulation applying in three years time, and (2) in expectation of a firm’s market value surpassing the
threshold within the next 3 years. We would expect this change however to be noticeably lower than the
one for firms which would have been immediately under the mandate of proxy access.
20Note that for reasons discussed in footnote 18 the discontinuity may not be as sharp as the threshold
may at first indicate, thus inducing noise into the estimate of the difference between Q1 firms and exempted
firms.
47
Table 2.5: Proxy Contest Costs and Firm Size
Event Benchmark All Exempted Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Diff: Diff:
Window Model firms firms portfolio portfolio portfolio portfolio portfolio (Q1-Q5) (Q1-Exempted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
[−1,−1] CAPM -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0034 -0.004 -0.0033 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0022
Placebo [-0.26] [-0.14] [-1.00] [-0.10] [-0.87] [-1.59] [-1.74] [-0.23] [-0.24]
FF4 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0013 0.0031 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0006
Placebo [0.29] [-0.22] [-0.47] [1.47] [0.29] [-1.02] [-1.01] [0.01] [0.06]
[0, 0] CAPM -0.0007 0.0041 -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0014 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0055β
[-0.26] [0.49] [-0.43] [-0.67] [-0.37] [0.33] [0.74] [-0.68] [-0.62]
FF4 0.0004 0.0044 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0019 0.0006 0.0044 -0.0009 -0.0047β
[0.29] [0.54] [-0.25] [0.19] [1.20] [0.48] [0.53] [-0.30] [-0.54]
[0, 1] CAPM -0.0018 0.0012 -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0021 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0038*β -0.0043β
[-0.91] [0.20] [-1.30] [-1.18] [-0.80] [-0.36] [0.68] [-1.46] [-0.67]
FF4 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0025*α -0.0030β
[-0.30] [0.20] [-0.91] [-0.73] [-0.01] [0.61] [0.80] [-1.27] [-0.48]
[0, 3] CAPM -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0030**β -0.0022α
[-0.68] [-0.05] [-1.44] [-0.80] [-0.45] [-0.21] [0.80] [-1.66] [-0.50]
FF4 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0023*α -0.0012α
[0.28] [-0.05] [-1.00] [-0.16] [0.89] [1.15] [1.35] [-1.48] [-0.27]
Table (2.5) shows the average daily abnormal portfolio returns (measured with CAPM and Fama French 4-factor model) in several event windows around July 22, 2011. The “exempted
portfolio” consists of all publicly listed firms at NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX that have a market capitalization at the end of Q4-2010 below the $75 million threshold and which are
therefore exempted from greater proxy access for 3 years (1,576 firms). Q1 to Q5 represent quintile portfolios based on firm size (market value of equity), each of which consists of
1,005 publicly listed firms with market capitalization above $75 million. Market valuations of firms and quintile cutoff points were obtained from the last trading day in 2010 with data
availability. The numbers in the table represent the coefficient γ on dEventWindow in the empirical asset pricing regressions in section III. For ease of reading, t-statistics are shown in
square brackets; columns (8) and (9) show one-sided directional t-statistics. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively where portfolio returns
are assumed to be normal. α, β, γ indicate statistical significance in the empirical distribution of the respective portfolio (or difference between portfolios). Specifically, α, β, γ means
that the coefficient ranks in the 10th, 5th, 1th percentile of the 200 trading day empirical distribution around the announcement date.
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The results from Table (2.5) show no indication that smaller or larger firms would
have been negatively affected by proxy access regulation. To the contrary, there is some
evidence that smaller firms saw a significant reduction in firm values relative to very large
firms on the day of the repeal. The result of no significant change for large firms is perhaps
not surprising when bearing in mind that the median firm in the Q5 portfolio had a
market valuation of $7.2 billion, thus requiring a $216 million investment by an investor
for a duration of three years to be affected by proxy access. We thus conclude against
hypothesis H3 and conclude that small firms did not experience significant declines in firm
value due to greater proxy access.
2.5.4 Eligible Investors and Proxy Access
In Table (2.5), firm size served as a proxy for the impact of contest costs as well as the
likelihood that an investor could accumulate and hold a 3% stake and thus could become
eligible for greater proxy access. Instead of using this likelihood, Table (2.6) analyzes the
value of proxy access reform when a number of 3%-3 year investors (henceforth “eligible
investors”) are already present in a firm’s investor base and thus could immediately make
use of greater proxy access. To do so, we create firm portfolios in which there is (a) no
single eligible investor, (b) at least 1 eligible investor, (c) at least 2 eligible investors and
(d) at least 3 eligible investors in the investor base. Further, we create a portfolio of firms
in which a coalition of up to three institutional investors can jointly cross the 3%-3 year
threshold. Finally, we create a control group portfolio that consists of firms in which there
is no single eligible investor and no coalition of shareholders (with up to 3 members) able
to cross the threshold.
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Table 2.6: Institutional Holdings and Proxy Access
Event Bench- No elig. Coalition At least 1 At least 2 At least 3 Diff. Diff. Diff.
Window mark investors (max.3 eligible eligible eligible (3)&(1) (4)&(1) (5)&(1)
model (Control) investors) investor investors investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
[-1,-1] CAPM -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0043 0.0043 -0.0030 -0.0019 0.0067α
Placebo [-0.82] [-1.35] [-1.35] [-0.75] [0.72] [-0.60] [-0.29] [1.01]
FF4 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0090**β -0.0019 -0.0007 0.0089**β
Placebo [0.12] [-1.15] [-1.23] [-0.11] [2.17] [-0.81] [-0.16] [1.95]
[0,0] CAPM 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0061 -0.0131**γ -0.0036β -0.0061β -0.0131**γ
[0.00] [-0.72] [-0.91] [-1.06] [-2.21] [-0.73] [-0.94] [-1.97]
FF4 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0030α -0.0111***γ -0.0025α -0.0040α -0.0121***γ
[0.80] [-0.43] [-1.07] [-0.81] [-2.69] [-1.04] [-0.96] [-2.66]
[0,1] CAPM -0.0014 -0.0027 -0.0036α -0.0044α -0.0078*β -0.0022α -0.0030α -0.0064*γ
[-0.65] [-1.08] [-1.25] [-1.08] [-1.86] [-0.62] [-0.66] [-1.37]
FF4 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0051*,β -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0051*β
[0.02] [-0.54] [-1.11] [-0.49] [-1.75] [-0.65] [-0.44] [-1.59]
[0,2] CAPM -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0040α -0.0070**β -0.0020α -0.0031α -0.0060*β
[-0.53] [-1.07] [-1.25] [-1.20] [-2.02] [-0.69] [-0.82] [-1.57]
FF4 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0046*β -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0049**β
[0.34] [-0.33] [-0.95] [-0.62] [-1.91] [-0.83] [-0.71] [-1.87]
[0,3] CAPM -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0055*β -0.0013α -0.0017 -0.0047*β
[-0.53] [-0.94] [-1.06] [-0.85] [-1.82] [-0.53] [-0.51] [-1.39]
FF4 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0035*β -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0038**β
[0.34] [-0.26] [-0.70] [-0.30] [-1.67] [-0.68] [-0.43] [-1.66]
Table (2.6) shows the average daily abnormal portfolio returns (measured with CAPM and Fama French 4-factor model) for five firm portfolios in several
event windows around July 22, 2011. The control portfolio in column (1) consists of 2,901 firms in which no single institutional investor has a holding
that satisfies the 3%-3year threshold and qualifies for immediate proxy access. The portfolios in columns (3), (4) and (5) consists of 945, 241 and 31
firms respectively, in which there are at least 1, 2 or 3 institutional investors eligible to make immediate use of greater proxy access. Column (2) consists
of 1,596 firms in which a coalition of up to three investors can jointly cross the 3%-3 year threshold. The numbers in columns (1) to (5) represent the
coefficient γ on dEventWindow in the empirical asset pricing regressions in section (2.4.2). For ease of reading, t-statistics are shown in square brackets;
columns (6)-(8) show one-sided directional t-statistics. *, **, *** represent statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively under the
assumption of normality for portfolio returns. α, β, γ indicate a value in the 10th, 5th and 1st percentile of the 200 trading day empirical distribution
of the respective portfolio (or difference between portfolios).
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Rows 1 and 2 in Table (2.6) show that (with one exception) there are no significant
portfolio valuation changes in the placebo treatment window [-1, -1].21 Further, on the day
of the repeal, the abnormal returns are negative in all specifications in which there exists
at least a coalition of eligible investors. The exception to this is the control group portfolio
(column 1; firms with no single eligible investor) which experiences insignificant positive
as well as negative abnormal returns. The magnitude and significance level of the abnor-
mal returns monotonically increases from a coalition of investors (column 2) toward the
extreme case where there are at least three eligible investors among the firms’ shareholder
base (column 5). On the day of the repeal for example, the FF4 abnormal returns mono-
tonically decline from +10 basis points in the control group portfolio to -6 basis points, -15
basis points, -30 basis points and -111 basis points for the portfolios with a coalition, 1,
2, and 3 eligible investors respectively. The same monotonic tendency can be observed in
all the other event windows [0,1], [0,2] and [0,3] for both CAPM and FF4, but not in the
placebo window [-1,-1]. The strongest and highly significant valuation decline of 111 basis
points occurs on the day of the court repeal for the portfolio in which there are at least
three eligible investors in firms’ investor bases. Columns 6 to 8 provide the difference-in-
difference estimates between firms without any eligible investors (column 1) and those that
have at least 1, 2 or 3 eligible investors. On the day of the court repeal, all differences are
negative, indicating that the valuations of firms with eligible investors dropped relative to
those that had no eligible investors. Most of those differences in columns 6 to 8 also rank
in the bottom 5% or 10% of their respective empirical distributions (some in the lowest
1%) and we obtain statistical significance up to the 1% level when there are at least three
eligible investors (column 8).
The results in Table (2.6) indicate that once the court repealed proxy access for share-
21In column (5) where at least three institutional investors cross the 3%-3 year threshold, we find a
positive and significant abnormal return in the FF4 specification on day -1. Note that the sign of the
abnormal return however flips and the coefficient becomes strongly negative and significant (and remains
so) the very next day as the court repeal became publicly known.
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holders, firm valuations declined among those firms in which it would have been most likely
utilized. The results are again consistent with the notion that whenever proxy access was
strong enough to make an impact on firm valuation, it was perceived positively by the
markets. The fact that we find significant valuation changes only in firms with extreme
ownership situations further highlights that the effects from proxy access reform were fairly
weak. This is consistent with the argument of proponents that the 3%-3 year threshold is
a very high bar for proxy activism (e.g., Fisch 2011; Schuster, 2010).
One potential concern with the results from Table (2.6) could be that activist investors
may have started changing their portfolios in anticipation of greater proxy access. As a re-
sult, on the day of the court repeal on July 22, 2011, many activist investors would not have
held their investment positions for 3 years yet (and those firms might have been included in
the control group of Table (2.6)), leading to a downwards bias. To investigate this concern,
we analyze the holdings of activist investors that are part of the SharkWatch50 index. The
SharkWatch50 index is a compilation of 50 significant activist investors; inclusion into the
list depends on the number of publicly disclosed activist campaigns and proxy fights waged
as well as the past success rate in affecting change at targeted companies (SharkRepellent,
2008). If investors had indeed changed their investment positions in anticipation of greater
proxy access, we would expect to find traces of such a behavior among this selected group
of investors.
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Table 2.7: SharkWatch 50 Holdings, 2009-2011
Average firm holdings by
Sharkwatch 50 Investors
Quarter E6 E4-E5 E0-E3 E0-E5
2009-06 2.4% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
2009-09 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2%
2009-12 2.6% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2%
2010-03 2.6% 2.1% 2.0% 2.1%
2010-06 2.7% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1%
2010-09 2.8% 2.3% 2.1% 2.2%
2010-12 2.9% 2.1% 2.0% 2.1%
2011-03 2.7% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9%
2011-06 2.6% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9%
2011-09 2.7% 2.1% 1.8% 1.9%
Avg. # of holdings 52 454 548 1,004
per quarter
Table (2.7) shows the average holding (as a percentage of market
capitalization of firms) held by SharkWatch50 activist investors
between June 2009 and September 2011 by E-Index and as dis-
closed in quarterly 13F filings with the SEC. SharkWatch50 is
a compilation of 50 significant activist investors that frequently
engage in proxy fights (SharkRepellent, 2008). Share prices and
shares outstanding are obtained from CRSP.
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Column 1 of Table (2.7) shows the average combined size of all SharkWatch50 investor
positions in firms with potential agency issues (E6).22 We present holding data from quar-
terly 13-F disclosures since June 2009 (one year before the Dodd-Frank Act). Naturally,
there are fewer firms in the E6 category than in the remainder categories as there are fewer
E6 firms in the overall market (a total of 72 E6 firms compared to 1,504 firms in the cate-
gories E0 to E5). The results are mixed: the average holding by SharkWatch50 investors
in firms with potential agency issues (E6) indeed continuously increased from 2.4% in June
2009 to 2.9% in December 2010 before declining to 2.7% in September 2011. The decline
however already starts in early 2011 and thus well before the court repeal. Further, there
is no abrupt decline observed in September 2011 after the Court repealed proxy access.23
While E6 holdings increased, columns 3 to 5 show that the average holdings in E4-E5
firms, E0-E3 firms and E0-E5 firms remained constant or slightly decreased in the same
time period. As a result, it is not clear whether the coefficients of our control group in
column 1 of Table (2.6) indeed suffer from a downwards bias. If this was indeed the case,
the coefficients in columns 6-8 of Table (2.6) (difference between treatment and control
group) would have indeed an upwards bias and the effect of the proxy access repeal could
have been larger.
With or without a bias, the results from Table (2.7) lends support for the alternative
hypothesis H4A which states that firm valuations will remain unchanged or will increase as
the number of eligible investors increase.
22As in Table (2.2), E<n> refers to firms that had as of 2007/2008 <n> of the six major anti-takeover
provisions as identified by Bebchuk et al. (2009). We choose to investigate firms by their E-Index as the
major policy goal for enhanced proxy access was to address agency issues by increasing the monitoring and
disciplining power of shareholders.
23One potential explanation for the latter could be that investors require time to divest.
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2.5.5 Special-Interest Investors and Proxy Access Reform
A major concern put forth by critics of greater proxy access is that “union [and pension]
funds were among the most active shareholders and often pursued changes that furthered
union interests rather than the company’s or shareholders’.” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
2010: 5). In its ruling the Court of Appeals mirrored those concerns:
“Notwithstanding the ownership and holding requirements, there is good
reason to believe institutional investors with special-interests will be able to
use the rule [..] Nonetheless, the Commission failed to respond to comments
arguing that investors with a special-interest, such as unions and state and local
governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than their interest in
share value, can be expected to pursue self-interested objectives rather than
the goal of maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to
incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected. [..] By ducking
serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed upon companies from
use of the rule by shareholders representing special interests, particularly
union and government pension funds, we think the Commission acted arbitrar-
ily.” (Court of Appeals, 2011: 14-15)
Although the incentives of special-interests investors may well diverge from those of the
general shareholder base, it is ex-ante not clear if greater proxy access in its proposed form
would have indeed empowered special-interest investors sufficiently to inflict damage onto
public firms. After all, greater proxy access allows only to nominate a board candidate,
while a majority of the shareholders still need to vote for the dissident nominee over the
board’s candidate. Further, as for example Schuster (2010: 1068-9) points out, with the
practice of diversified portfolio management to reduce risk, most special-interest investors
are unlikely to cross the 3%-3 year threshold.24
To investigate whether the market agrees that a potential abuse of greater proxy ac-
cess by special-interest investors (union and pension funds) would hurt firm valuations,
24As an example: The median S&P500 company on 12/31/2010 had a market cap of $11.2 billion. Hence,
an investor has to continuously hold a $334 million investment position for 3 years to cross the threshold
so to be allowed to nominate a candidate.
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we investigate all publicly disclosed shareholdings by special-interest investors. To do so,
we manually identify all special-interest investors among the 13-F filers and extract their
shareholdings. We then form firm portfolios in which a single special-interest investor – or
a coalition thereof – holds 3% (alternatively, 1% or 0.5%) for 3 years (alternatively, 2, 1
and 0 years) continuously.
Table (2.8) shows the results when requiring a 3-year holding period. The first three
columns show portfolios of firms in which special-interest investors (unions and pension
funds) held a 3%, 1%, or 0.5% stake for at least 3 years. Columns 4 and 5 use firm port-
folios where a potential coalition of special-interest investors (of any size) jointly crosses
the 3% or 1% threshold. Finally, columns 6 to 8 provide the returns to firm portfolios in
which investors (who are not pension funds or unions) cross the 3%, 1% or 0.5% ownership
threshold with a holding period of 3 years and there is no special-interest investor invested
with a greater than 0.5% eligible shareholder stake. Columns 6 to 8 thereby serve as our
control group.
Noteworthy, we find only 12 firms in which a single special-interest investor overcomes
the 3% ownership threshold for 12 consecutive quarters (Q3-2008 to Q2-2011). As we
reduce the ownership threshold to 1% and 0.5% the number of firms increases to 77 and
1,093 firms respectively. This indicates that most investments that are held by special-
interest investors for a long period of time remain below the 1% threshold.25 Allowing
for the formation of special interest coalitions (columns 4 and 5), the number of firms in
which the 3% and 1% threshold is jointly crossed jumps to 33 and 1,245 firms respectively.
25This is consistent with what Fisch (2011) argues: “Public pension funds, union pension funds, founda-
tions and the like virtually never hold as much as 3% of a company – holdings of even 1% are comparatively
rare, because such concentrated holdings increase the risk of the institution’s portfolio.” (ibid: 27) Likewise,
this is supported by a comment letter by the National Coalition for Corporate Reform (NCCR) received by
the SEC in 2004 during an earlier attempt to reform proxy access: “[T]he combined ownership [of the three
largest public pension funds at the time, CalPers, CalSTRS and NYSRF] exceeds 2% in only one instance
and exceeds 1.5% in only twelve instances.” (SEC, 2004: VII.E2)
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Thus, even with the potential of coalitions among pension and union funds, only 33 firms
could have faced dissident nominees put forth by a coalition of special-interest investors
that would have immediately qualified for greater proxy access.
The results in Table (2.8) show that there were no significant changes in firm valua-
tions on the day of the repeal or thereafter when special-interest investors held alone or in
a coalition a large eligible ownership stake. This holds for the 3% threshold but also for a
1% or even a 0.5% threshold. Peculiarly, we find some negative and significant abnormal
CAPM returns the day before the court ruling in the case where special-interest investors
cross 1% (column 2) or when a coalition can jointly cross 3% (column 4). The significance
however disappears after controlling for the Fama-French 4 factors. Note that if those
abnormal returns were to represent an early incorporation of leaked information into stock
prices, the negative abnormal returns would imply that markets had valued proxy access
for special-interest investors. We do not argue that this is the case as we do not find any
other statistical significance (neither while assuming returns to be normally distributed nor
with the respective empirical distributions).
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Table 2.8: Special-Interest Investors and Proxy Access
Event Bench- Special-Interest Investors Coalition of Non-Special Interest Investors
Window mark Special-Interest Inv. (Control Group)
Model ...with ...with ...with ...with ...with ...with ...with ...with
>3% >1% >0.5% >3% >1% >3% >1% >0.5%
(n=12) (n=77) (n=1,093) (n=33) (n=1,245) (n=251) (n=473) (n=600)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
[-1,-1] CAPM -0.0111 -0.0085**β -0.0043 -0.0084*β -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0019
Placebo [-1.14] [-2.05] [-1.14] [-1.75] [-1.18] [-0.46] [-0.13] [-0.09]
FF4 -0.0107 -0.0051 -0.0004 -0.0050 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0058 -0.0037
Placebo [-1.10] [-1.48] [-0.28] [-1.12] [-0.29] [-0.31] [-0.22] [-0.18]
[0,0] CAPM -0.0002 0.0031 -0.0029 0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0003 0.0016 0.0019
[-0.02] [0.73] [-0.75] [0.50] [-0.69] [-0.08] [0.06] [0.09]
FF4 0.0012 0.0035 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0025 0.0026
[0.13] [1.04] [-0.85] [0.40] [-0.86] [-0.02] [0.09] [0.12]
[0,1] CAPM 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0026 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0009
[0.13] [0.40] [-0.97] [-0.01] [-0.81] [-0.55] [-0.10] [-0.06]
FF4 0.0012 0.0025 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0009
[0.30] [1.03] [-0.44] [0.17] [-0.17] [-0.44] [-0.10] [-0.06]
[0,2] CAPM 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0024 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0007
[0.40] [0.01] [-1.10] [-0.03] [-0.82] [-0.00] [-0.06] [-0.06]
FF4 0.0030 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0010
[0.59] [0.66] [-0.62] [0.27] [-0.03] [0.18] [-0.09] [-0.09]
[0,3] CAPM -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0010
[-0.26] [0.02] [-0.73] [-0.35] [-0.69] [-0.15] [-0.10] [-0.10]
FF4 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0016
[-0.12] [0.83] [0.24] [0.14] [0.29] [0.05] [-0.16] [-0.15]
Table (2.8) shows the average daily abnormal portfolio returns (measured with CAPM and Fama French 4-factor model). The first three
columns use portfolios of firms in which special-interest investors (unions and pension funds) held a 3%, 1%, or 0.5% stake for at least 3 years.
Columns 4 and 5 use firm portfolios where a coalition (of any size) of special-interest investors can jointly cross the 3% or 1% threshold.
Finally, columns 6 to 8 provide the returns to control portfolios in which investors who are not pension funds or unions cross the 3%, 1% or
0.5% ownership threshold with a holding period of 3 years and no special-interest investor holds more than a 0.5% eligible share. The numbers
in columns (1) to (8) represent the coefficient γ on dEventWindow in the empirical asset pricing regressions in section III. T -statistics are
shown in square brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively under the assumption of normally
distributed portfolio returns. α, β, γ indicate a coefficient in the 10th, 5th and 1st percentile in the empirical distribution of the respective
portfolio obtained from a 200 trading day window around the day of the repeal. None of the differences between columns (1) to (5) with their
respective control portfolio in columns (6) to (8) are statistically significant (not shown in table). Also checked but not shown in table:
Holding periods of 2 years, 1 year and 0 years.
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Further, no difference between the treatment portfolios (columns 1 to 5) and the respec-
tive control group portfolios (columns 6-8) are significant (output omitted). In unreported
results, we repeat the analysis and find the same results with holding period requirements
of 2 years, 1 year and without any holding period requirement at all. We also repeat the
analysis while value-weighting firm portfolios for 3 years, 2 years, 1 year and 0 years hold-
ing periods and also do not find any significant differences. As a result, we do not find any
support for hypothesis 5 that the market expected public firms to face greater costs due to
a potential abuse of proxy access by special-interest investors. This result is perhaps not
surprising when recalling that after the nomination, an activist special-interest investor
would still need to convince the majority of shareholders to vote for its dissident candidate
over the management’s candidate. Further, most special-interest investors’ own positions
well below 1% and rarely cross the required 3% threshold.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the shareholder wealth effects from proxy access reform as introduced by the
SEC in August 2010. To do so, we use the surprise repeal of proxy access reform through
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on July 22, 2011. We argue that this event serves as
a natural experiment as neither the timing nor the Court’s decision was anticipated by
the market. We confirm the surprise of the market through a placebo treatment on the
day prior to the repeal as well as by comparing how our estimates rank in their respective
empirical distributions.
First, the results indicate that the effects from proxy access reform were rather weak.
We only find significant effects in extreme ownership situations, in extreme corporate gov-
ernance situations and for the difference between very small and very large firms. Wherever
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we do obtain significant effects, they are consistent with the notion that the market valued
proxy access reform positively. Specifically, while proxy access is valuable to firms that
have many of the anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) associated with agency issues, we do
not find any significant valuation changes for any one specific ATP with the exception of
staggered boards. We further do not find any negative impact on firms that have few or
no ATPs. Second, we analyze overall U.S. shareholder wealth effects by (1) comparing the
returns to several U.S. market indices to those of international benchmark indices, and
(2) by estimating the abnormal returns to all those firms that were mandated to provide
greater proxy access. In both cases, we do not find any positive or negative abnormal re-
turns, which indicates that total U.S. shareholder wealth was not affected by proxy access.
Third, we do find a differential impact by firm size: while large firms do not experience
any significant valuation changes, we find a monotonically increasing valuation decline the
smaller a firm becomes. This firm size effect – strongest for the smallest quintile of firms
with market capitalizations between $75 million and $184 million – does however not ex-
ist for very small public firms (<$75 million market cap) which had been exempted from
proxy access reform for 3 years. We further find a significant difference of 23 to 38 ba-
sis points between the smallest quintile of affected public firms and the largest quintile
of public firms. The results thereby do not lend any empirical support to concerns that
small firms could have become overwhelmed by potential proxy contest costs; rather, they
provide some indication that the market expected small firms to also benefit from greater
proxy access. Fourth, we investigate institutional holdings. We find that firm valuation
declined upon the repeal in the number of eligible investors. The results however again
indicate that the reform was rather weak: having a coalition or just one or two investors
crossing the threshold does not yet yield a significant change in valuation. Only in the
rare case with three or more eligible investors in the investor base we find (large negative)
significant valuation changes. Nonetheless, all coefficients (also in less severe ownership
cases) are firmly negative and several rank in the lowest 5-10% of their respective empiri-
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cal distributions. Our last piece of evidence concerns special-interest investors. Critics of
greater proxy access have been particularly outspoken about the potential of shareholder
wealth destruction through unions and pension funds abusing proxy access. We do not
find any evidence that the market agrees with this argument for the prescribed 3%-3 year
threshold, but also for lower ownership thresholds and shorter holding period requirements.
To summarize, the evidence supports the notion that greater proxy access is beneficial to
firms with potential agency problems, while not adversely impacting smaller firms, firms
with few anti-takeover provisions or firms with special-interest investors. The evidence
thereby corroborates results from the greater literature on the benefits from shareholder
activism and provides support (from a natural experiment in a within-country setting) for
international evidence that greater shareholder rights lead to greater shareholder wealth.
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3.0 GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION, COMPETITION AND BANK
SURVIVAL
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Banks fail when they cannot meet their obligations to depositors or creditors; this, in turn,
is typically preceded by a shock to a bank’s mortgage and loan portfolio or by depositors
drawing down their savings. Bank instability can also be triggered by a shock to an-
other financial institution or a shock to some asset class that propagates through financial
channels such as payments systems, interbank markets or other asset markets (Bandt and
Hartmann, 2002). This paper focuses exclusively on the former source of bank instability:
the one that arises from portfolio shocks that are due to severe declines in local real estate
and labor markets. As will be discussed in more detail in later sections, such portfolio
shocks lie at the core of hundreds of commercial bank failures in the U.S. between 2008-
2011.
Differently from the bankruptcy of a manufacturing firm, the failure of a financial in-
stitution may lead to large negative externalities and social costs. The default of a large
interconnected bank may for example reduce the survival probability of financial counter-
parties in interbank, securities or derivative markets. Counterparty exposures are however
rarely transparent to other market participants; thus, also a healthy financial firm may find
itself cut-off from financial markets as distrust and uncertainty creeps into the financial
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system. Liquidity needs may further spur asset fire sales that depress asset prices and
cause real losses and write downs, setting off margin calls and prompting further asset fire
sales, thus producing a spiral of financial distress that also affect healthy institutions. In
an alternative scenario, the failure of a small financial institution may lead to a bank run,
which – with few costs to retrieving one’s money and potentially large costs to not doing
so for other banks’ customers – has the potential to snowball into a general bank run in
which even healthy banks fall prey to the banking-inherent maturity mismatch between
assets and liabilities. Whenever the social costs exceed the private costs of a default, a gov-
ernment intervention may thus become warranted. Consequently, after several such bank
runs during the Great Depression, the U.S. government provided in 1934 a taxpayer-backed
deposit guarantee to break this cycle. The potential of a small shock to escalate into a
widespread crisis of confidence and to impose large costs on society thus distinguishes the
defaults of financial firms from those of manufacturing firms.
Branching into other counties and states has been credited with allowing banks to diver-
sify away from local economic shocks in real estate and labor markets and thus to smooth
both asset volatility (the values of loans and mortgages) and liability volatility (the deposits
by savers). The idea that greater geographic branching may result in a more stable and
more competitive banking system has been around for more than a century (cf. Sprague,
1902) and was among the key rationales of the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) that sought (unsuccessfully) to eliminate restrictions
on interstate banking as of 1997. From a theoretical perspective, bank branching should
lead to greater financial stability in the banking sector as it leads to bank portfolios being
spread out over more banking markets, thus smoothing asset and liability volatility (e.g.,
Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Gart, 1994; and Calomiris and Mason, 2001 among others).
The empirical evidence however is decidedly mixed: on the one hand, branching has been
found to increase individual bank stability due to a greater geographic diversification of
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bank portfolios and to increase overall bank system’s stability due to greater competition
that removes weaker and inefficient banks prior to a crisis (Grossman, 1994; Wheelock,
1995; Calomiris, 2000). At the same time however there is also empirical evidence that
greater competition reduces profit margins thereby eroding a bank’s charter value and
leading to greater risk-taking by bank managers (Keeley, 1990; Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz; 2000, Jime´nez, Lopez and Saurina, 2007). Further, there is empirically evidence
that banks may decrease their capital reserves and increase credit risk as they diversify
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Calomiris and Mason, 2001; Carlson, 2004) thus intention-
ally offsetting some or all diversification gains. As a result, while the theoretic literature
predicts branching and geographic portfolio diversification to increase bank stability, the
accompanying increase in competition and reduction in capital reserves may offset any or
all diversification benefits and may even lead to a decline in stability.
This chapter has three objectives. First, it examines whether greater bank branching
affected banks’ survival rates in the context of the recent 2008-2011 U.S. banking crisis
in which more than 5% (10%) of U.S. banks failed (ceased to exist). Second, the paper
estimates the effect from portfolio diversification on the probability of bank survival and
disentangles the effect from the one of banking competition. The findings thereby con-
tribute to the ongoing debate whether banking competition increases or decreases bank
stability. Third, I analyze whether banks decreased capital reserves at the same time while
they were enlarging their geographic footprint prior to the 2008 crisis, thereby offsetting
the portfolio risk decline achieved by a greater geographic diversification of loans and mort-
gages.
Analyzing geographic diversification assumes that local economic fundamentals that
occur within a bank’s branch network actually matters for its portfolio and its perfor-
mance. This assumption is not as obvious as it may seem: on the asset side of the balance
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sheet, new financial innovations such as syndicated corporate loans or asset backed secu-
rities (mortgages, auto, credit card, tuition) that are spread across the country may allow
a bank to diversify independently from its geographic footprint. On the liabilities side,
online banking and brokered deposits may allow banks to obtain deposits from outside its
geographic reach. Furthermore, many banks sell conforming mortgages in secondary mort-
gage markets and can thereby reduce the risk from and exposure to the local economy’s
business cycle. As a result, I investigate in a first step whether the assumption that local
economic fundamentals still matter to banks holds up empirically during 2008-2011 period.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the best of
my knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the benefits of branching and geographic
diversification in the context of the 2008-2011 U.S. banking crisis. This matters because the
benefits from branching may differ today significantly from those found in previous banking
crises which have been investigated in the existing literature (the Great Depression in the
1930s and the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s). The benefits may differ because of
a much larger availability of financial innovation that allows less geographically diversified
banks to economically diversify nationwide without an actual physical branch network, and
– owing to a more activist Federal Reserve – a reduced likelihood of bank runs than during
earlier banking crises. Further, the U.S. banking landscape has changed significantly since
the most recent banking crisis: between 1994 and 2007 alone, the number of U.S. banks
has shrunk by 34% while the number of bank branches simultaneously increased by 16%.
Today, the average distance between a bank’s headquarter and its branches has more than
doubled from 9.31 miles to 21.62 miles. These numbers suggest large changes to banking
competition and geographic diversification since the last major banking crisis in the 1980s,
thus raising doubts about the applicability of results that are based on banking crises in
the 1930s or 1980s.
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Second, I introduce a novel and arguably superior measure for geographic diversifica-
tion. The existing literature has traditionally focused on measures of geographic spread of
a bank’s network to measure geographic diversification (for example, the average distance
between a bank’s headquarter and its branches or whether a bank operates out-of-state
branches), thereby conflating the effects from portfolio diversification with those from being
exposed to more banking competition. I construct separate variables that aim at disentan-
gling both effects. Specifically, my measure of portfolio diversification is based on portfolio
theory: as bank loan and mortgage portfolios are unobserved, I consider a U.S. county as
an asset into which the bank can invest by establishing local branches. I further use the
share of local deposits a bank derives from each U.S. county (relative to its total deposit
base) as the portfolio weight with which the bank is invested into that asset. The portfolio
approach assumes that banks invest into mortgages and loans in those counties where it
has established branches and thus its loan and mortgage portfolio is affected by local eco-
nomic shocks to those counties.1 Using monthly county unemployment numbers between
1990 and 2007 as a proxy for county economic conditions and local business cycles, I then
estimate the portfolio risk by computing the historical variances and covariances of all U.S.
county labor markets into which a bank has invested (and thus of its unobserved loan
and mortgage portfolios in those counties). The resulting portfolio risk measure provides
a more exact estimate for the degree of a bank’s portfolio diversification than previous
spread-related measures.
Third, to deal with potential endogeneity in the results, I employ two novel instrumen-
tal variables. I use exogenous topographic variation (oceans and international borders) and
the availability of distinct local business cycles nearby bank headquarters so to instrument
the actual degree of portfolio diversification with the potential of banks to geographically
diversify. This instrument is based on the well-established observation that banks do not
1To ensure that this is a reasonable assumption, I analyze in section (3.5.1) whether bank performances
are indeed related to county economic conditions.
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branch into far-flung regions (typically explained by increasing costs of monitoring far-off
branches, marketing costs and less knowledge about far-off markets and borrowers) but
typically branch out along the boundaries of their existing network. The instrument thus
estimates how much portfolio diversification could be achieved by a bank within a 200 miles
radius around its headquarter. For example, while certain Midwestern banks have plenty
of potential counties with diverse local business cycles within a 200 miles radius to invest
into, banks in Florida are surrounded by oceans and banks in Michigan are limited by
the Great Lakes, the international border with Canada and an automotive industry that
imposes similar business cycles on nearby counties. I further instrument the amount of
competition a bank was exposed to prior to the 2008 U.S. crisis using state-level restric-
tions on interstate branching. While the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act (that went into effect in
1997) reduced federal restrictions on interstate branching, it allowed states to introduce
their own state-level restrictions for out-of-state banks that attempt to enter their mar-
kets. Subsequently, between 1994 and 2005, most U.S. states established restrictions for
out-of-state banks, often entering into reciprocity agreements with other states. This –
combined with the geographic distance between states – provides exogenous time-series
and cross-sectional variation for the amount of competition a bank faced from out-of-state
competitors prior to the 2008 banking crisis. Using such a market contestability measure
for the degree of banking competition also mitigates well-known concerns that traditional
concentration-based competition measures (Hirschman-Herfindal index or the number of
competitors) are poor empirical proxies for the amount of actual competition taking place
(see, for example, Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, Freixas and Seabright, 2010: 17-23).
I find that both portfolio diversification and banking competition are positively cor-
related with bank survival, reducing the probability of failure (conditional on other bank
covariates) by 5.8% per standard deviation of portfolio diversification and by 1.6% per stan-
dard deviation of banking competition. These are very large effects given an unconditional
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probability of failure during 2008-2011 of 5.2% and are robust to a range of verification
tests. The findings are also confirmed with a number of alternative bank distress measures:
on the extensive margin, the volatility of earnings, the distance from failure or insolvency
and the proportion of at-risk loans; on the intensive margin, the length of survival for
non-surviving or failing banks. Finally, the degree of geographic diversification is shown
to also play a relevant role outside the crisis period, even though its strongest stabilizing
impact is experienced during the crisis. These findings are relevant to banking regulators
as both the U.S. and European banking markets continue to be characterized by financial
fragmentation and bank instability, and as new regulatory frameworks introduce implicit
incentives for banks to increase their degree of geographic diversification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I shortly describe the
severity of the 2008-2011 U.S. banking crisis as well as recent regulatory changes to increase
the stability of the banking system by inducing a greater level of geographic diversifica-
tion. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the past literature on banking competition,
geographic diversification and bank stability. Section 4 then introduces the methodology
and the data while section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 THE 2008-2011 U.S. BANKING CRISIS AND CURRENT REFORMS
3.2.1 The Banking Crisis
Much has been written about the causes and consequences of the 2007 U.S. financial crisis;
a review of the financial crisis or its literature is outside of the scope of this paper and I
will instead content here with a brief description of the effects of the financial crisis on the
banking sector.
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Between 2008 and 2011, the FDIC closed 427 banks as their risk-adjusted capital re-
serve ratios had fallen below the mandatory 3% threshold.2 During the same time another
486 banks were taken over by competitors, often during financial distress. As a result,
the number of banks dropped between January 2008 and December 2011 by a staggering
913 banks, or 10.6% of the U.S. banks that had existed in January 2008. These numbers
compare to a total of just 575 FDIC-closed banks in almost 50 years (11 failures per year)
between 1934 (the inception of FDIC deposit insurance) and 1981 (shortly before the start
of the Savings and Loan crisis) and just 73 bank failures (or 6 per year) for the 14 years
between 1994 and 2007.
If we restrict our attention to only those banks that were publicly listed on one of
the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX), we can use the market valuation
of banks to learn the investors’ view about the severity of the crisis. Figure (3.1) shows
the daily combined market valuation of all publicly listed U.S. banks (solid line) and its
standard deviation based on a 3-month rolling window (dashed line) between January 2005
and December 2010. At the height of the crisis the total market value of all U.S. public
banks had fallen from a peak of $1.72 trillion in February 2007 to a low of $426 billion in
March 2009 – a staggering decline of 75.3%. At the same time, the standard deviation of
U.S. banks’ total market valuation tripled from an average of $25.8 billion between January
2005 and February 2007 to an average of $72.8 billion between March 2007 and July 2009.
Figure (3.2) provides another cut of the data to show the calamity of the crisis: it dis-
plays the number of publicly listed U.S. banks by their market valuation change between
January 2007 and December 2009. Even though the worst period of the market decline had
ended months earlier (cf. figure (3.1)), among the 506 publicly listed banks that survived
2Another 50 banks were closed between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012.
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Figure 3.1: Daily Market Capitalization of Public U.S. Banks, 2005-2011
until December 2009, 56 banks had still market valuation declines in excess of 90% and
more than half of all the banks (266 banks) continued to have valuation declines in excess
of 50%. An additional 135 banks had delisted between 2007-2009.
A major factor that led to a stabilization of the U.S. banking sector was a federal
recapitalization program for struggling banks in 2009. By December 31, 2009, the U.S.
Government had injected a total of $200 billion as part of TARP’s Capital Purchase Pro-
gram (CPP) into 704 bank holding companies that owned 742 banks. In 657 (or 90.2%)
of those injections, the government received preferred stocks, thus effectively nationalizing
part the U.S. banking sector.3 By June 2012, 341 institutions had repaid TARP funds,
3In the remaining 9.8%, it received subordinated debentures thereby becoming a non-collateralized
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Figure 3.2: Losses in Market Capitalization 2007-2009 among Public U.S. Banks
while another 401 banks were still partly owned by the government. Nonetheless, in an-
other sign of continued bank distress, 921 U.S. banks with combined assets of $349 billion
remained on the FDIC’s (unofficial) list of “problem banks” as of July 2012.4 Combining
these facts, the 2008-2011 period qualifies as one of the worst banking crises in modern
U.S. history.
Notably, 249 out of the 427 bank failures in our sample occurred in 2010 or 2011 – long
creditor. (Data based on an analysis of the CPP transaction lists in Office of the Special Inspector General
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (2010: 173-198; 2012: 239-256).
4The FDIC does not make its list of problem banks public. Various sources however compile an unofficial
list by collecting the publicly available FDIC enforcement letters to banks (consent orders, cease and desist
orders, etc.). The reported numbers are based on a list compiled in July 2012 by calculatedriskblog.com.
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after the panic of the Lehman failure in September 2008, many months after the market
valuations of public banks had recovered (cf. figure (3.1)) and well after the U.S. Govern-
ment had injected TARP funding into struggling banks. Owing to a robust intervention
by regulators, the majority of 2008-2011 U.S. bank failures had not been triggered by the
propagation of a large bank default shock via payment systems or counterparty exposures
in the asset markets. Instead – as section (3.5.1) empirically shows – the majority of U.S.
bank failures were due to sharp declines in local real estate and labor markets affecting
bank portfolios and performances, which could potentially have been mitigated by a greater
degree of geographic diversification in banks’ mortgage and loan portfolios.
3.2.2 Current Reforms in Banking Regulation
In a special edition of Central Banker, FED economists Jim Fuchs and vice president for
Banking Supervision and Regulation Timothy Bosch identify the failure to diversify among
the four major reasons for bank failures during the most recent crisis (Fuchs and Bosch,
2009:4). Consequently, newly proposed banking regulation aims at increasing the strength
of banks and the overall banking system by increasing the diversification of bank funds
and bank portfolios.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for example proposes in its latest Basel
III framework the introduction of a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR requires any bank to hold sufficient high-quality liquid
assets so to be able to survive net cash outflows lasting 30 days. The NSFR requires banks
to show evidence that the available stable funding exceeds the required amount of stable
funding for a one year period of financial stress. Since core deposits represents in the av-
erage U.S. bank 70% of bank funding, the requirement falls by and large upon deposits as
the main funding source. Thus, branching into economic regions that operate on separate
local economic business cycles (so to avoid a quick drawndown of deposits during a local
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labor market downturn in one region) becomes key to avoiding a shortfall in stable funding.
In addition, Basel III recommends a new counter-cyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% that
strengthens the rationale for greater fund diversification to reduce the effect of business
cycles. The U.S. Federal Reserve announced on December 20, 2011 that it would fully
implement those Basel III recommendations.
While new banking regulation encourages greater diversification of bank funds and calls
for greater branching into diverse economic regions so to insulate bank portfolios from busi-
ness cycle volatility, it is however not yet fully understood how geographic diversification
impacts bank stability. Section 3 discusses this point in greater detail.
3.3 BRANCHING, DIVERSIFICATION, COMPETITION AND BANK
STABILITY
3.3.1 Bank Branching, Diversification and Bank Stability
Discussing restrictions to interstate branching, Sprague (1903) is among the earliest ref-
erences to argue that branching allows for a spreading of risk and a more effective use of
bank funds:
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“The danger of heavy losses at any one time is reduced if the bank is engaged in
business over a wide geographic area (..) [Further,] a bank must actually hold
or be able to get at all times enough money to meet any demands which, upon
the most conservative estimate, are likely to be made upon. The larger number
of depositors and the more varied their business, the less likely these demands
to come at any one time. (..) The greater efficiency of reserves may result
not only in greater safety, but also in an important economy of the cost of
banking facilities. In Canada [where there are no branching restrictions], cash
holdings normally run between 7 and 8 per cent of demand liabilities, while
in the United States the proportion is in the neighborhood of 15 per cent.”
(Sprague, 1903: pp. 243-4)
Much of Sprague’s argument has been reaffirmed in later studies. In their detailed
account of the Great Depression, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for example attribute
the high failure rate of banks during the Great Depression to the lack of bank branching
at the time. Wheelock (1995) and Calomiris (2000) find empirical evidence of this: U.S.
states and regions that had greater bank branching experienced indeed lower failure rates,
suggesting more stable state banking systems due to branching. Gart (1994) suggests that
interstate branching mitigated losses and bank failures during the 1980s Savings and Loan
crisis, and Grossman (1994) finds support that countries that had banking systems with
greater branching during the Great Depression were less likely to experience a banking
crisis. Finally, much of the rationale for the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was based upon the presumed expected benefits that
greater geographic diversification would bring for efficiency and stability (Shiers, 2002).
While greater bank stability in the aggregate (usually, measured at the state level)
has generally been attributed to geographic diversification and branching, Calomiris and
Mason (2000) and Carlson (2004) analyze individual bank-level data during the Great De-
pression and find the opposite result: branch banks were more likely to fail and tended
to fail sooner than unit banks. This, so the authors argue, was due to the lower capital
reserves that banks with branches held relative to unit banks – a point already made by
Sprague (1903) in the above quote. Thus, instead of retaining the lower bank risk attained
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from diversification, bank managers during the Great Depression sought higher expected
returns by lowering capital reserves. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find a similar conflict be-
tween greater diversification and lower capital ratios in a more recent data set: the authors
analyze market measures of diversification for 150 publicly listed bank holding companies
between 1980 and 1993. While larger bank holding companies have higher measures of
diversification than smaller ones, the stocks of both exhibit historically similar risk. The
authors explain this inconsistency via greater risk-taking: any diversification benefits that
larger banks accrue are offset by lower capital ratios and larger credit risks.
Carlson and Mitchener (2006) suggest an alternative channel to reconcile the two con-
flicting findings that fewer state branching restrictions lead to more stable state banking
systems in the aggregate but also to greater failure rates for branch banks relative to unit
banks. The two authors argue that branching allows more efficient banks to enter the
markets of inefficient banks, thereby purging the banking system (prior to the arrival of a
banking crisis) from the weakest and most inefficient banks – a point made by the efficient
structure hypothesis (cf. section (3.3.2)). While fewer branching restrictions and the ensu-
ing competition may therefore leave the banking system more resilient in the aggregate, it
is consistent with the observation that branch banks may fail earlier and more often than
unit banks due to lower capital buffers.
The existing literature thus suggests that greater geographic diversification may in-
crease overall bank stability through a greater level of diversification of bank portfolios,
thereby isolating banks against local economic shocks in labor or real estate markets. The
literature also suggests that those benefits may be offset by banks lowering their capital
reserves, thereby increasing their exposure to unforeseen shocks. If this was true, new
banking regulation that incentivizes banks to diversify geographically may well be ren-
dered ineffective by bank managers’ subsequent decision to reduce capital buffers. Finally,
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greater geographic diversification however also increases a bank’s exposure toward compe-
tition, whose effect on bank stability – as further discussed in the next subsection – remains
unresolved in the literature.
3.3.2 Banking Competition and Bank Stability
Does banking competition increase bank stability? The question remains unresolved. Both
the theoretical and empirical literature are ambiguous about the relationship between bank-
ing competition on the one hand and individual bank stability or aggregate bank stability
on the other. While theoretic ambiguity typically renders the discovery of a relationship
to empiricists, this is complicated in this case by the absence of an agreed-upon method to
measure banking competition (see, e.g., Bikker and Spierdijk, 2010). As a result, the empir-
ical literature has employed different methods and measures and has found contrary results.
Competition in the non-banking industry is typically associated with more innovation,
improved efficiency, lower prices, greater product variety and an overall increase in con-
sumer welfare. There are however defining market aspects specific to the financial sector
which makes competition in this sector depart from the textbook version of competition.5
Specifically, while fierce competition increases consumer welfare, it also entails thinner
profit margins which might increase a bank’s vulnerability to a shock to its portfolio. This
effect may further get amplified by a deposit insurance scheme that frees depositors from
monitoring banks’ financial conditions and incentivizes them to shop for the highest deposit
interest rates. Thus, troubled banks may engage in an aggressive asset growth strategy
by offering high interest rates, while healthy banks become vulnerable to sudden deposit
withdrawals, thereby exacerbating the maturity mismatch of banks’ assets and liabilities.
Once a bank is in distress, the downside for shareholders, employees and management in
5These include for example asymmetric information, network effects, customer switching costs or negative
externalities in case of firm bankruptcy.
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turn is truncated while the upside implies firm survival; thus, excessive risk-taking becomes
attractive leading to magnified social losses if the gamble turns bad. With fewer and on
average larger banks, these gambles may grow further in size and may involve a greater
number of counterparties, thus increasing aggregate risk. As a result, greater competition
may reduce individual as well as aggregate bank stability. An earlier and much related the-
ory argues that less competition and accompanying higher profit margins increase banks’
charter (or franchise) value, thereby incentivizing bank managers to reduce risk-taking in
order to avoid bankruptcy and forgoing future super-profits (see, e.g., Hellman, Murdock
and Stiglitz, 2000).
While there is the theoretic potential for competition to worsen bank stability, compe-
tition may however also have the potential to do just the opposite, i.e. increase individual
and aggregate bank stability. Endogenizing for example entrepreneurial effort by making
it a function of banks’ interest rates (which in turn impacts entrepreneurial payoff and
thus her effort to succeed) may reduce bank portfolio risk. It thus becomes an empirical
question which effect – greater instability due to lower profit margins or less instability
due to greater entrepreneurial effort with an accompanying reduction in loan riskiness –
dominates (Boyd and De Nicolo´, 2005). Further, competition can also lead to ambigu-
ous results via the interbank market: banks with surplus liquidity may withhold liquidity
from banks that suffer from liquidity problems. Or, they may provide more liquidity to
avoid contagion and a fire sale of assets that may reduce the valuation of their own assets
(Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2012).6
As if theory was not yet troublesome enough, the literature is further unclear on how to
empirically measure banking competition. While many studies (and regulators) often rely
on concentration measures (e.g., HHI, C3, C5), the relationship between concentration and
6For a historical example of the latter, see the Great Panic of 1907.
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competition relies on a vague structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. It is how-
ever not clear whether fewer banks indeed implies less competition among banks, a point
made by the efficient structure hypothesis. According to the efficient structure hypothesis,
more efficient banks grow faster and less efficient banks lose market share, are taken over
or are forced to exit the market; this process of fighting for market share – at least while
still ongoing – implies fierce competition among banks even if there are only few around
(Berger, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich, 2004). Alternative micro-founded competi-
tion measures do exist (e.g., Lerner-index, H-statistic), but require detailed input costs and
product price information that is often unavailable while still often ignoring bank size, and
product and geographic markets (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2010; OECD, 2010). As a result,
many authors prefer regulatory-based measures that impact the competitive environment
of banks (e.g., the openness to international competitors or regulatory restrictions to spe-
cific banking activities), often referred to as market contestability measures. The benefits
of such measures are however tempered by their rarity and often crudeness.
Finally, the empirical evidence on competition’s impact on bank stability is further
mixed. Keeley (1990) and Jime´nez, Lopez and Saurina (2007) provide evidence for the
charter value hypothesis – more competition eroding bank charter values and leading to
greater risk-taking by bank managers – for the U.S. and Spain. To the contrary, cross-
country studies predominately find that both concentration and competition increase ag-
gregate bank stability. Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2006) analyze how banking con-
centration measures are related to the likelihood of a financial crises for 47 crisis episodes
across 69 countries between 1980-1997. Controlling for the differences in regulatory policies
and macroeconomic conditions, the authors find that a higher degree of concentration is
associated with a decline in the likelihood of a crisis. Additionally, however, the authors
also find that countries with mechanisms that foster competition (e.g., more openness to
international competitors or fewer restriction on non-loan generating activities) experience
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fewer banking crises. To reconcile both findings, the authors suggest that concentration
measures are inapt measures of competition. Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2006) confirm
those results when measuring banking competition with the H-statistic. Reviewing a large
set of literature, Beck (2009: 14) concludes that the majority of cross-country studies find
a positive relationship between competition and stability and mixed evidence between con-
centration and stability. Within-country study results are however more ambiguous as such
studies do not control for regulatory framework.
3.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.4.1 Data
3.4.1.1 Bank branch networks and branch deposits I collect all U.S. bank branches
with their addresses between 1994 and 2011 from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits database.
In total, the data set covers 28,201 distinct depository institutions and a total of 1,597,842
branch-year data points. Table 1 provides summary statistics. Column 1 shows that be-
tween 1994 and 2011 the number of banks declined by over 40% from 12,980 to 7,512. At
the same time, the total number of branches simultaneously increased by 21 percent from
80,788 to 97,678. As a result, the average (surviving) bank more than doubled the num-
ber of its branches from 6.22 to 13.00, corresponding to an average annual growth rate in
the number of branches of 4.4 percent. Several spread-related measures of branching also
show increases in geographic reach: the mean distance for the average bank between its
headquarter and its branches (column 7) increased from 9.31 miles to 25.38 miles and the
number of counties the average bank is invested in (column 8) has increased from 1.89 to
3.54. Nonetheless, the percentage of institutions that operate branches outside their home
state (column 9) increased in the aftermath of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Branching Act
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from just 0.7 percent to 8.7 percent.7 Also the percentage of banks that operate branches
farther than 100 miles away from their headquarters (column 10) tripled from 4.4 percent
in 1994 to 11.2 percent as of 2011 and the number of population living within the average
bank’s network (column 11) increased by 72% from 950,000 to 1,634,000.
I further collect the amount of deposits obtained from each branch between 1994 to
2011 from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits database. Between 1994 and 2011, total
deposits (column 3) increased from 2.82 to 10.46 trillion dollars (in constant 2000 dollar),
which corresponds to an annual increase of 8%. Importantly, a steady share of about 70%
of deposits are accounted for at local branches rather than at the headquarter (column
5), an interesting finding given an increased prevalence of brokered deposits.8 Similarly
interesting is that deposits account for over 70% of bank liabilities in most years (column
6). Thus, when new banking regulation requires evidence that stable available bank funds
exceed required bank funds for an extended amount of time (the net stable funding ratio
of Basel III, see section 2.2), the requirement by and large falls upon bank deposits as the
main funding source.
7Part of this increase is likely due to bank holding companies consolidating their individual institutions
in the aftermath of the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act.
8Brokered deposits are certificates of deposits that financial institutions can purchase from a broker who
pools many small deposits. The price is a fee that is embedded in the interest rate which the purchasing
bank needs to pay and which is higher than the one that the broker pays to the ultimate depositors. The
counterpart to brokered deposits are core deposits which a bank directly obtains via its branch network
from customers. Brokered deposits are typically accounted for at the bank headquarter.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Year Banks Branches Branch Deposits Diversification Measures Bank Distress Measures
All Excl. Branches Deposits Avg. No. of % inter- % dist. Avg. Popul. Portfolio Failure Joined Left Under
(trill.) HQ in % as % of Distance counties state > 100 in net- Risk TARP TARP TARP
(trill.) total miles work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1994 12,980 80,788 2.82 1.89 67.10% 78.70% 9.31 1.89 0.70% 4.40% 950 1.878 15 - - -
1995 12,266 80,473 2.93 2.00 68.30% 77.10% 9.90 1.96 0.80% 4.70% 957 1.872 8 - - -
1996 11,671 80,827 3.09 2.14 69.40% 76.90% 10.79 2.05 1.30% 5.00% 957 1.869 6 - - -
1997 11,168 81,541 3.31 2.30 69.50% 75.40% 11.31 2.15 1.90% 5.00% 979 1.865 1 - - -
1998 10,719 82,722 3.50 2.48 70.80% 74.10% 12.12 2.25 2.50% 5.30% 1,026 1.860 3 - - -
1999 10,328 83,703 3.67 2.60 70.90% 72.40% 13.39 2.36 3.00% 5.80% 1,085 1.858 8 - - -
2000 10,100 84,871 3.97 2.82 71.00% 70.50% 14.76 2.45 3.60% 6.20% 1,131 1.860 7 - - -
2001 9,739 85,440 4.39 3.07 69.90% 71.20% 15.89 2.56 4.10% 6.60% 1,183 1.857 4 - - -
2002 9,456 85,951 4.74 3.34 70.40% 71.50% 16.78 2.63 4.40% 7.00% 1,201 1.857 11 - - -
2003 9,242 87,151 5.40 3.81 70.50% 72.00% 17.75 2.71 4.90% 7.40% 1,234 1.855 3 - - -
2004 9,050 89,152 5.91 4.15 70.10% 71.10% 18.06 2.78 5.30% 7.60% 1,277 1.855 4 - - -
2005 8,840 91,407 6.63 4.81 72.60% 70.30% 19.07 2.90 5.90% 8.10% 1,321 1.851 0 - - -
2006 8,750 94,091 7.43 5.34 71.80% 70.10% 20.05 3.00 6.40% 8.80% 1,382 1.849 0 - - -
2007 8,588 96,624 7.95 5.81 73.00% 69.70% 21.62 3.12 7.10% 9.20% 1,456 1.851 3 - - -
2008 8,425 98,528 8.52 6.14 72.10% 67.80% 22.75 3.23 7.50% 9.90% 1,521 1.849 30 265 0 265
2009 8,169 98,943 9.25 6.73 72.80% 70.90% 23.56 3.33 7.80% 10.40% 1,571 1.845 148 576 70 841
2010 7,809 97,952 9.53 6.93 72.70% 72.60% 23.85 3.43 8.10% 10.70% 1,570 1.838 157 - 103 771
2011 7,512 97,678 10.46 7.46 71.30% 74.30% 25.38 3.54 8.70% 11.20% 1,634 1.833 92 - 215 668
Table (3.1) shows summary statistics and trends over the sample period on several of the key measures used in this study. Columns (1) and (2) show the number of banks (with unique FDIC
certificates) and the number of physical bank branch locations. Column (3) shows the total deposits in banks in trillion $ across all banks and branches (in 2000 constant dollars). As brokered
deposits have become more prevalent in recent years, we exclude the HQ at which brokered deposits are usually accounted for in column (4) and provide the ratio of deposits held in branches
relative to total deposits in column (5). Columns (7) to (9) show the average distance between branches and bank headquarters in miles, the number of counties the average bank is represented
in and the percentage of banks that have branches outside of their home state. Columns (10) and (11) show the percentage of banks that have bank branches farther than 100 miles and
the market size (as measured by the population in those counties that a bank is represented in) of the average bank. Column (12) gives the portfolio risk from local business cycles that the
average bank is exposed to via its bank branch network. Finally, columns (13) to (16) provide the number of bank failures and the annual number of banks entering and leaving the TARP
bailout program. Data sources: Columns (1) and (2) originate from FDIC’s institutions directory, columns (3) to (6) from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits Database. Columns (7) to (10) are
computed by the author using bank branch data address data from the FDIC’s institutions directory. County population data used in columns (11) is obtained from the FRED database of the
St. Louis Federal Reserve. Column (16) is based on the failed banks list of the FDIC and columns (17) to (19) from the July 2012 Quarterly Report to Congress by the Office of the Special
Inspector General for TARP (Appendix D, pp.239-258).
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3.4.1.2 Measures of Bank Survival and Bank Distress As the goal is to analyze
bank survival, I use the most direct measure – namely, whether a bank failed or not during
the crisis – as the main measure of bank performance/stability during the crisis. Bank
failure occurs if a bank is involuntarily closed by the FDIC for falling below the minimum
risk-adjusted capital ratio of 3%. Between 2008-2011, the FDIC closed 427 bank. Many
banks that did survive the crisis until the end of 2011 may still have experienced significant
bank distress or came close to failing. To quantify how close a bank came to failing, I
further compute for each bank the minimum capital reserve ratio it attained during the
crisis period. While the previous two measures relate to the extensive margin, another
measure aims at the intensive margin: for banks that did fail (or were acquired) during
the crisis period, I measure the length of survival between the start of the crisis and the
date when they failed (or ceased to exist). Finally, I relate portfolio diversification and
competition to traditional book-related measures of bank distress, namely the noncurrent
loans to asset ratio, the nonccurent loans to total loans ratio, return on equity, return on
assets and a rolling window of the standard deviation of return on assets.
3.4.1.3 Bank performance data Besides bank survival measures, I collect bank bal-
ance sheet items between 1990 and 2011 from quarterly bank call reports made available
in the Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI) and Uniform Bank Performance Reports
(UBPR) databases from the FDIC. Specifically, I obtain items related to firm size (assets,
deposits), risk-taking/profitability (return on equity, return on assets, net income, net op-
erating income), investment opportunities (asset growth rate) and bank risk (risk-weighted
capital ratio, bank equity, noncurrent loans, and total loans).
3.4.1.4 County business cycle data Further, the measure on portfolio diversification
(discussed in detail in section (3.4.2.1)) requires local economic performance data. I obtain
monthly unemployment levels for all 3,141 U.S. counties from January 1990 to December
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2007 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics so to compute the variances and covariances
among county business cycles. Finally, to not only consider county business cycles from
a labor market perspective, I also collect data on county housing markets. Unfortunately,
there is no housing price index available on the county level.9 A proxy for the county-level
can however be obtained from the Building Permits Survey Database of the U.S. Census
which provides information on imputed and reported annual construction costs of all new
residential housing in a county for the years between 1996-2011.10
3.4.1.5 Banking competition and branching regulation Unfortunately, a well
recognized problem in the banking literature is that banking competition cannot be di-
rectly measured since often costs and prices for specific bank products are unavailable.
While concentration-based measures (such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) are widely
used in applied work, there is plenty of evidence that concentration-based measures are
only very poor proxies of actual competition (see, e.g., Berger, 1995; Bikker and Haaf,
2002). In a cross-country study, Claessens and Laeven (2004) for example find that bank
concentration are positively instead of negatively related to competition.
In contrast, several papers use banking regulation that restrict market-entry for com-
petitors as a measure for the degree of banking competition. Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt,
and Huizinga (2001) for example analyze how the entry by foreign banks makes domes-
tic banking systems more efficient by reducing profit margins. Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2004) investigate the effect from regulatory restrictions across 107 countries and find that
more stringent entry restrictions limit competition, determine bank efficiency and impact
bank stability. The advantage of such market contestability measures (when available) is
9The two most detailed housing price indices are the Case-Shiller Housing Price Index that reports
housing prices for 20 MSAs and the national housing price index by the Federal Housing Finance Agency
that is available on the state-level.
10A downside of this data source for researchers is that it does not provide an option to download data
in bulk, but only separately by state and year. A web-crawling algorithm however is able to download and
extract the data and is available upon request.
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that less stringent restrictions are unlikely to decrease competition; thus greater contesta-
bility is increasing competition or has no effect on competition leaving at the very least
the directional impact right.
To side-step the concerns raised over concentration-based competition measures, I col-
lect information from Johnson and Rice (2008) on the evolution of interstate bank reg-
ulations after the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act went into effect in 1997. Specifically, while the
Riegle-Neal Act removed federal restrictions that banks could not cross state borders, it
provided in a political comprise U.S. states the opportunity to opt out of federal defaults
for interstate legislation by creating state restrictions to the entry of out-of-state banks.11
What followed was a complex web of state level restrictions affecting the ability to establish
new and to acquire existing in-state banks by out-of-state banks.
Yet another group of states eased restrictions under a reciprocity principle: fewer re-
strictions applied if the home state of an out-of-state bank likewise provided fewer restric-
tions. The empirical analysis uses state regulatory changes between 1997 and 2005 and
creates a panel of annual pair-wise state-to-state regulations along four restrictive dimen-
sions of market contestability.12 Appendix (B) and section (3.4.2.2) provide additional
details on the data and variable construction.
3.4.2 Methodology
The main goal is to run the following cross-sectional baseline regression:
11Johnson and Rice (2008) provide an excellent review of the state-wise evolution of branching restrictions
after 1997.
12In total, the data set consists of 78,400 bilateral restrictions (50x49 states x 8 years x 4 types of
restrictions).
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Bank Survivali, crisis = α+ β1Portfolio Diversificationi,pre
+ β2Competitioni,pre + γXi, pre + i
where the dependent variable is a measure of bank survival during the 2008-2011 U.S.
banking crisis. The main independent variables are measures of bank i’s pre-crisis level of
portfolio diversification and a measure of the degree of competition bank i was exposed to
prior to the crisis. The coefficients of interest are thus β1 and β2 which provide us with
estimates on the benefits from pre-crisis portfolio diversification and banking competition
for bank survival during the crisis.
As there is the obvious potential of omitted variables that may be correlated with
the key independent variables, the specification is supplemented in a first step with bank
covariates as suggested by previous literature to control for pre-crisis bank size (assets,
deposits), risk-taking/profitability (return on equity, return on assets, net income, net
operating income), bank risk (risk-weighted capital ratio, bank equity) and investment op-
portunities (asset growth rate). Since there remains the possibility for endogeneity in this
specification, in a second step I make use of two instruments for the two key independent
variables portfolio diversification and banking competition. Specifically, I instrument the
actual level of portfolio diversification with the potential to diversify which depends on
geographic characteristics (oceans and international boarders) and the availability of dis-
tinct local business cycles in the vicinity of a bank’s headquarter. Further, I make use of
cross-sectional and time-series variation in interstate branching legislation between 1997
and 2005 and and bilateral state distances to instrument for the amount of competition
banks faced in their home state from out-of-state competitors.
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3.4.2.1 Portfolio Diversification Portfolio diversification is the first key indepen-
dent variable in our baseline regression. Previous studies use coarse measures of geo-
graphic spread (for example, an indicator variable whether a bank has branches outside its
home county or state) to proxy for the degree of geographic diversification of the bank’s
unobserved portfolio of loans and mortgages. Instead, this measure aims at explicitly in-
corporating the effect from local business cycle volatility onto bank portfolios, which is
desirable for two reasons: first, having branches (and thus mortgages and loans) in sev-
eral counties does not automatically imply that the assets derived from those counties
are uncorrelated with one another as the counties may have very similar characteristics
(e.g. same industries or similar rural/urban characteristics) leading to highly correlated
business cycles and mortgage and loan portfolios. Hence, the diversification benefit is not
guaranteed by distance alone. Second, the most recent crisis has shown that significant
differences continue to exist in local business cycles in real estate and labor markets, thus
offering a diversification benefit to banks: while a few states saw massive home price de-
preciations (e.g., Arizona, California, Florida or Nevada), housing prices remained above
their 2005 levels in many other U.S. states (e.g., Texas, Washington D.C., North Dakota or
Wyoming) throughout the crisis. In fact, as of September 2011, 35 states still had housing
prices above their respective 2005 levels and in 10 states housing prices even continued to
rise.13 As a result, the stark decline in the U.S. housing markets should be understood as
a regional rather than a national phenomenon. Consequently, geographic diversification
– i.e., having physical bank branches in different housing markets – may allow banks to
reduce the exposure of their mortgage and loan portfolios to a single market.14
13Based on monthly FHFA House Price Index data between 2005 and 2011.
14To provide a few such examples of housing markets in relative close geographic proximity but on different
housing market cycles: while the Pittsburgh MSA saw an increase in its housing prices of 7.9% between
January 2007 and December 2011, the Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor MSA was down by 18%. Meanwhile,
the Detroit area (Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills-MSA) saw an even starker decline of 33%. While the
housing prices in the Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale MSA declined by 51%, the Dallas-Plano-Irving MSA had
remained unchanged and the Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown MSA was up by 5%. Finally, even though
all of California was badly hit by the housing crisis, there is still heterogeneity in its severity: the San
Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos MSA saw a decline of 30%, while the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario MSA
86
Besides the housing markets, there is also a large variation in local labor market per-
formances across U.S. states and regions. Figure (3.3) depicts the patchwork of high and
low unemployment across U.S. counties – often in close proximity to one another – at the
beginning of 2011. Banks located in just one or few counties could thus be more vulner-
able to local industry and unemployment shocks while banks with branches in a greater
number of counties may benefit through a less volatile deposit base and a higher expected
repayment rate of borrowers.
Figure 3.3: Unemployment by U.S. County (January 2011)
But how large are the deposit and loan businesses in banks’ balance sheets? Are they
really large enough to affect a bank’s survival? At the end of 2006, the average U.S. bank
had 62.4% of its assets in outstanding loans of which 33.8% were in private mortgages,
east of L.A. experienced a 52% decline. (All numbers based on seasonally adjusted purchase-only housing
prices available from the Federal Housing Finance Agency for the largest 25 MSAs at http://www.fhfa.
gov/Default.aspx?Page=87.)
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12.2% in commercial loans and 7.5% in consumer loans. On the liabilities side, deposits
made up 70.1% of total fund sources in 2006 while borrowings from other banks or financial
institutions constituted only 22.1%.15 As a result, sources of funds (liabilities) and uses
of funds (assets) ought to be sensitive to the local economic conditions in housing prices
and unemployment levels, which in turn affect the valuation of assets and the probability
of repayment by borrowers.
To capture the benefits from geographic diversification our measure relies on basic
portfolio theory. Specifically, the variance of a portfolio of n assets is calculated as:
σ2P =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ωiωjσij =
n∑
i=1
ω2i σ
2
i + 2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
ωiωjσij
where ωi represents the portfolio weight of asset i and σ
2
i and σij are the variance and
covariance of the historic payoffs of assets i and j. Assuming that banks obtain deposits
and invest into mortgages and loans in those counties where they have a physical bank
presence, I consider each county as an asset into which a bank can invest by establishing
a bank branch. Hence, a branch network becomes a bank’s chosen portfolio. I further use
the total branch deposits derived from a county as a share of a bank’s total deposits as the
weight with which the bank is invested into that county. The riskiness of each county (σ2i )
subsequently depends on the county’s local business cycle in its labor market since this rep-
resents the local economic conditions that affect a bank’s profitability through its lending
and deposit businesses. Further, the covariance term σij represents the covariance of county
i and js’ business cycles – a lower covariance thereby implies a larger diversification benefit.
Thus, I compute for each bank k the portfolio risk of its loans and mortgages in year t
15Numbers based on bank call reports.
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via the variances and covariances of the county business cycles in which bank k has branches
as of year t. The lower the portfolio risk, the more diversified is a bank. Specifically, the
portfolio risk of bank k in year t is computed as:
σPk,t =
( Nt∑
i=1
Nt∑
j=1
1ktij(ωitωjtσijt)
) 1
2
where
1. 1ktij(·) is an indicator function which is 1 if bank k has in year t at least 1 branch in
counties i and j.
2. ωlt is the share of deposits that bank k derives in year t from county l relative to its
total deposit base.
3. σijt is the covariance between the business cycles of counties i and j for year t based
on monthly county unemployment numbers between Jan 1990 and Dec of year t− 1.
4. Nt is the number of U.S. counties that existed in year t (e.g., 3,141 in 2005)
Two facts are worth noting. First, portfolio risk does not simply capture bank size:
the correlation coefficient between bank size (measured by bank assets) and portfolio risk
is not significantly different from zero.16 Instead, since banks typically do not expand into
far-off regions, a bank’s portfolio risk depends in part on the covariances of local business
cycles of counties that are close to the bank’s existing network and which are therefore
potential candidates to expand into. But do business cycles of nearby counties provide suf-
ficient variation such that banks can achieve a meaningful diversification benefit? Figure
(3.4) shows two densities of correlation coefficients of counties’ business cycles. The left
panel consists of 4,878,126 pair-wise correlation coefficients of all U.S. counties (the upper
triangular of the 3,124 x 3,124 variance-covariance matrix) based on counties’ monthly
16As a case in point, while Michigan’s Citizens Republic Bancorp ranked with $7.6 billion assets in the
top size quintile in 2007, it also ranked in the top quintile of portfolio risk. This may in part be due to
the fact that Michigan counties exhibit very similar business cycles and do not offer much potential for
diversification (which is discussed more in section 5.4).
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unemployment levels between Jan 1990 and Dec 2006. Not surprisingly, most correlation
coefficients are positive, but correlation coefficients below 0.5 are not uncommon and 83.9%
of coefficients remain below a threshold of 0.75. As any investment into an asset with a
correlation coefficient below 1 provides a diversification benefit, banks seem to have many
counties to choose from so to diversify their portfolios. The panel on the right further
shows the density of 515,294 correlation coefficients of only those counties that are within
200 miles distance of one another and which are therefore more likely candidates to expand
into for banks located in one of those counties. While counties closer to one another have
on average (as expected) more similar business cycles, still 63.9% of correlation coefficients
remain below a threshold of 0.75. Banks thus retain a significant number of counties within
a 200 miles radius to choose from so to reap a diversification benefit. Further reducing
the distance to just 50 miles shifts the mass of the distribution further to the right, but
still leaves 42.6% of correlation coefficients below a threshold of 0.75 (chart available upon
request).
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Figure 3.4: Correlations between Local Business Cycles
Second, note that a portfolio with n assets has just n variances but n(n−1)/2 covariance
terms; thus, the greater the number of assets in a portfolio, the greater the contribution of
the asset covariances to the portfolio variance. Eventually, as n becomes large, the portfo-
lio variance approximates the weighted average of the covariances of the individual assets.
This has very practical consequences for larger banks as not the variance of individual
county business cycles matter any longer, but only its correlation with other counties. As
a case in point, in 2007, Wells Fargo operated 3,255 branches across 532 U.S. counties. The
532 county variances in its portfolio risk formula are completely dominated by the 141,246
pair-wise county covariance terms.
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Table 3.2: Portfolio Risk by Geographic Spread, 1994-2011
Year All Banks Unit Banks Non-Unit Banks with Banks with Banks with
Banks Branches in Branches in Branches in
up to 2 counties 3 to 10 counties >11 counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1994 12,954 1.878 4,757 1.782 8,197 1.933 11,319 1.884 1,420 1.848 215 1.744
1995 12,245 1.872 4,320 1.781 7,925 1.922 10,598 1.879 1,423 1.842 224 1.736
1996 11,661 1.869 3,965 1.779 7,696 1.915 9,963 1.877 1,476 1.834 222 1.714
1997 11,150 1.865 3,738 1.79 7,412 1.903 9,435 1.876 1,505 1.818 210 1.711
1998 10,712 1.86 3,492 1.788 7,220 1.896 8,976 1.867 1,523 1.845 213 1.714
1999 10,319 1.858 3,263 1.788 7,056 1.891 8,561 1.862 1,551 1.854 207 1.726
2000 10,093 1.86 3,169 1.79 6,924 1.891 8,302 1.866 1,567 1.845 224 1.716
2001 9,732 1.857 3,000 1.785 6,732 1.889 7,880 1.862 1,628 1.851 224 1.722
2002 9,451 1.857 2,821 1.789 6,630 1.885 7,558 1.862 1,666 1.85 227 1.71
2003 9,241 1.855 2,669 1.786 6,572 1.883 7,295 1.861 1,714 1.848 232 1.715
2004 9,048 1.855 2,559 1.789 6,489 1.881 7,059 1.863 1,769 1.839 220 1.746
2005 8,838 1.851 2,417 1.799 6,421 1.871 6,804 1.859 1,804 1.834 230 1.754
2006 8,749 1.849 2,367 1.8 6,382 1.867 6,611 1.858 1,886 1.829 252 1.756
2007 8,585 1.851 2,280 1.807 6,305 1.867 6,359 1.866 1,968 1.814 258 1.754
2008 8,424 1.849 2,140 1.803 6,284 1.865 6,159 1.866 2,003 1.813 262 1.734
2009 8,168 1.845 2,014 1.787 6,154 1.864 5,901 1.861 1,998 1.813 269 1.722
2010 7,810 1.838 1,858 1.781 5,952 1.855 5,572 1.857 1,971 1.801 267 1.712
2011 7,512 1.833 1,756 1.784 5,756 1.848 5,297 1.854 1,938 1.793 277 1.727
Average - 1.856 - 1.789 - 1.885 - 1.866 - 1.832 - 1.728
Std dev† - 0.691 - 0.714 - 0.678 - 0.713 - 0.612 - 0.474
% chg. -42.00% -2.40% -63.10% 0.10% -29.80% -4.40% -53.20% -1.60% 36.50% -3.00% 28.80% -1.00%
Table (3.2) provides summary statistics about U.S. banks’ portfolio risk of their bank branch networks. Portfolio risk is defined as in section
(3.4.2.1). Each section shows the number of banks and the corresponding portfolio risk; the final row “% change” shows the percentage change
in the number of banks or in the portfolio risk measure between 1994 and 2011. (†) The column “Std dev” shows the average annual standard
deviation.
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Table (3.2) provides an overview of the evolution of the portfolio risk for banks by
different geographic spread between 1994 and 2011. Despite an increase in the average
bank network size (cf. Table (3.1)), overall portfolio risk has not changed by a large
amount: between 1994 and 2011, the portfolio risk for the average U.S. bank (column 2)
declined by just 2.4% (or 6.5% of a standard deviation). Not surprisingly, the portfolio
risk of unit banks (column 4) has remained constant as a unit bank’s portfolio risk in
year t is simply the variance of the one county business cycle in which the bank is located
estimated from monthly unemployment numbers from 1990 up to December of year t− 1.
Non-unit banks however experienced a decline of 4.4% (or 12.5% of one standard deviation)
in portfolio risk (column 6). Separating the banks by the number of counties into which
they were invested, we see that the largest improvements occurred among those banks that
invested into 3-10 counties with a decline of 3.0% (or 9.0% of a standard deviation). This
raises the question why banks do not make greater use of opportunities to geographically
diversify? While banks have indeed grown in geographic reach, county business cycles have
simultaneously become more synchronized over the years: using 5-year rolling windows of
monthly county unemployment levels, the average correlation of business cycles of counties
within a 200 miles radius for example increased from 0.433 in 1994 to 0.528 in 2007. Put
differently, recalculating the portfolio risk for all banks in 2011 (column 2) while using 1994
business cycle correlations (based on monthly county unemployment data from Jan 1990
to Dec 1993) leads to an average portfolio risk of 1.476 instead of 1.833. Thus – if local
U.S. county business cycles had not become more synchronized between 1994 and 2011 –
this would correspond to a decline in portfolio risk of 19.5% (or a decline of 52% of one
standard deviation) instead of the observed 2.4% (or 6.5% of one standard deviation). One
could therefore consider the geographic diversification of banks as an attempt to offset an
increasing correlation of local business cycles and thus of the underlying loan and mortgage
portfolios.
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3.4.2.2 Banking Competition The final key variable concerns the degree of banking
competition a bank was exposed to prior to the crisis. As discussed earlier, similar to Stra-
han and Rice (2010), I use state restrictions to interstate banking as market contestability
measures are considered a preferred measure for banking competition. Specifically, for the
first measure “Openness (to Out-of-State Banking Competition in 2007)”, I determine for
each bank k in 2007 the number of states that have more lenient restrictions to enter k’s
home state than the federal defaults established by the 1997 IBBEA. Specifically:
opennesski,2007 =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
4∑
m=1
1ijm2007
where
1. i represents the home state of bank k
2. m2007 represents one of the four interstate banking restrictions types in year 2007 (cf.
section (3.4.1.5) and columns 3-6 in (B1))
3. 1ijm(·) is an indicator variable which is 1 if state i applies to banks from state j as
lenient or more lenient regulation in restriction type m than put forth by the IBBEA
federal default, else 0. Specifically:
a. 1 if banks from state j can establish de novo branches in state i
b. 1 if banks from state j are permitted to acquire in-part institutions in state i
c. 1 if banks from state j are permitted to acquire banks in state i that hold deposits
larger than 30% of state deposits
d. 1 if banks from state j are permitted to acquire banks in state i which are younger
than 5 years.
The next section discusses the empirical results.
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3.5 RESULTS
This section discusses the findings to the following main questions:
1. Do local economic fundamentals (still) matter for bank survival? Or has new financial
innovation meanwhile allowed banks to economically diversify independently from their
geographic footprint? (In the latter case we would not expect to find any diversification
benefits from bank branching.)
2. Did geographic diversification/bank branching impact the probability of bank survival
during the 2008-2011 U.S. banking crisis? Further, did U.S. banks simultaneously
decrease their capital reserves as they increased their level of geographic diversification?
3. If greater branching is indeed correlated to bank survival, is this due to a greater
portfolio diversification, due to a greater previous exposure to competition, or both?
What are the contributions and relative magnitudes of the two channels?
3.5.1 Do local fundamentals (still) matter to banks?
Financial innovations since the late 1990s may have allowed banks to economically diversify
their portfolios without having to invest into a greater branching network. On the asset
side, even small banks can nowadays invest into residential or commercial mortgage-backed
securities that consist of mortgages or loans that are either spread across the country or
focused on specific regional markets. A larger syndicate commercial loan market allows
for diversification in industrial loans, and asset-back securities (auto loans, credit card re-
ceivables or student loans) allow banks to reduce their exposure to the housing market.
On the liabilities side, some banks have attempted to attract greater deposits via online
banking rather than by putting down physical branches. In addition, banks frequently
sell mortgages in secondary mortgage markets – conforming loans often to the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Freddie Mac) – and thereby have the option to manage their exposure to the local
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business cycle despite engaging in the local mortgage business. Thus, it is not clear from
the outset by how much banks are still affected by local economic conditions.
If banks were indeed diversifying away risk incurred on the local level with nationwide
investments, we would not expect to find any geographic clustering of bank failures. Hence,
the first test aims to provide evidence that bank failures are geographically clustered (and
not randomly spread out across the U.S.). An implicit assumption of this test is that
failing banks are located in economically depressed areas and that it is this exposure to
local conditions which led to their demise. The second test therefore analyzes whether
local economic conditions are correlated with the occurrence of bank failures.
3.5.1.1 Geographic Clustering Figure (3.5) shows a map of the lower 48 U.S. states
displaying the geographic location of the headquarters of all U.S. banks as of 2007. Figure
(3.6) displays the location of 427 banks that failed between January 2007 and December
2011 as well as (underlying) a kernel density map with “hot spots” representing a greater
number of banks in the area. A visual inspection of the geographic pattern of bank fail-
ures in Chart (3.6) suggests geographic clustering. As the density map however shows,
many of the failures also occurred in areas with a greater overall number of banks (hot
spots). In other words, a randomly selected set of banks from the bank population may
exhibit a similar visual degree of geographic clustering due to the population of banks be-
ing clustered itself. I therefore compute a statistic for the degree of geographic clustering
among the failed banks and compare it to the same statistic computed for many randomly
drawn samples of banks from the population (thus generating an empirical distribution).
Appendix (C) provides the details on the methodology to arrive at the geographic cluster-
ing statistic. I find that the degree of geographic clustering among failed banks is indeed
significantly higher (lying in the outmost tail of the empirical distribution with a p-value
less than 0.001) than the clustering among randomly sampled banks, which confirms that
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the location of banks that fail are not random.
Figure 3.5: U.S. Bank Locations in 2007 and Bank Failures 2008-2011
3.5.1.2 Failed Bank Locations and Local Economic Conditions The fact that
bank failures are geographically clustered implies that something inherent to those ge-
ographic locations ought to be related to bank failures. I therefore test whether local
economic conditions can explain the pattern of bank failures and bank survivals in the
U.S. between January 2008 and August 2012.
I compute two proxies to measure the economic downturn that occurred on the local
(county) level:
1. the change in the county unemployment rate between 2008-2011 (rel. to pre-crisis)
2. the change in the county real estate markets between 2008-2011 (rel. to pre-crisis)
Monthly county-level unemployment data is readily available from the U.S. Bureau of
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Figure 3.6: U.S. Bank Failures (2008-2011) and Density Map of Surviving Banks
Labor statistics. For each bank that existed as of 2007, I compute the average annual
unemployment level that the bank faced in all the counties with at least 1 branch between
2006 and 2011 and define the variable <<labor market decline>> as the largest increase
in the unemployment level that a bank faced in its branch network between 2008-2011 rel-
ative to the base year 2006. This measure thus proxies the extent by which the local labor
market within a bank’s branch network worsened during the crisis relative to pre-crisis
levels. While no housing price indicator is available on the county level, county-level data
from the U.S. Census Building Permits Survey provides the annual construction costs of
all new residential housing in a county. For each bank I construct a variable called <<real
estate market decline>> which represents for the largest average percentage change in
real estate construction costs in all the counties in which a bank had branches between
2008-2011 relative to the pre-crisis base years. As the real estate changes for almost all
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counties are negative, I invert the sign so to make the results in Table (3.3) easier to read:
thus, a value of 0.5 for the variable <<real estate market decline>> implies that the
real estate construction market declined by 50%.17
Columns 1 to 4 of Table (3.3) show the results of several logistic specifications where the
dependent variable is whether a bank failed (i.e., was closed by the FDIC) or not between
2008 and 2011. Reported are marginal effects at the mean and median with z -statistics in
square brackets. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to protect the results from
outliers and bank covariates are standardized. I find that the mean and median probability
of bank failure significantly increases with a rise in the local unemployment rate and with a
decline in the construction activity within a bank’s branch network. In columns (3) and (4),
after controlling for a number of bank characteristics, a doubling of the unemployment rate
in a bank’s branch network increases the bank’s failure probability at the mean (median)
by between 0.9 (1.7) to 1.6 (2.7) percent. Similarly, a decline in real estate activity in a
bank’s branch network by 100% is associated with an increase in failure probability at the
mean (median) by between 7.9 (16.6) to 15.5 (25.7) percentage points. In practical terms,
the median bank experienced a 90% increase in its network unemployment level (relative
to 2006) and a 78.9% decline in real estate activity, which corresponds for the median bank
(after controlling for bank covariates) to a 1.53% increase in the bank failure probability
due to the unemployment increase and a 13.1% increase in the failure probability due to
the decline in real estate activity.
17As an example, consider “ESB Bank” in Pennsylvania: as of 2008, ESB Bank was represented with 23
branches in 4 PA counties: Allegheny, Beaver, Butler and Lawrence County. The highest unemployment
levels in those 4 counties during the crisis period (2008-2011) were respectively 7.7%, 8.2%, 7.4% and
9.5% while the 2006 levels were 4.4%, 4.7%, 4.3% and 5.3%. Thus the largest county-level changes in the
unemployment rate were respectively 75%, 74%, 72% and 79%. Taking the average of those four changes,
we arrive at an average unemployment increase in ESB’s bank network of 75.2%. Similarly, the maximum
annual real estate construction costs in the pre-crisis period (2003-2006) for Allegheny, Beaver, Butler and
Lawrence County were $396.9, $62.8, $192.4, and $27.2 million. The lowest real estate activity during
the crisis period (2008-2011) were respectively $248.8, $28.3, $77.6, and $7.3, thus representing changes of
-37.3%, -55.0%, -59.7% and -73.1%. Taking the average of those four declines, we arrive at an average real
estate decline that ESB faced via its branch network of 56.3%.
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Table 3.3: Bank Stability and Local Economic Conditions
Bank Failure (2008-2011) Min. Risk-Wght. Capital Reserves (2008-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Market Mean 0.028 [3.12] 0.032 [3.92] 0.009 [1.76] 0.016 [2.33] -2.217 -1.856 -1.252 -0.998
Decline Median 0.028 [3.28] 0.032 [4.07] 0.017 [2.01] 0.027 [3.16] [-2.87] [-2.91] [-2.54] [-3.15]
Real Estate Mean 0.097 [2.21] 0.211 [3.17] 0.079 [2.86] 0.155 [3.09] -0.732 -2.107 -1.075 -0.353
Market Decline Median 0.097 [2.13] 0.211 [3.05] 0.166 [2.77] 0.257 [3.16] [-0.50] [-1.52] [-1.28] [-0.33]
Bank Assets 0.004 [0.74] 0.025 [1.67] 2.126 [1.12] -0.885 [-1.54]
Return on Equity -0.002 [-0.57] -0.045 [-2.64] -1.722 [-2.84] 0.934 [0.67]
Return on Assets 0.005 [0.84] 0.052 [1.33] 1.687 [1.10] -3.246 [-0.43]
Net Income 0.004 [0.73] -0.001 [-0.04] 0.614 [-0.32] -0.418 [-0.64]
Net Operating Income -0.004 [-1.01] 0.069 [0.80] 7.211 [4.24] 6.961 [0.34]
Asset Growth Rate 0.012 [3.85] 0.015 [2.67] -2.293 [-5.53] -1.327 [-2.07]
Equity -0.094 [-1.01] -0.025 [-1.88] -1.521 [-0.54] 1.404 [1.46]
Deposits -0.003 [-0.61] -0.001 [-0.09] -1.293 [-1.19] 0.113 [0.14]
Risk-wght. Capital Reserves -0.001 [-4.06] -0.007 [-3.86] 0.865 [8.87] 1.137 [3.31]
Fixed effects for bank types No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Condition ≥1 Branch ≥5 Branches ≥1Branch ≥5 Branches ≥1Branch ≥5 Branches ≥1Branch ≥5 Branches
N 8,056 2,770 7,085 2,319 7,278 2,478 7,255 2,470
Table (3.3) shows the correlation between local economic conditions (proxied by local labor market and local real estate declines) and two measures of bank stability.
Columns (1) to (4) use a logistic regression as bank failure is a binary outcome; columns (5) to (8) employ a Tobit framework with a lower bound of 0% as capital
reserve ratios are non-negative (result unchanged to alternative bounds of 2% or 3%). “Labor market decline” is the maximum percentage increase in the average
county unemployment level that a bank faced via its branch network during the crisis period (2008-2011) relative to the baseline in the bank’s network in 2006. The
variable “real estate market decline” is the largest average county-level real estate decline (proxied by construction costs of new residential buildings) that a bank faced
in its branch network during the crisis period (2008-2011) relative to the pre-crisis period (2003-2006). “Bank types” refer to an FDIC-determined institution’s primary
asset specialization, including a bank being a mortgage-, consumer-, commercial- or “other type” specialist. Balance sheet bank controls are pre-crisis averages from
June 2006-June 2007 and are standardized. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to protect the results from outliers and all regressions employ heteroskedastic
error terms with clustering on the state level to allow for differences across states in banking regulation enforcement. Reported coefficients in columns 1-4 are the
marginal effects at the mean and median. 2-sided z -statistics (columns 1-4) and t-statistics (columns 5-8) are reported in square brackets.
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Columns 5 to 8 show the results of several Tobit regressions where the dependent vari-
able is the lowest risk-weighted capital reserve ratio a bank attained between 2008-2011.
Since the FDIC closes banks that become critically undercapitalized, this measure relates
to the channel through which these bank failures occurred and quantifies how close a bank
came to failing during the crisis. I employ a censured regression framework since capital
ratios are non-negative and the FDIC closes a bank when its risk-weighted capital ratio
falls below 3%. I find that local labor market declines (but not local real estate declines)
are significantly correlated with capital reserve ratio declines. With the median bank facing
an unemployment increase within its network by 90%, capital reserves declines on average
by between 80 to 113 basis points.
The results suggest that bank failures are indeed geographically clustered and that
local county economic conditions are significantly correlated with the probability of bank
failure and bank distress. This leads to the conclusion that local economic fundamentals
still matter to bank stability and that a geographic diversification of bank portfolios could
be an effective strategy for banks to reduce their exposure to local economic shocks.
3.5.2 Capital Reserves and Geographic Diversification
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) analyze market measures of diversification for 150 publicly
listed bank holding companies between 1980 and 1993 and find that larger holding com-
panies have higher levels of diversification but also lower capital ratios and larger credit
risks. Similarly, Carlson (2004) find that unit banks during the Great Depression had
significantly higher capital ratios than non-unit banks, suggesting that banks with greater
geographic diversification may also decrease their capital ratios. Thus, the positive effects
on bank stability that greater geographic diversification may bring may well be offset by
bank managers’ decisions to lower their capital ratios.
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To investigate whether such a trade-off existed among U.S. banks prior to the 2008
crisis, I next investigate the correlation between measures of geographic diversification and
risk-adjusted capital reserve ratios. The dataset consists of a panel of all 8,127 U.S. banks
included in the FIDC’s Uniform Bank Performance Reports with data between 2002 and
2011.
Panel A of Table 4 shows univariate results for a 2002-2011 data panel as well as a
pre-crisis 2006 cross-section in which banks are sorted by the number of branches and the
number of counties in which they have a branch presence. While unit banks with just 1
branch had in any given year very high risk-adjusted capital reserve ratios of 23.7 percent
between 2002-2011, the ratio quickly declines in the number of branches. Likewise, as
the number of counties with a bank presence increases, the ratio declines. The average
bank with more than 50 branches and with a presence in more than 10 counties has a
risk-adjusted capital reserve ratios of just 12.8 percent – about half of that of unit banks.
The marginal (frequency-adjusted) averages show the same trend from 20.4 percent to 13.2
percent as the number of counties increase and from 23.7 percent to 12.9 percent as the
number of branches increase. The trend is even stronger in the pre-crisis 2006 cross-section
where unit banks had on average capital ratios of 34.8 percent which declined to just 11.8
percent for the largest banks in branches and spread.
Table (3.5) reports the conditional correlation between the following measures of geo-
graphic diversification (used in previous literature) and capital ratios:18
1. whether a bank has branches outside its home county,
18Each of the 35 coefficients shown in Table 4 Panel B is derived from a separate regression where just
one geographic diversification measure is included. Each specification includes standard errors that allow
for heteroskedasticity with clustering on the state of the bank’s headquarter so to allow for the possibility
that state banking regulators may encourage different levels of capital ratios. All variables are winsorized
at the 1% level to protect the results against outliers.
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2. whether a bank has branches outside its home state,
3. the log number of branches,
4. the log number of zip codes in which a bank has branches,
5. the log number of counties in which a bank has branches,
6. the average distance between a bank headquarter and its branches, and
7. whether a bank has a branch farther than 100 miles away.
Column 1 uses a pooled OLS regression with Newey West standard errors to correct for
autocorrelation. It regresses capital reserve ratios on measures of geographic diversification
while including state and year fixed effects and finds that all measures are negative and
highly significantly associated with capital ratios. This indicates that a greater geographic
footprint coincides with lower capital reserves. Intra-county banks for example hold on
average 5.69% more risk-adjusted capital reserves than do inter-county banks which is
roughly consistent with the decline from 20.4% to 15.1% as observed in Panel A. Capital
reserve ratios also decline in the number of (log) branches, (log) zip codes and (log) coun-
ties a bank is represented in, the average distance between headquarters and branches (in
miles) and an indicator variable whether the bank has any branches further than 100 miles
from the headquarter.
Column 2 repeats the analysis of column 1 while adding to the state and year fixed ef-
fects an extensive set of bank controls;19 the previous finding however remains unchanged.
Column 3 further adds to the set of controls and fixed effects additional bank-specific
intercept terms, thereby controlling for any omitted time-invariant bank characteristics.
The identification now relies on the differences between capital ratios within banks before
versus after they became more geographically diversified. Understandably, the test loses
power as (for example) out of the 8,127 banks in the panel only 460 changed their status
19The set of controls include proxies for bank size (assets, deposits), profitability (return on equity, return
on assets, net income, net operating income), investment opportunities (asset growth rate) and bank equity.
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from an intra-state to an inter-state bank. Nonetheless, most coefficients remain negative
and significant indicating that a greater degree of geographic diversification is associated
with lower levels of capital reserve ratios. Finally, column 4 uses a first-difference estimator
thus making use of the time-series dimension of our data. First differences cancel out any
time-invariant observables and omitted constant unobservables and relies only upon the
variation from changes in our geographic diversification measures between t−1 and t when
the variable of interest (here, some measure of geographic diversification) changes. The
coefficient on “intercounty bank” for example states that a bank that transitions from an
intra-county bank to an inter-county bank on average experiences an (insignificant) 0.24%
decline in its capital ratio in that year (relative to banks that do not transition). 4 of the
7 measures remain significantly negative.
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Table 3.4: Capital Ratios and Geographic Diversification – Univariate Results
Number of Number of Counties with Bank Presence
Bank Branches 1 county 2-5 counties 6-10 counties >10 counties Freq. adj. avg.
A
n
n
u
a
l
a
v
g
.
2
0
0
2
-
1
1
1 Branch 23.7 . . . 23.7
2-5 Branches 17.5 15.8 . . 16.6
6-10 Branches 15.3 14.3 14.0 . 13.5
11-50 Branches 15.1 13.8 13.5 13.9 13.8
>50 Branches . 13.6 13 .5 12.8 12.9
Freq. adj. average 20.4 15.1 13.6 13.2 17.9
2
0
0
6
o
n
l
y
1 Branch 34.8 . . . 34.8
2-5 Branches 17.7 15.7 . . 16.7
6-10 Branches 15.0 14.1 16.9 . 13.3
11-50 Branches 15.8 13.4 12.9 15.4 13.6
>50 Branches . 12.6 12.3 11.8 11.9
Freq. adj. average 26.2 15.0 13.7 13.5 20.9
1
05
Table 3.5: Cap. Ratios and Geogr. Diversification – Multivariate Results
Dependent Variable: Risk-adjusted Capital Ratio
Each coefficient below is obtained from an individual
regression in which just one of the measures of
geographic diversification was used.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercounty Bank -5.69 -4.48 -0.88 -0.24
[-46.4] [-39.2] [-11.4] [-0.94]
Interstate Bank -4.30 -1.80 0.17 -0.24
[-20.3] [-8.65] [1.14] [-0.94]
Log (branches) -3.48 -3.37 -0.82 -2.05
[-49.0] [-37.6] [-11.2] [-10.2]
Log (zip codes) -3.59 -3.49 -0.81 -2.02
[-48.9] [-38.0] [-11.2] [-10.2]
Log (counties) -3.69 -3.22 -0.59 -1.50
[-45.3] [-32.4] [-7.36] [-8.36]
Avg. Distance -0.008 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003
[-4.53] [-2.70] [-0.16] [-1.74]
Max. Dist. > 100m -4.69 -2.59 -0.35 -0.81
[-27.1] [-13.1] [-2.86] [-3.28]
Bank Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects State,Year State,Year State,Year State,Year
Model OLS OLS Bank-FE 1st Diff.
Bank controls include measures of bank size (assets, deposits), profitability (return on equity,
return on assets, net income, net operating income), investment opportunities (asset growth
rate), bank equity and bank types. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to protect the
results against outliers. Bank types include indicator variables whether a bank is a mortgage
specialist, consumer loan specialist, or a commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by
the FDIC). Columns 1, 2 and 4 with Newey West standard errors allowing for up 3 orders
of autocorrelation, column 3 with first-order autocorrelation robust standard error. 2-sided
t-statistics shown in square brackets.
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Overall, the results in Tables (3.4) and (3.5) indicate that greater geographic diversi-
fication coincides with lower risk-adjusted capital reserve ratios. This provides credence
to the related findings by Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Carlson (2004) who suggest
that bank managers prefer higher returns when faced with the trade-off between keeping
a lower risk level obtained from diversification or higher expected returns. Consequently,
when incentivized by regulation to geographically diversify, banks may simply lower capital
reserves so to return to what it perceives as its private optimal risk level.
3.5.3 Bank Branching and Bank Stability during the 2008-2011 Banking Crisis
Previous literature has found that greater bank branching leads to an improvement in bank
survival during a crisis (Wheelock, 1995 and Calomiris, 2000 on the Great Depression; Gart,
1994 on the Savings and Loan crisis). I investigate this question in the context of the 2008-
2011 U.S. banking crisis and provide in Table (3.6) the association between the number of
branches (the most common proxy for geographic diversification) and several measures of
bank survival.20
20A log-transformation of the number of branches shields the results from outliers driving the results.
The results are qualitatively the same when using the number of bank branches.
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Table 3.6: Bank Branching and Bank Stability
Measures of Bank Stability (2008-2011)
Covariates Bank Failures Failed Banks: Bank Exists Non-surviving Std Dev. Average Minimum Change in
as of 2007 Failures Log (days in 2011 banks in 2011: of ROA z -Score z -Score Avg. z -Score
survival) Log (days survival) 2008-2011 2008-2011 pre-to-post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Branches -0.020 [-2.33] † 0.114 0.024 [1.30] † 0.092 -0.001 11.192 3.324 -3.037
-0.034 [-2.47] ‡ [2.33] 0.025 [1.27] ‡ [3.41] [-1.35] [1.73] [1.82] [-1.72]
Bank Assets 0.017 -0.448 -0.018 -2.43 -0.001 45.724 12.664 7.742
[1.07] [-2.08] [-0.43] [-0.87] [-1.61] [2.95] [2.21] [1.26]
Return-on-Equity -0.043 -0.057 -0.036 -0.028 0.001 -3.76 7.505 -3.083
[-3.02] [-0.65] [-1.07] [-0.49] [0.66] [-0.35] [1.20] [-1.45]
Return-on-Assets 0.078 -2.154 0.066 -0.592 -0.003 -45.938 -37.888 -22.43
[1.73] [-1.85] [0.57] [-1.03] [-0.65] [-0.73] [-1.32] [-1.34]
Net Income 0.002 -0.06 0.004 0.012 0 -17.444 -5.09 1.124
[0.16] [-0.36] [0.13] [0.01] [-0.26] [-2.03] [-1.78] [0.33]
Net Operating Income 0.02 4.559 0.069 8.12 0.005 108.53 63.61 39.073
[0.21] [1.97] [0.25] [0.77] [1.35] [0.87] [1.27] [1.33]
Asset Growth Rate 0.02 -0.113 -0.031 -7.33 0.001 -31.407 -10.574 3.859
[2.22] [-1.71] [-2.63] [-5.69] [3.49] [-6.00] [-5.95] [2.08]
Equity -0.021 -0.005 -0.069 0.741 0.002 -15.9 -2.062 -2.13
[-1.85] [-0.03] [-3.18] [1.03] [3.32] [-1.19] [-0.61] [-0.68]
Deposits 0.011 0.441 0.058 0.375 0 -26.568 -10.867 -7.087
[0.65] [1.33] [1.43] [0.33] [-0.47] [-2.09] [-2.54] [-1.80]
Risk-wght. Capital Reserves -0.008 0.015 0.009 0.001 0 6.474 2.388 -0.155
[-3.55] [1.27] [1.23] [0.45] [-0.18] [3.52] [5.02] [-0.94]
Bank type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,442 145 2,615 452 2,501 2,510 2,510 2,501
Table (3.6) shows the association between the number of branches and several measures of bank survival for banks with at least 5 branches. Columns (1) and (3) consist of logistic
specifications whether a bank failed (i.e., was closed by the FDIC) or survived (i.e., did neither fail nor was acquired) during the crisis period 2008-2011. Reported are marginal effects
at the mean (†) and the median (‡) for the variables of interest and at the mean for all other independent variables. Columns (2), (4), and (5)-(8) use OLS regressions to analyze
whether the number of branches is correlated to the number of days which a failed bank still survived during the crisis. Columns (6) to (8) use bank z -Scores that are typically
interpreted as the distance towards insolvency. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to shield results against the effect of outliers; bank balance sheet items are standardized.
Bank type controls include indicator variables whether a bank is a mortgage-, consumer loan-, commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by the FDIC). All specifications use
heteroskedastic standard errors with clustering on the state level to allow for potential differences in the enforcement of banking regulation across states.
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As before, the results in Table (3.6) control for 2007 bank characteristics on size,
risk-taking, profitability, investment opportunities and banks’ main business model (bank
types). The findings confirm that a larger number of branches is positively associated with
bank survival, even after controlling for the level of pre-crisis capital reserves and deposits.
Specifically, on the extensive margin, I find that a greater number of branches decreases
the probability of bank failure (column 1) by 2% (3.4%) at the mean (median) and in-
creases (though not significantly) the probability of bank survival (column 3).21 Given
that a bank fails or does not survive (the intensive margin), I further find that the length
of bank survival (in log days since the start of the crisis) is also positively and significantly
associated with the number of branches (columns 2 and 4). A greater number of branches
also reduced (although insignificantly) earnings volatility in the crisis period (column 5).
Columns 6 to 8 show that a greater number of branches is also positively correlated with
a banks average and minimum distance to insolvency (z -Score) and is also correlated with
a smaller decline of z -Scores during the crisis period.22 Naturally, these specifications still
suffer from several endogeneity issues which we will address in the next section.
While the number of branches has been traditionally used as a proxy of geographic
bank diversification, it conflates two distinct effects: first, the effect due to a portfolio
diversification as banks spread their assets and liabilities over different economic regions
that may operate along different local economic business cycles, and second the effect from
being exposed to more competitors prior to the crisis, thus having gained efficiency and
strength once the crisis arrives.
Table (3.7) makes a first attempt towards separating both effects. Instead of using the
21A bank is called a survivor if it neither fails nor is acquired by a competitor.
22A bank z -Score (not to be confused with an Altman z -score) is computed as (ROA + capital reserve
ratio)/std dev (ROA) and is typically interpreted as the distance to insolvency. Note that as capital reserves
are an endogenous choice to geographic diversification (cf. section (3.5.2)), z -Scores are an imperfect
measure of bank distress for this study and will not be further investigated.
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number of branches, we use the portfolio risk measure as introduced in section (3.4.2.1)
that is based on the variances and covariances between county labor markets in which a
bank has branches. We further measure the amount of competition banks face via the
openness of the bank’s home state in 2007 to out-of-state competitors as described in
section (3.4.2.2).
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Table 3.7: Bank Stability, Portfolio Diversification and Competition, I
Bank Failed between 2008-2011 Std. Dev. ROA
2008-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Portfolio Risk Mean 0.011 [1.99] 0.019 [2.69] 0.010 [3.35] 0.016 [3.10] 0.001 0.001
Median 0.011 [2.04] 0.019 [2.75] 0.017 [3.92] 0.025 [4.28] [1.61] [2.47]
Openness to Mean -0.006 [-1.26] -0.018 [-2.54] -0.002 [-0.79] -0.009 [-2.24] -0.001 -0.001
Competition Median -0.006 [-1.26] -0.018 [-2.50] -0.004 [-0.80] -0.014 [-2.41] [-2.64] [-2.07]
Assets 0.003 0.026 -0.001
[0.43] [1.65] [-1.56]
Return-on-Equity -0.002 -0.043 0.001
[-0.55] [-3.06] [0.67]
Return-on-Assets 0.005 0.071 -0.003
[0.90] [1.46] [-0.68]
Net Income 0.006 0.001 -0.001
[0.94] [0.09] [-0.27]
Net Operating Income -0.004 0.023 0.005
[-1.19] [0.22] [1.39]
Asset Growth Rate 0.120 0.018 0.001
[3.50] [2.41] [3.59]
Equity -0.005 -0.026 0.002
[-1.20] [-2.10] [3.41]
Deposits -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[-0.28] [-0.14] [-0.67]
Risk-wght. Capital Reserves -0.001 -0.008 -0.000
[-3.57] [-3.82] [-0.19]
Bank type Controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
N 8,661 2,921 7,470 2,442 2,512 2,501
Table (3.7) shows the correlation between (1) banks’ portfolio risk in 2007 and bank failure, and (2) the degree of competition that banks
faced as of 2007 and bank failure during the crisis. Balance sheet items are the average values of the 4 quarterly call reports between
June 2006 and June 2007 (i.e., before the crisis). Bank type controls include indicator variables whether a bank is a mortgage specialist,
consumer loan specialist or commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by the FDIC). Columns 1 and 3 show results for all U.S. banks
while columns 2 and 4 show results for banks with at least 5 branches. Reported are the marginal effects at the mean and at the median
for the key variables and at the mean for the remainder variables. Columns 5 and 6 use the standard deviation of return on assets as
a measure of bank stability during the crisis period. All variables are standardized and winsorized at the 1% level and all specifications
include heteroskedastic standard errors that are clustered at the state level to allow for potential differences in the enforcement of banking
regulation across states.
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Table (3.7) shows the marginal effects at the mean (and, for the key variables, at the
median) from several logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is whether a bank
failed or not between 2008-2011. All specifications use heteroskedastic standard errors that
are clustered at the state level to allow for differences in banking regulation enforcement
across states, and all variables are winsorized at the 1% level to protect the results from
outliers. The results are consistent with the interpretation that an increase in the portfolio
risk in 2007 (i.e., a decrease in the degree of portfolio diversification) is positively correlated
with bank failure during the banking crisis. Specifically, an increase in the portfolio risk
by one standard deviation is correlated with a significant increase in the failure probabil-
ity at the mean (median) between 1.0 (1.7) percentage points in specification 3 (for all
U.S. banks) and 1.6 (2.5) percentage points in specification 4 (only banks with at least
5 branches). The effects are less strong for pre-crisis openness to banking competition:
the probability of failure only decreases significantly for banks with at least 5 branches by
0.9% (1.4%) at the mean (median) per standard deviation increase in state openness to
competition in 2007. This is consistent with the finding by Carlson and Mitchener (2006)
that within-state competition leads to a greater degree of bank stability.
3.5.4 Results from an Instrumental Variable Approach
An obvious concern with the results in Table (3.7) is that there might exist some unob-
served variables that are correlated to bank failure and the portfolio risk or the amount of
competition a bank faced prior to the crisis. For example, greater risk-aversion by bank
managers may be correlated to a lower average credit risk and a greater degree of portfo-
lio diversification. If risk-aversion was only incompletely controlled for, the coefficient on
portfolio risk may therefore capture some of the effect of managerial risk-aversion and be
downwards biased.
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To make sure that our results are not just the result of such endogeneity, I suggest two
instruments that offer exogenous variation. Specifically, I suggest to use the potential for
portfolio diversification that a bank has nearby its bank headquarter as an instrument for
the actual degree of portfolio diversification a bank achieves through its branch network.
The instrument is based on the well-established observation that banks do not branch into
far-flung regions (due to monitoring and marketing costs and less knowledge about far-off
borrowers and markets), but typically branch out along the boundaries of their current
networks. I therefore estimate for each bank how much portfolio diversification it could
have achieved in 2007 if it had been represented with equal weight in each of the counties
within a 200 miles radius around its headquarter. Specifically, I compute the potential
portfolio risk for bank k as:
σ˜Pk,i =
( 3,141∑
j=1
1kij(ω
2σijt)
) 1
2
where
• i is the county that hosts bank k’s headquarter,
• 1kij(·) is an indicator function which is 1 if the distance between the geometric centers
of counties i and j is 200 miles or less, and
• ω = 1/Nk where Nk is the number of counties located within 200 miles of county i.
While, for example, Midwestern banks have plenty of potential urban and rural coun-
ties within a 200 miles radius that offer a variety of local business cycles to invest into,
banks in Southern Florida are surrounded by oceans, banks in Las Vegas are restricted by
the desert and banks in Michigan are limited by the Great Lakes, international borders
and an automotive industry that imposes similar business cycles onto nearby counties.
As a result, in part due to this geography, banks in Florida, Nevada and Michigan are
“stuck” with counties nearby that offer similar business cycles and less potential to diver-
sify. Thus, the identifying assumption is that topographic variation (oceans, deserts and
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international borders) and the availability of uncorrelated business cycles in the vicinity of
banks’ headquarters are exogenous to bank failure other than through its impact on the
portfolio diversification of banks.
As an example, using a 200 miles radius around Wayne County (Detroit), Dade County
(Miami) and Clark County (Las Vegas), the three counties rank among those with the low-
est potential diversification options: relative to all other 3,141 U.S. counties, their counties
rank in the 5th, 4th and 2nd percentile of the measure of potential geographic diver-
sification. On the other hand, counties in the top 10 percentiles of potential portfolio
diversification are frequently located in Northern Texas, Kansas and Nebraska with rural
and urban areas, agriculture and manufacturing as well as some oil and gas industries
nearby.
Figure (3.7) shows the actual portfolio risk measure by county (averaged over all banks
that have a headquarter in that county) while figure (3.8) displays the potential portfolio
risk measure within a 200 miles radius. Figures (D1) and (D2) in appendix (D) show very
similar maps that use 50 or 100 miles. First, it becomes evident that the actual degree of
diversification and the potential to diversify are correlated with one another (the uncon-
ditional correlation for all banks is 0.588) which is a promising sign for an instrument and
the first stage regression. Further, the potential to diversify (figure (3.8)) is low (dark)
in most places where we would expect it to be: Florida, and around the Great Lakes, in
the North-East as well as in along the West Coast and Nevada. The highest potential for
diversification (light shading) is however located in Midwestern counties and East to where
the Rocky Mountains form another natural boundary.23
23It may seem surprising that the largest potential to diversify is located in the Great Plains where the
population density is low and that the potential to diversify is smaller in coastal areas with high population
density. Even though possibly counterintuitive, note that the portfolio risk measure is simply the average
of the county business cycle covariances within a 200 miles radius and thus this is just a result borne out
of the county unemployment numbers obtained from the BLS.
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Figure 3.7: Actual Average Portfolio Risk of Banks, by U.S. County
To instrument for banking competition, I make use of the time-series dimension of
interstate branching laws and reciprocity agreements between 1997 and 2005 as well as
the distances between states. Specifically, for each state i, I compute for each state pair
(i, j) the number of years between 1997 and 2005 in which banks from state j were granted
more lenient interstate branching/banking restrictions by state i. I then add up the years
across all states while inversely weighting each state pair by the distance between both
states. The latter step incorporates the fact that even lenient branching restrictions may
not matter as much for competition if states are very far apart:24
24As an example: As early as 1998, Hawaiian and New Jersey banks were both able to branch de novo
into and acquire in-part banks in Maryland (banks from Maryland however had to wait until 2001 to receive
the same privilege from Hawaii and could still not establish de novo branches in New Jersey as of 2005).
Clearly, we would expect a greater increase in banking competition in Maryland from New Jersey based
banks than from Hawaiian banks.
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Figure 3.8: Potential Average Portfolio Risk of Banks, by U.S. County
opennessi,1997-2005 =
50∑
j=1;j 6=i
4∑
m=1
2005∑
y=1997
wij1ijmy
where
• 1ijmy is an indicator variable which is 1 if state i applies for banks from state j in year
y more lenient regulation in restriction type m than put forth by the IBBEA federal
default (cf. section 4.1.5), else 0.
• wij is a distance-related integer weight between 1 (highest state-pair distance quintile;
farthest) and 5 (lowest state-pair distance quintile; closest) with intermediate weights
according to their quintile rank. The distances between state pairs are computed from
their nearest border locations to each other.
As in any instrumental variables (henceforth, IV) approach, two concerns are the ex-
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planatory power of our instrumental variables to explain bank failures and orthogonality
with the dependent variable. To address the first concern, I provide in all IV-based results
the first-stage F-tests as well as the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test statistic that tests for
weak identification. Under weak identification, two serious problems arise: first, two-stage
least squares (henceforth, 2SLS) estimators incur a finite-sample bias (in the same direction
as the ordinary least squares estimator suffers from), and second standard errors become
too small and the asymptotic distribution may be decidedly non-normal, undermining re-
liable hypothesis testing (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002). Stock and Yogo (2005) provide
a formally derived test (and critical values) about when instruments become too weak and
thus unreliable. Under the null hypothesis of the test, the bias of the two-stage least squares
estimator is less than a fraction (for example 10% or 15%) of the bias of the ordinary least
squares, thus leading to different critical values depending on that fraction and the number
of instruments and endogenous variables.25 All 2SLS results are therefore supplemented by
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test-statistic and the applicable Stock-Yogo critical values.
Further, I provide in all IV results the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic which
tests whether the equation is underidentified, i.e. whether the instruments are sufficiently
correlated with the endogenous regressors to be relevant. Under the null hypothesis, the
equation is underidentified so that a small p-value rejects underidentification (cf. Bazzi
and Clemens, 2013: 165-175).
The common approach for testing the orthogonality assumption of instruments is with
the help of the Hansen J-test, which has the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error terms and are therefore correctly excluded from the second-
stage estimation. Hansen’s J-test however requires over-identification, i.e. more instru-
ments than endogenous variables. I therefore add two additional instruments that I subse-
quently include into the 2SLS results in order to test the orthogonality assumption. Since
25See for example Murray (2006) for details.
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the two additional instruments are weaker than the main instruments (as shown in table
(3.8)), I do not interpret the results from the coefficients when using the weaker instru-
ments (since they may suffer from a finite sample bias and may have too small standard
errors) but only use them so to verify the orthogonality assumption. Specifically, as a
second instrument for the degree of banking competition in 2007, I use pre-Riegle Neal
state-level interstate branching restrictions between 1978 and 1997: the years before 1997
since a state had entered into an agreement with at least one more state to allow out-of-
state banks to acquire in-state banks (cf. column(1) in (B1)). As a second instrument for
portfolio diversification (or the potential thereof) I use the proportion of land under U.S.
jurisdiction within a 200 miles radius around a bank’s headquarter.26 All IV specifications
with over-identification thus report the Hansen J-test statistic and its p-value.
Finally, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) illustrate that inferences based on reduced-
form IV regressions in ordinary least squares with weak instruments can easily be adjusted
for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering using standard robust covariance ma-
trix estimators so to provide accurate standard errors. As a result, I also provide results
from a reduced-form IV regression where the first stage is omitted and the instruments are
directly plugged into the second stage regression.
26This differs decidedly from the main instrument of portfolio diversification which incorporates the
variation in nearby business cycles.
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Table 3.8: Bank Stability, Portfolio Diversification and Competition, II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red.Form Red.Form Red.Form
Portfolio Risk 0.058 0.079 0.056 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.074 0.038 0.033 0.044
[4.60] [2.06] [4.84] [4.45] [4.57] [4.41] [4.44] [4.62] [4.94] [4.92]
Openness to Competition -0.016 -0.020 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.026 -0.015 -0.010 -0.019
[-2.83] [-1.88] [-0.57] [-2.85] [-2.92] [-2.94] [-3.76] [-3.16] [-2.93] [-4.21]
Bank Assets 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.050 - 0.003 0.041
[0.86] [1.03] [0.82] [0.85] [0.86] [0.85] [1.52] [0.26] [1.18]
Return-on-Equity -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.028 - 0.002 -0.023
[-0.29] [-1.07] [-0.29] [-0.28] [-0.29] [-0.28] [-1.86] [0.16] [-1.55]
Return-on-Assets 0.017 0.010 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.096 - 0.007 0.063
[0.60] [0.71] [0.62] [0.60] [0.60] [0.60] [1.65] [0.24] [1.00]
Net Income 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 -0.000 - 0.009 -0.003
[1.61] [1.28] [1.68] [1.61] [1.62] [1.61] [-0.00] [1.01] [-0.22]
Net Operating Income -0.030 0.013 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.081 - -0.017 -0.022
[-1.19] [1.57] [-1.20] [-1.18] [-1.19] [-1.19] [-0.63] [-0.70] [-0.15]
Asset Growth Rate 0.045 0.034 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.064 - 0.040 0.060
[3.83] [3.89] [3.82] [3.83] [3.83] [3.84] [4.49] [3.60] [4.15]
Equity -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.028 - -0.013 -0.027
[-2.11] [-1.83] [-2.14] [-2.10] [-2.11] [-2.10] [-2.23] [-1.91] [-2.20]
Deposits -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.020 - 0.001 -0.013
[-0.34] [-0.35] [-0.40] [-0.33] [-0.35] [-0.34] [-0.67] [0.16] [-0.42]
Risk-wght. Reserve Capital -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 - -0.001 -0.002
[-2.29] [-3.27] [-2.25] [-2.30] [-2.29] [-2.30] [-3.05] [-2.54] [-3.01]
Bank Type Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Instruments used:
Potential Portfolio Risk x - x x x x x x x x
Proportion Bankable Area - x - x - x x - - -
Openness 1997-2005 x x - x x x x x x x
Openness 1978-1997 - - x - x x x - - -
1st Stage F stat. (Portf. Risk) 99.2 5.9 111.1 74.7 83.9 71.3 72.6 n/a n/a n/a
1st Stage F stat. (Competition) 110.1 90.6 12.0 69.8 105.5 77.1 102.5 n/a n/a n/a
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 102.9 3.64 4.25 80.5 72.2 64.7 75.9 n/a n/a n/a
Stock-Yogo Crit. Value (10%) 7.03 7.03 7.03 13.43 13.43 16.87 16.87 n/a n/a n/a
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) <0.001 0.079 0.020 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 n/a n/a n/a
Hansen’s J Statistic - - - 0.293 0.303 1.041 0.681 n/a n/a n/a
p-value of Hansen’s J - - - 0.589 0.582 0.594 0.712 n/a n/a n/a
N 7,370 7,554 7,370 7,367 7,436 7,367 2,553 8,141 7,370 2,554
All variables winsorized at the 1% level and standardized. Bank type controls include indicator variables whether a bank is a mortgage specialist,
consumer loan specialist or commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by the FDIC). All specifications with heteroskedastic standard errors
and clustered at the state level. Columns 8-10 are results from ordinary least squares (logistic specifications provide very similar results).
Columns 7 and 10 only on banks with at least 5 branches.
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Table (3.8) provides the results of two-staged least squares regressions and reduced-
form IV specifications where the outcome variable is whether a bank failed during the
crisis. All specifications use heteroskedastic standard errors with clustering at the state
level. Column 1 shows the main specification where actual geographic diversification is
instrumented with potential geographic diversification and openness to banking competi-
tion in 2007 is instrumented with a bank’s home state’s openness to competition between
1997 and 2005. The results are qualitatively consistent with those found in Table 6, but
the effects have strengthened: a one standard deviation increase in portfolio risk increases
the probability of failure by 5.8% while a one standard deviation increase in openness to
competition decreases the failure probability by 1.6%. The F-statistics of the first stages
and the Kleibergen-Paap statistics are well above the critical values (a value of 10 for
the first-stage F-statistics and 7.03 for the Kleibergen-Paap statistics, cf. Stock and Yogo
(2005)). Among the bank covariates, more aggressive asset growth rates prior to the crisis
increased the probability of failure while more equity and more capital reserves significantly
decreased the failure probability.
Columns 2 and 3 introduce the secondary instruments, the proportion of land nearby
the bank headquarter under U.S. jurisdiction and interstate branching restrictions between
1978 and 1997. Not surprisingly, the first stages are significantly worse (and, for the in-
strument on the proportion of bankable land with such a low first-stage F-statistic that
drawing inferences from the coefficient becomes unreliable). The sole purpose of including
these inferior instruments is to achieve over-identification in specifications 4-7 so that the
Hansen J-test statistic can be obtained.27 In specifications 4-7, I subsequently use com-
binations of the four instruments and obtain the corresponding Hansen J-test statistics.
While weak identification continues to be soundly rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap statis-
27Note that the joint null hypothesis of Hansen’s J-test is that all instruments are uncorrelated with the
error terms; adding a weak and valid instrument does not adversely impact the inference of the Hansen’s
J-test for the other instruments. Adding a weak or invalid instrument works against the null hypothesis
and makes the rejection of orthogonality more likely.
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tics, the Hansen J-statistics have p-values of 0.58 or higher, i.e. the test cannot reject that
the instruments are indeed orthogonal to bank failures. Specification 7 further excludes
banks that have less than 5 branches as of 2007 and finds a further strengthening of the
portfolio risk and competition effect on bank failures.
Finally, following Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), specifications 8-10 employ a reduced-
form IV approach, in which I directly regress bank failure on the two instrumental variables
in a single stage (while maintaining heteroskedastic standard errors that are clustered on
the state level). The results are consistent with the previous findings: an increase in port-
folio risk increased the probability of failure, while greater pre-crisis competition decreased
the failure probability.28 As a result, the findings thus far suggest that both portfolio
diversification and banking competition increased bank stability. Further the effect from
geographic diversification seems significantly larger than the effect of banking competition.
28Results from reduced-form IV logistic regressions are very similar and available upon request.
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Table 3.9: Bank Stability, Portfolio Diversification and Competition – Alternative Distress Measures I
Minimum Capital Length of Survival for
Reserves (2008-2011) Non-surviving Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit Tobit Red. 2SLS 2SLS Tobit Tobit Red. 2SLS 2S LS
(no IVs) Form IV (≥ 10 br.) (no IVs) Form IV (log)
Potential Portfolio Risk -0.231 -0.712 -0.684 -0.394 -79.36 -80.54 -151.3 -0.134
[-1.82] [-5.77] [-6.03] [-2.95] [-5.22] [-6.59] [-6.09] [-5.60]
Openness to Competition -0.042 0.096 0.094 0.037 35.02 49.96 60.84 0.060
[-0.37] [0.88] [1.00] [0.46] [2.13] [3.36] [3.23] [3.27]
Bank Assets 0.058 0.463 0.312 0.078 -144.9 -193.9 -233.5 -0.239
[0.14] [1.10] [0.74] [0.29] [-1.66] [-2.02] [-2.54] [-2.36]
Return-on-Equity -1.926 -2.357 -2.338 -0.875 30.65 14.40 23.70 0.031
[-9.10] [-8.95] [-8.11] [-3.80] [1.26] [0.57] [0.80] [1.08]
Return-on-Assets 2.814 5.673 5.716 -0.200 -62.71 -113.5 -158.2 -0.182
[5.34] [4.34] [4.04] [-0.20] [-1.23] [-1.30] [-1.62] [-1.93]
Net Income 0.027 -0.141 -0.094 0.115 -26.16 -25.77 -28.81 -0.026
[0.12] [-0.70] [-0.56] [0.88] [-0.96] [-0.84] [-0.98] [-0.85]
Net Operating Income 0.634 -3.341 -3.387 4.445 -68.06 115.2 160.1 0.185
[1.18] [-1.62] [-1.56] [1.60] [-1.89] [1.16] [1.56] [1.80]
Asset Growth Rate -1.510 -1.712 -1.395 -0.346 -134.2 -175.3 -192.8 -0.199
[-13.15] [-11.55] [-10.10] [-2.90] [-6.09] [-7.41] [-8.42] [-8.38]
Equity 0.295 -0.014 -0.117 -0.266 87.35 103.1 116.1 0.119
[1.05] [-0.05] [-0.46] [-0.83] [2.75] [3.14] [3.40] [3.55]
Deposits -0.788 -0.596 -0.476 -0.057 84.35 125.3 147.1 0.147
[-2.88] [-2.27] [-1.76] [-0.21] [1.48] [1.94] [2.42] [2.11]
Risk-wght. Capital Reserves 0.268 0.295 0.290 0.300 1.307 1.010 0.680 0.001
[31.0] [27.7] [12.0] [3.77] [2.77] [2.49] [1.44] [1.71]
Bank Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portfolio Risk 2005 x - - - x - - -
Openness 2005 x - - - x - - -
Potential Portf. Risk - x x x - x x x
Openness 1997-2005 - x x x - x x x
1st Stage F stat. (Portf Risk) n/a n/a 100.4 98.6 n/a n/a 55.5 55.5
1st Stage F stat. (Competit.) n/a n/a 107.5 186,5 n/a n/a 156.9 156.9
Kleibergen-Paap rk Walk F stat. n/a n/a 101.7 96.45 n/a n/a 59.8 59.8
Stock-Yogo Crit. Value (10%) n/a n/a 7.03 7.03 n/a n/a 7.03 7.03
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) n/a n/a <0.001 0.001 n/a n/a <0.001 <0.001
N 7,419 7,136 7,136 1,001 1,163 1,120 1,120 1,120
All tobit specifications with lower bounds of 0 (results robust to alternative bounds of 2 or 3 percent); all 2SLS specifications with an
indicator variable whether the bank failed and an indicator variable if a bank had capital ratios below 3% at any point in time. Bank types
indicate whether a bank is a mortgage specialist, consumer loan specialist or commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by the FDIC).
All specifications with heteroskedastic standard errors and clustered at the state level and all covariates standardized and winsorized at the
1% level. Column 4 for banks with at least 10 branches. Columns 5 and 6 with lower bound of 0 and upper bound of 1,642 days. Column 8
uses a log transformation to reduce the influence of outliers.
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Tables (3.9) and (3.10) replaces the dependent variable with alternative measures of
bank distress. Columns 1-4 of table (3.9) analyze the minimum risk-weighted capital ratio
that a bank obtained during the crisis period 2008-2011. As the FDIC closes banks that
fall below 3% of capital ratio, the decline in a bank’s capital ratio is the channel through
which failure occurs; it can further be understood as a measure as to how close a bank
came to failing. Since capital ratios are non-negative, specifications 1 and 2 employ a Tobit
specification with a lower bound of 0 while specifications 3 and 4 use two indicator variables
whether a bank failed or had capital reserves below 3% at any point in time. Specification
1 employs the actual portfolio risk in 2007 and openness to banking competition as of 2007
as the two key independent variables and finds that a higher portfolio risk leads to a lower
capital ratio (and thus an increase in bank distress) during the crisis. Greater pre-crisis
competition however does not significantly impact capital ratios during the crisis. Specifi-
cations 2-4 revert to the main instruments, first in a reduced-form Tobit framework, and
then in a two-stage least squares framework. The findings confirm those from specification
1: the minimum capital reserve ratio levels during the crisis are negatively correlated to the
potential to diversify by between 68 and 71 basis points for all banks and 39 basis points
for banks with at least 10 branches. Pre-crisis openness to competition however does again
not affect the capital reserve ratios during the crisis.
Specifications 5-9 repeat the analysis by investigating how the length of survival during
the crisis for non-surviving banks (banks that failed or were acquired by competitors) re-
lates to pre-crisis portfolio risk and competition levels. The Tobit specifications in columns
5 and 6 includes upper and lower bounds for 0 days and 1,643 days (surviving until the
end of 2011) while the 2SLS specifications in columns 7 and 8 include indicator variables
whether a bank failed within 50 days or fewer or survived more than 1,600 days. To make
sure that outliers do not drive the results, column 8 employs a log-transformation of the
dependent variable. The findings in columns 5 to 8 are consistent with the notion that a
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higher pre-crisis portfolio risk decreased the length of survival while a higher level of pre-
crisis openness to competition increased the length of survival. Larger banks and banks
with more aggressive asset growth rates pre-crisis survived a shorter time periods, while
those banks with more equity, more deposits and higher pre-crisis capital ratios survived
longer. While the exact effect of portfolio risk and competition varies across the Tobit and
2SLS specifications, the signs are consistent with those found in previous tests and confirm
the benefits of banking competition and portfolio diversification on bank stability.
Table (3.10) repeats the exercise with three alternative book-based measures of bank
stability: the standard deviation of return on assets as a measure of earnings volatility
during the crisis, the ratio of noncurrent loans relative to assets, and the noncurrent loans
to total loans ratio. Specifications 1, 4 and 7 use the actual portfolio diversification and
openness of home states to competition as of 2007 while the remainder specifications employ
the instruments. The results are in line with those of earlier tables: a higher portfolio risk
pre-crisis led to greater earnings volatility and noncurrent loan ratios during the crisis,
while more competition in the pre-crisis period negatively affects earnings volatility and
at-risk loans.
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Table 3.10: Bank Stability, Portfolio Diversification and Competition – Alternative Distress Measures II
Std Dev of ROA Noncurrent Loans-to- Noncurrent Loans-to-
(2008-2011) Assets Ratio (2008-2011) Loans Ratio(2008-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No Reduced 2SLS No IVs R.form IV 2SLS No IVs R.form IV 2SLS
IVs form IV (2IVs) (tobit) (tobit) (2IVs) (tobit) (tobit) (2IVs)
Potential Portfolio Risk 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.376 0.576 0.565 0.372 0.566 0.519
[2.78] [5.06] [4.54] [5.03] [5.35] [5.97] [4.87] [5.12] [5.22]
Openness to Competition -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.086 -0.133 -0.115 -0.102 -0.147 -0.127
[-1.87] [-3.94] [-3.31] [-1.12] [-2.23] [-2.50] [-1.44] [-2.47] [-2.81]
Bank Assets -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.444 -0.393 -0.200 -0.380 -0.333 -0.214
[-1.83] [-1.75] [-1.78] [-2.10] [-1.89] [-2.05] [-1.69] [-1.56] [-2.38]
Return-on-Equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.617 -0.530 -0.222 -0.431 -0.351 -0.149
[0.67] [0.81] [0.75] [-3.28] [-3.11] [-2.89] [-2.19] [-2.01] [-1.95]
Return-on-Assets -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.233 -0.019 0.206 -0.712 -0.939 -0.436
[-0.69] [-0.78] [-0.61] [0.27] [-0.02] [0.34] [-0.84] [-1.22] [-0.62]
Net Income 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.285 0.274 0.152 0.250 0.228 0.126
[-0.01] [-0.27] [-0.14] [1.88] [1.79] [1.67] [1.75] [1.64] [1.36]
Net Operating Income 0.005 0.005 0.004 1.994 2.305 0.510 3.271 3.599 1.604
[1.36] [1.38] [1.08] [1.01] [1.35] [0.45] [1.74] [2.15] [1.19]
Asset Growth Rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.339 0.328 0.255 0.297 0.309 0.227
[3.43] [3.68] [3.86] [3.70] [4.38] [4.39] [3.23] [4.48] [4.26]
Equity 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.143 -0.197 -0.052 -0.083 -0.158 -0.018
[3.84] [3.78] [3.97] [-0.86] [-1.17] [-0.53] [-0.47] [-0.94] [-0.18]
Deposits 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.367 0.305 0.139 0.289 0.266 0.152
[-0.09] [-0.14] [-0.22] [1.22] [0.94] [0.74] [0.99] [0.91] [0.86]
Risk-wght. Capital Reserves 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.041 -0.035 -0.018 -0.022 -0.012 -0.008
[-0.43] [0.03] [-0.19] [-3.08] [-2.33] [-3.22] [-1.83] [-1.17] [-1.83]
Bank Spread Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TARP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F stat. (Portf. Risk) n/a n/a 121.2 n/a n/a 121.2 n/a n/a 121.2
1st Stage F stat. (Competit.) n/a n/a 157.4 n/a n/a 156.9 n/a n/a 156.9
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. n/a n/a 132.1 n/a n/a 132.4 n/a n/a 132.4
Stock-Yogo Crit. Value (10%) n/a n/a 7.03 n/a n/a 7.03 n/a n/a 7.03
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) n/a n/a <0.001 n/a n/a <0.001 n/a n/a <0.001
N 2,501 2,445 2,445 2,510 2,454 2,454 2,510 2,454 2,454
All variables winsorized at the 1% level and standardized. Banks with at least 5 branches. Bank type controls include indicator variables
whether a bank is a mortgage specialist, consumer loan specialist or commercial loan specialist bank (as determined by the FDIC). All
specifications with a TARP indicator variable, with bank spread controls (interstate indicator, 100 miles indicator, avg. distance between
HQ and branches, no of counties with bank presence, log number of branches) and with heteroskedastic standard errors and clustered at
the state level.
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A concern with the previous results might be that some of the banks with greater geo-
graphic diversification may also benefit from a too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status which may yet
be incompletely controlled for by bank assets and bank deposits. This TBTF-designation
in turn may (through various channels) have decreased the probability of failure and thus
leads to an upwards bias in the portfolio risk coefficient. Columns 1 and 2 of Table (3.11)
address this concern. In column 1, an indicator variable specifies whether or not a bank
was included into the TARP program. The key coefficients remain unchanged. Column
2 further adds several bank spread controls: an indicator variable whether a bank had
a branch network crossing a state border, an indicator variable whether it had branches
in excess of 100 miles from the headquarter, the log number of branches, the number of
counties with a bank branch and the average distance between the headquarter and its
branches. Again, the key coefficients on portfolio risk and openness to competition remain
unchanged.29 Columns 3 and 4 further replace the potential portfolio risk instrument that
is based on the diversification potentials within a radius of 200 miles with one that is based
on a 100 mile and a 50 mile radius. Since the average bank has an average distance be-
tween the headquarter and its branches of 22 miles (cf. column 7 in Table (3.1)), a smaller
distance for the potential to diversify leads to a larger correlation with the actual level of
diversification and thus a higher F-statistics in the first stage. In both specifications, the
significance and relative magnitudes of the coefficients remain the same.
Another concern with the geographic risk instrument may be that real estate business
cycles nearby natural boundaries (oceans or mountains) may be exacerbated by the lack
of land supply for real estate development (Saiz, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2011). If this was
indeed the case, and if risk-seeking (risk-averse) bank managers were to endogenously locate
their bank headquarters nearby (away from) such banking markets this would violate our
exclusion restriction. Subsequently, as those market also provide fewer opportunities for
29Using alternative bank spread measures does not change the results.
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diversification, this may lead to an upward bias in the portfolio risk coefficient. Before
addressing this concern, it is important to realize that the potential to diversify depends
on the availability of uncorrelated (labor market) county business cycles nearby. While
topographic restrictions impacts this availability, a locally dominating industry may do
so likewise. To rule out that the results are driven by topography alone, columns 3 to 6
employ different geographic modifications to our main specification. Column 3 excludes
all banks with headquarters in states that have an ocean coastline (“salt-water states”);
column 4 further excludes banks with headquarters in Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin
(states bordering the Great Lakes; “sweet- or salt-water states”). The test thus relies on
the variation in diversification potential that stems from the diversity of nearby business
cycles rather than those from topographic restrictions due to water bodies. While the point
estimate on portfolio risk drops from 6.3 to 4.5 percent points, it is not significantly different
from the coefficients in specification 2. In column 5, I further exclude all those banks that
have less than 90% of their area within a 200 miles radius around their headquarters being
“bankable” (i.e., it is neither water nor non-U.S. territory), effectively excluding all banks
within a 200 miles band stretching along the coastlines of the Oceans, Great Lakes, and the
U.S. international borders with Canada and Mexico. Column 6 recreates a measure similar
to the one by Saiz (2010): I compute for each bank the average slope and standard deviation
of slopes of all the land within a 50 miles radius around each headquarter.30 Column 6
then excludes all banks whose 50 miles area has an average slope that is in the top quartile
of all banks’ average slope.31 The goal is thus to exclude those banks that may suffer
from greater real estate business cycles due to a considerable constraint on developable
land nearby (as argued by Saiz, 2010). The coefficient on portfolio risk declines to 5.0 and
4.2 percent respectively, but again are not significantly different from earlier results. The
results of columns 3-6 show that the portfolio risk coefficient is not exclusively driven by
30Slopes are computed from 30 arc-seconds digital elevation data obtained from the U.S. Geological
Survey.
31An alternative test using the standard deviation of slopes instead of the average slope yields very similar
results.
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topography, but that the availability of local business cycles nearby is likewise important.
This in turn raises a new question: Could the result be driven by new banks choosing
strategically their headquarter locations to be in areas with many distinct local business
cycles nearby? In other words, might headquarter location choice be endogenous? To
address this concern, column 7 excludes all banks that were established after 1978, while
column 8 only retains banks that were established before 1934. In both cases, it is unlikely
that bank managers could have predicted the degree of local business cycle integration 30
and 70 years into the future. The results remain robust to this exclusion.
128
Table 3.11: Further Robustness Tests
Bank Failed between 2008-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Potential Portfolio Risk 0.061 0.063 0.051 0.040 0.045 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.030 0.023
[4.69] [4.93] [4.47] [4.28] [2.33] [2.14] [2.61] [3.30] [3.03] [2.55]
Openness to Competition -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.024 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007
[-2.72] [-2.60] [-2.56] [-2.45] [-1.34] [-1.32] [-2.26] [-1.31] [-1.96] [-1.86]
G
eo
gr
a
p
h
ic
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od
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ti
o
n
No Salt-Water States - - - - x - - - - -
No Sweet- or Salt- - - - - - x - - - -
Water States
Bankable Area >90% - - - - - - x - - -
(Spec. 1; land-based)
Bankable Area Q1-Q3 - - - - - - - x - -
(Spec. 2; slope-based)
B
a
n
k
A
ge
Bank established - - - - - - - - x -
before 1978
Bank established - - - - - - - - - x
before 1934
TARP Classification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Spread Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F stat. (Portf. Risk) 102.8 95.2 189.2 444.3 81.5 65.5 147.2 228.2 151.2 142.9
1st Stage F stat. (Competit.) 109.6 109.1 107.5 103.5 159.9 37.3 51.6 121.6 102.9 118.8
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 104.6 96.8 175.2 349.3 26.8 12.0 137.6 183.4 99.9 95.5
Stock-Yogo Crit. Value (10%) 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370 4,745 4,129 5,232 4,040 5,509 4,071
All variables winsorized at the 1% level and standardized. Bank performance and bank type controls are the same as in Tables (3.7)-(3.10)
and 8. Column (1) with an TARP indicator variable. Column (2) with bank spread controls (interstate indicator, 100 miles indicator,
avg. distance between HQ and branches, number of counties with bank presence, log number of branches; robust to using alternative set of
spread controls). Columns (3) and (4) use a radius of 100 miles and 50 miles for the potential portfolio risk instrument. Columns (5)-(8)
address concerns that real estate business cycles may be worse along water bodies. Columns (9) and (10) address concerns that bank
headquarter location may be chosen endogenously to have distinct business cycles nearby.
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3.5.5 Geographic Diversification outside the Crisis Period
Does geographic diversification also matter outside the extreme events of the 2008-2011
banking crisis? To investigate this further, Table (3.12) shows the unconditional correlation
coefficient between a measure of earnings volatility – the standard deviation of return of
assets based on a rolling 4-quarter window – and geographic diversification between 1994
(the earliest available year in the FDIC database) and 2011. While the actual portfolio risk
is not significantly differently from zero between 1994 and 2007 – a time of relative calm
with on average just 6 bank failures per year – it becomes positive and highly significant
during 2008 to 2011. As actual portfolio risk may be endogenous, column 2 shows the
correlation between earnings volatility and potential portfolio risk (based on a 200 miles
radius around a bank’s headquarter). This time, the coefficient is positive and significant
in all specifications, but particularly so in the 2008-2011 crisis period, indicating that a
higher degree of geographic diversification is positively correlated with a lower degree of
earnings volatility also outside the crisis period.
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Table 3.12: Geographic Diversification and Earnings Volatility, 1994-2011
Standard Deviation of ROA with Portfolio Risk
Year Portfolio Risk Potential Portfolio Risk
Coefficient Coefficient
(1) (2)
1994 0.002 [0.31] 0.040 [2.99]
1995 0.003 [0.40] 0.044 [3.38]
1996 -0.005 [-0.67] 0.069 [4.86]
1997 0.002 [0.29] 0.050 [3.56]
1998 -0.017 [-2.19] 0.006 [0.48]
1999 -0.009 [-1.02] 0.040 [2.87]
2000 0.011 [1.19] 0.079 [5.79]
2001 -0.001 [-0.07] 0.054 [3.93]
2002 0.005 [0.54] 0.060 [4.04]
2003 0.006 [0.55] 0.042 [2.94]
2004 0.015 [1.61] 0.056 [4.03]
2005 0.003 [0.32] 0.048 [3.57]
2006 -0.012 [-1.28] 0.011 [0.91]
2007 0.009 [0.86] 0.045 [3.17]
2008 0.068 [5.34] 0.229 [12.87]
2009 0.130 [8.69] 0.378 [18.99]
2010 0.120 [7.80] 0.332 [16.09]
2011 0.124 [8.47] 0.284 [14.24]
Columns (1) and (2) show the unconditional correlation coefficient and its signifi-
cance level between the standard deviation of RoA (based on a rolling 4-quarters
window) and the standard deviation of Portfolio Risk and Potential Portfolio Risk
(obtained from a 200 miles radius around a bank’s headquarter).
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Figure (3.9) further splits the 2004-2011 period into a pre-crisis period (2004-2007) and
a crisis period (2008-2011) and displays the noncurrent loans-to-assets ratio, the noncur-
rent loans-to-loans ratio, and return on assets by the quintile of portfolio risk. While the
bank performance measures across the quintiles do not significantly differ from one another
in the pre-crisis period, there is a clear trend towards increasing at-risk loan ratios and
lower ROAs the higher the portfolio risk during the crisis period. The fact that bank per-
formance seems little affected by geographic diversification in the pre-crisis period, but is
very much so in the crisis period highlights that geographic diversification has its strongest
effect still during the banking crisis.
132
Figure 3.9: Bank Performance and Portfolio Risk, 2004-2011
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper sought to answer three questions:
1. Do local economic fundamentals still matter for bank stability? Or has new financial
innovation allowed banks to economically diversify independently from their geographic
footprint?
2. Did geographic diversification and bank branching impact the probability of bank sur-
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vival during the 2008-2011 U.S. banking crisis? Moreover, did U.S. banks decrease their
capital reserves simultaneously as they increased their degree of geographic diversifica-
tion?
3. Finally, is greater bank stability due to portfolio diversification or due to pre-crisis
exposure to banking competition? What are the relative magnitudes of the two effects
to one another?
These questions are policy relevant to bank regulators who are currently in the pro-
cess of creating new regulation that aim at insulating bank portfolios from macroeconomic
shocks; they receive added urgency as the great majority of recent bank failures were due
to local economic fundamentals in local real estate and labor markets. Further, the find-
ings contribute to the literature that investigate whether banking competition increases or
decreases bank stability during a crisis and makes a contribution by introducing a novel
measure of portfolio diversification that incorporates the volatility and correlations between
local business cycles in the economic areas where banks keep their loan and mortgage port-
folios.
In regard to the first question, I find that bank failures during the 2008-2011 U.S. bank-
ing crisis exhibit statistically significant geographical clustering and that banks that failed
were located within counties that were particularly hard hit in their real estate and labor
markets. This confirms that the large majority of bank failures between 2008-2011 occurred
not due to contagion or systemic risk but due to credit risk in banks’ local mortgage and
loan portfolios. Local economic fundamentals thus still matter for banks, giving credence
to the rationale that banks ought to geographically diversify to reduce their exposure to
local economic shocks.
Turning to the second question, theory predicts that greater geographic diversification
allows banks to mitigate potentially adverse effects from local business cycles in real es-
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tate and labor markets. Several empirical studies however raise doubts that bank stability
increases with geographic diversification, suggesting instead that banks reduce capital re-
serves and increase credit risk as they diversify geographically, and thus becoming more
likely to fail during a crisis (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Carlson, 2004). I therefore investi-
gate first if U.S. banks reduced their capital reserve ratios as they diversified geographically
pre-crisis, and second whether greater geographic diversification increased bank stability
during the banking crisis. I find strong evidence for both cases. As the average bank
increases its number of branches (or, alternatively, the number of counties it is represented
in) its risk-adjusted capital ratio declines significantly. In 2006, the average unit bank had
a three times higher risk-adjusted capital reserve ratio (34.8%) than the average bank that
had more than 50 branches spread across more than 10 counties (11.8%). The decline
in capital reserves is significant and robust to using different measures of geographic di-
versification and across several regression specifications using bank fixed effects and first
differences while controlling for a large set of bank characteristics, state and year fixed
effects.
I further find evidence on the extensive margin that greater geographic diversification
(as measured by the log number of branches) prior to the banking crisis decreased the prob-
ability of bank failure and increased the probability of bank survival (i.e., neither failed
nor were acquired). Furthermore, among those banks that did fail or did not survive (the
intensive margin), a larger number of branches is correlated with longer survival. I find
similar results for measures of earnings volatility and bank z -Scores. While those findings
are consistent with previous results from the Great Depression and the Savings and Loan
crisis, it is not clear whether this increase in bank stability is due to greater banking com-
petition (which forced inefficient banks to exit earlier) or due to a portfolio diversification
effect. I therefore use two exogenous sources of variation to disentangle both effects: (1)
bilateral state restrictions on interstate banking between 1997 and 2005 (post Riegle-Neal;
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inversely weighted by distance) to instrument for the amount of out-of-state competition
a bank was exposed to in the 10 years prior to the start of the crisis, and (2) topographic
variation and the availability of distinct local business cycles nearby bank headquarters
that impact the potential for portfolio diversification nearby as an instrument for actual
portfolio diversification. I find that both banking competition and portfolio diversification
are positively related to bank stability, reducing the probability of failure (while controlling
for other bank characteristics including capital reserve ratios) by 5.8% per standard devia-
tion of portfolio diversification and by 1.6% per standard deviation increase in out-of-state
banking competition. These are very large effects given an unconditional probability of
failure during 2008-2011 of 5.2%. The results are confirmed with alternative bank distress
measures, namely (1) the minimum capital reserve ratio a bank attained between 2008-
2011 as a measure as to how close a bank came to failing, (2) the length of survival during
crisis for non-surviving banks, (3) the standard deviation of return on assets as a measure
of earnings volatility, and (4) the proportions of noncurrent loans relative to total assets
and total loans. Per standard deviation of portfolio diversification, minimum capital re-
serve ratios during the crisis are on average higher by 23-71 basis points and the length of
survival among non-survivors increases by 79-151 days. While pre-crisis competition does
not significantly affect minimal capital reserve ratios, it does increase the length of survival
of non-survivors by 33 to 57 days per standard deviation of openness to competition.
Overall, the results suggest that both portfolio diversification and banking competition
were beneficial to bank stability during the recent U.S. banking crisis. Further, the con-
tribution from portfolio diversification to bank stability seems to be at least as high, but
probably significantly larger than the contribution from banking competition. With just
8.7% of U.S. banks having branch networks that cross state lines, this calls for renewed
attention of banking regulators towards branching restrictions, branching decisions and
portfolio diversification.
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4.0 SUMMARY
The U.S. financial and banking crisis forcefully illustrated that also advanced economies
with strong institutions are vulnerable to financial turmoil and the massive wealth destruc-
tion that comes with it. This dissertation contributes to the growing body of research that
analyzes how new financial and banking regulation can strengthen the overall economic
system.
In chapter (2) I analyze the effects from shareholder empowerment via enhanced proxy
access as it was mandated by U.S. Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
and introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The analysis finds that the
concern that proxy access may destroy rather than create shareholder wealth was largely
unfounded; on the other hand, I however also find that there were only few firms that
experienced significant shareholder wealth increases. These sobering results suggest that
the benefits from proxy access – at least in the form as prescribed by the SEC – are rather
limited.
In chapter (3) I then analyze the degree to which geographic portfolio diversification
and banking competition were beneficial to bank stability during the recent U.S. banking
crisis. The crisis provides a unique environment in which a large set of banks failed or
ceased to exist within a short time period thereby providing sufficient statistical varia-
tion to address these questions. The analysis makes use of exogenous cross-sectional and
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time-series variation in states’ branching restrictions, the degree of county business cycle
integration, and topographic variation due to oceans and international borders that limited
the potential to diversify. I find that both banking competition and geographic portfolio
diversification significantly reduced the failure probability of banks thereby providing a
policy rationale to reduce the financial fragmentation of U.S. banking markets, to promote
banking competition, and a greater degree of portfolio diversification.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF SPECIAL-INTEREST INVESTORS
ALASKA RETIREMENT MANAGEMENT BOARD NJ STATE EMPLOYEES DEFERRED
ALLSTATE PENSION PLAN COMPENSATION PLAN
ALLSTATE RETIREMENT PLAN ONTARIO TEACHERS PENSION PLAN BOARD
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP INC RETIREMENT OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND
& SAVINGS PLAN PENSIONFUND DSM NETHERLANDS
AMICA PENSION FUND BOARD OF TRUSTEES PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION
APG ALL PENSIONS GROUP OF COLORADO
BEDRIJFSTAKPENSIOENFONDS VOOR DE MEDIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF
PNO OHIO
BRITISH COLUMBIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SAVINGS PLAN & PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION INV.BOARD
CORP SHELTER INS PROFIT SHARING
CAISSE DE DEPOT ET PLACEMENT DU QUEBEC SHELTER INS RETIREMENT PLAN
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF FLORIDA
SYSTEM RETIREMENT SYSTEM
CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMON PENSION FUND A
SYSTEM STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMON PENSION FUND B
CANADA PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT BOARD STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMON PENSION FUND D
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMON PENSION FUND E
SCHOOL EMPLS RETRMT SYS STATE OF WISCONSIN INVESTMENT BOARD
COORDINATING INVESTMENT FIDUCIARY OF STATE TREASURER STATE OF MICHIGAN
RAYTHEON CO EMPLOYEE BE STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OHIO
ELCA BOARD OF PENSIONS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS TEACHERS ADVISORS INC
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE TEACHERS INSURANCE & ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE OF ALBERTA OF AMERICA
IBM RETIREMENT FUND TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE
NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE OF KENTUCKY
ASSOCIATION TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND
NEW JERSEY BETTER EDUCATIONAL SAVINGS TIAA CREF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LLC
TRUST TIAA CREF TRUST CO FSB/MO
NEW MEXICO EDUCATIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND UNITED STATES STEEL & CARNEGIE PENSION FD
NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT UNITRIN, INC. MASTER RETIREMENT TRUST
SYSTEM VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ET AL
WASHINGTON STATE INVESTMENT BOARD
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APPENDIX B
INTERSTATE BRANCHING AND STATE RESTRICTIONS
State-level interstate branching/banking restrictions pre and post the 1994 Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (effective 1997).† indicates that reciprocity
is required to have more lenient regulations apply. Interstate banking pre-1997 (column
1) indicates the first year in which a state entered an agreement with another state to
allowed out-of-state banks to acquire in-state banks (the acquiring bank could however not
consolidate banking operations but had to run the target as an independent institution).
More information on the data in section 4.1.5 and on the construction of competition-
related measures in 5.4. Data sources: Johnson and Rice (2008) and Kroszner and Strahan
(1999).
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Table B1: State Interstate Branching and Banking Restrictions
Pre-1997 1997-2005
Interstate Ban- Date for de novo Minimum Age to Part-acquisition Deposit cap for
State king Permitted Effectiveness branching be acquirable permitted acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AK 1982 1/1/1994 No 3 Yes 50
AL 1987 5/31/1997 No 5 No 30
AR 1989 6/1/1997 No 5 No 25
AZ 1986 8/31/2001 No 5† Yes† 30
CA 1987 9/28/1995 No 5 No 30
CO 1988 6/1/1997 No 5 No 25
CT 1983 6/27/1995 Yes† 5 Yes† 30
DC 1985 6/13/1996 Yes 0 Yes 30
DE 1988 9/29/1995 No 5 No 30
FL 1985 6/1/1997 No 3 No 30
GA 1985 5/10/2002 No 3 No 30
HI - 1/1/2001 Yes 0 Yes 30
IA 1991 4/4/1996 No 5 No 15
ID 1985 9/29/1995 No† 5† No† 100†
IL 1986 8/20/2004 Yes† 5† Yes† 30†
IN 1986 7/1/1998 Yes 5 Yes 30
KS 1992 9/29/1995 No 5 No 15
KY 1984 3/22/2004 No 0 No 15
LA 1987 6/1/1997 No 5 No 30
MA 1983 8/2/1996 Yes† 3† Yes† 30
MD 1985 9/29/1995 Yes 0 Yes 30
ME 1978 1/1/1997 Yes† 0 Yes† 30
MI 1986 11/29/1995 Yes† 0 Yes† 100
MN 1986 6/1/1997 No 5 No 30
MO 1986 9/29/1995 No 5 No 13
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(Appendix 3 continued)
Pre-1997 1997-2005
Interstate Ban- Date for de novo Minimum Age to Part-acquisition Deposit cap for
State king Permitted Effectiveness branching be acquirable permitted acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MS 1988 6/1/1997 No 5 No 25
MT 1993 3/13/2001 No 5 No 22
NC 1985 7/1/1995 Yes 0† Yes† 30
ND 1991 8/1/2003 Yes 0† Yes† 25
NE 1990 5/31/1997 No 5 No 14
NH 1987 1/1/2002 Yes 0† Yes† 30
NJ 1986 4/17/1996 No 0 Yes 30
NM 1989 6/1/1996 No 5 No 40
NV 1985 9/29/1995 No 5 No 30
NY 1982 6/1/1997 No 5 Yes 30
OH 1985 5/21/1997 Yes 0 Yes 30
OK 1987 5/17/2000 Yes 0† Yes† 20
OR 1986 7/1/1997 No 3 No 30
PA 1986 7/6/1995 Yes 0† Yes† 30
RI 1984 6/20/1995 Yes 0† Yes† 30
SC 1986 7/1/1996 No 5 No 30
SD 1988 3/9/1996 No 5 No 30
TN 1985 3/17/2003 Yes† 3 Yes† 30
TX 1987 9/1/1999 Yes† 0 Yes† 20
UT 1984 4/30/2001 Yes† 5 Yes 30
VA 1985 9/29/1995 Yes† 0 Yes 30
VT 1988 1/1/2001 Yes† 0 Yes 30
WA 1987 5/9/2005 Yes† 5 Yes† 30
WI 1987 5/1/1996 No 5 No 30
WV 1988 5/31/1997 Yes† 0 Yes† 25
WY 1987 5/31/1997 No 3 No 30
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APPENDIX C
GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERING OF BANK FAILURES
The goal is to compute a statistic that represents the degree to which geographic cluster-
ing occurs in a network of geographic points (here, the bank network of 453 banks that
failed between January 2008 and July 2012). Once such a sample statistic is obtained, its
statistical significance is needed.
Step 1: For each of the 453 points in the failed bank network, I count the number of
failed banks in the network within a 200 miles radius and divide that number by 452.
Thus, for each failed bank, I obtain the probability that another randomly chosen bank
from the failed bank network is within 200 miles.1 If geographic clustering in the net-
work was high, we would expect to get high probabilities; if however failed banks were
thinly spread out across the U.S., we would expect to get low probabilities. I then take
the average of the 453 probabilities to arrive at the average probability that a randomly
chosen bank in the network is within 200 miles. I find for the failed bank network an aver-
age probability of 10.005%. Hence, for the average bank in the failed bank network, there
is a 10.005% chance that another randomly chosen failed bank is within 200 miles distance.
1Distances are calculated between bank headquarters’ GPS locations as obtained by the FDIC. The
results are robust to alternative distances such as 50 or 100 miles.
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Step 2: At this point, it is not yet clear whether a probability of 10.005% indeed indi-
cates clustering relative to the population of all banks. After all, the population of all 8,588
U.S. banks that existed as of Jan 1st, 2007 could be themselves geographically clustered.
For that reason, I draw 1,000 random samples of size 453 from the population of all banks
and repeat step 1 for each randomly drawn bank network. The procedure provides the
empirical sampling distribution of the clustering statistic, which has a mean of 6.384% and
a standard deviation of 0.3708% (Chart A.1).
Figure C1: Empirical Sampling Distribution of Geographic Clustering Statistic
The clustering statistic of the failed bank network (10.005%) lies 9.77 standard devia-
tions to the right of the mean and is located in the top percentile of the empirical sampling
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distribution. I therefore conclude that the geographic clustering in the failed bank network
is significantly higher than the average clustering in the general bank population.
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION
Figure D1: Potential Average Portfolio Risk of Banks (50 miles), by U.S. County
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Figure D2: Potential Average Portfolio Risk of Banks (100 miles), by U.S. County
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